[BACK]   [HOME PAGE]

"It is difficult to start over"

A Case Study of Land Access Implications of the proposed Prek Thnot Dam Project in Kampong Speu

Elisabeth Kato

Cambodia Land Study Project

Phnom Penh

March 1999

^{GREAT BRITAIN}

Working for a Fairer World

Many of the issues currently affecting land access in Cambodia are legacies of the recent war and social upheaval: the absence of a rule of law, weak institutions, and poverty. However, now that peace and stability are returning, Cambodia will also begin to face new types of land access issues similar to those that other developing countries face. In particular, as better security and the improving financial climate make it possible for the government to undertake more ambitious development projects, Cambodia will need to consider how to balance the needs of farmers for agricultural and residential land with the need of land for large infrastructure projects such as roads and dams. Without clear guidelines, the rush for development could lead to the dispossession and impoverishment of thousands of vulnerable people. Furthermore, the rate at which public land is currently being privatised, coupled with rapid population growth, will make this balance increasingly difficult to strike in the future.

Dams, more than almost any other type of large infrastructure project, affect people's access to land. On the one hand, the availability of water for irrigation may increase the productivity of land downstream from the dam or make more land available for agriculture. However it is also possible that families living in the irrigation area may be forced to sell their land due to the change in water regime, inability to take advantage of the irrigation because of lack of capital, or speculative pressure. Upstream from the dam, the creation of a reservoir may submerge thousands of houses and fields, destroying the work of generations of farmers. Unless adequate and appropriate compensation is given, displaced families will join the ranks of the landless poor.

The record of compensation to people displaced by dams is not encouraging.¹ Fair compensation can be very expensive and can upset project cost-benefit ratios. Since resettlement has frequently been seen as peripheral to the success or failure of the dam, governments can be tempted to economise on resettlement in order to lower the cost of the entire project. Furthermore, people displaced by dams are frequently politically weak and not in a position to defend their interests. As has been pointed out, dams are not built to submerge urban areas, and ethnic minorities are far more likely to have their lands flooded than are their fellow citizens who belong to the dominant ethnic group.² Because of the negative experiences in the past, international lending institutions have developed extensive guidelines for resettlement, but there is still considerable controversy over whether and how those rules are actually applied.

Because of the civil war and insecurity that shook Cambodia from 1970 through the mid-1990s, Cambodia missed the dam building frenzy that many developing countries went through. At present, there is only one small hydropower station in Cambodia – the Ochum power station in Rattanakiri. However, now that political stability and donor/business confidence are returning, the Royal Government of Cambodia has made clear its intention to intensify the development of Cambodia's hydropower resources. The government has identified 40 sites for hydropower development and is seeking international assistance (both commercial investment and loans, as well as international aid) to develop them.³ Of these, the proposed Prek Thnot dam in Kampong Speu is one of the government's top three priorities.

¹ See Phnom Penh Post, June 5-18, 1998, "The $200 m mountains and rivers of Kampong Speu," p. 20.

² Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams. (London: Zed, 1996), p. 70.

³ Ministry of Environment, Cambodia: National Environmental Action Plan 1998-2002, (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment, 1998) p. 51.

The goal of this case study is to understand the impact of large infrastructure projects on land access by the rural poor in contemporary circumstances of diminished availability of unoccupied land, and to explore options and processes by which their interests can be protected. Prek Thnot was chosen because it raises these issues strongly, and because it is likely (although not certain) to be one of the first projects implemented. By looking at the issues raised by the proposed project and comparing them to the legal and institutional frameworks currently designed for resolving them, this report hopes to identify areas for reform and strategies for advocacy.

This case study is based on a review of studies and articles on the Proposed Prek Thnot project and interviews with government officials in Ministries with responsibility for the project. Information on current conditions in the project site was gathered through interviews with local government officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the area, and through group discussions with villagers in five villages and one wat which will be affected by the reservoir if the dam is built. Because initial discussions with NGO workers and local government officials suggested that the land ownership situation in the potential irrigation areas has not changed dramatically over the past 10 years in terms of economy and land ownership, the downstream areas were not visited. The issues and concerns raised during the field visits were then compared with existing legal and institutional frameworks relating to impact assessment and compensation. A bibliography and list of people interviewed is attached as Appendices 5 and 6.

This research would not have been possible without support from Oxfam America, and advice and logistical support from MAG and LWS in Kampong Speu. In particular we would like to thank Sophal for organising information and logistics, Kim San and Sam Oeun for introducing us to the villages where they worked, and the villagers who took time to meet with us and share their thoughts and concerns. Finally, we would like to give credit to the two student volunteers, Hok Sensamphea and Hor Bunreth, who participated in the fieldwork and helped analyse the information collected during village interviews.

The proposed Prek Thnot dam project is located on the Prek Thnot River in Kampong Speu, about 70 kilometres west of Phnom Penh. The goal of the project is to provide flood control, water for irrigation, and power generation. The project (as currently planned) consists of a 10.3 kilometre long dam linking several small mountains, a power station, and an extensive system of irrigation canals stretching east from Kampong Speu town across Kandal Steung. Construction of the Prek Thnot Dam project began in 1969, but was suspended due to deteriorating security in 1973. The Khmer Rouge extended some of the unfinished channels, but their poor grasp of engineering caused more unintended disruption to water flow and fish migration than benefit. By the end of the 1980s, the few structures that had been built (a small part of the dam, the Roleng Chrey diversion weir, and the left-hand canal head regulator) had fallen into disrepair. [A map of the project is included in Appendix 2]

Between 1988 and 1991, Australian Catholic Relief (ACR) organised a number of studies to determine the feasibility of reviving the dam project. The cost of whole reappraisal was $1.1 million and took 2.5 years to complete. The reappraisal included four separate studies, which were carried out by different engineering companies.

1. Power Development study by SwedPower (Sweden)
2. Reappraisal of civil works by the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (Australia)
3. Reappraisal of plant and equipment for power station by a consortium of Japanese contractors (Japan)
4. Irrigation Reappraisal by Euroconsult (the Netherlands)

Although unable to include a detailed study of environmental and socio-economic effects because of security, the reappraisal report concluded that the project was worthwhile as a means to increase food production (electricity was considered a secondary concern), with an internal rate of return of 18% and an economic rate of return about 10%. However the report recommended that the project be divided into stages.

1. The development of 4,200 hectares of irrigation for double cropping using the Prek Thnot River, without a storage dam.
2. If subsequent environmental studies concurred, the construction of the dam and power station and further irrigation canals to irrigate up to 34,000 hectares and produce 44.8 GW/year (if irrigation is given priority) or 27,500 hectares and 45.2 GW/year (if power is given priority).

The total cost of the project was estimated at US$ 188 - 212 million, depending on which irrigation option was chosen. However since the estimation was made in 1991, it can be anticipated that the cost in 1999 dollars will be considerably higher. Despite the high cost of the project (financial and social), there does not seem to be any evidence that alternative methods of providing irrigation and flood control were ever explored.

The three main benefits that the Prek Thnot dam is expected to provide are

• flood control
• irrigation
• electricity

A secondary benefit is that the reservoir could be used as a fishery.

In addition to these benefits described in the 1991 and 1994 reports, government officials frequently claim that the dam will yield additional benefits such as:

• ecotourism
• transportation
• reforestation
• reduction in rural-urban migration.

In 1991 the Prek Thnot River flooded and caused more than $1 million in damage. A second flood in 1996 caused much less damage partly because the volume of water was less and partly because people were better prepared.⁴ While prevention of further floods is a worthy goal, it also needs to be noted that it would take around 100 floods of the size of the 1991 flood to equal the cost of the dam.

⁴ Author's interview with District Chief of Samrong Tong.

2.1.2 Irrigation

The 1966 project was designed to provide irrigation for 70,000 hectares of land, using water from both the reservoir and from other rivers. The more recent 1991 study designed a project that would only use water from the reservoir and calculated that 27,500 hectares of suitable land or 34,000 hectares maximum could be irrigated using this water source. Interestingly, the 1994 Nippon Koei report and many government officials to this day continue to use the 1966 figure of 70,000 hectares for irrigation, while using the 1991 report figures for project cost.

Since the entire target area is already settled and farmed, the goal of increased water availability is not to bring new land into production, but rather to stabilise rainy season crops and make dry season rice possible, increasing the number of crops from one to two per year. The land close to the river is reported to be some of the best rice land in the province, so double cropping is a reasonable goal. However, the most recent study was done between 1989 and 1991, so it is reasonable to expect that irrigation needs have changed over the past 10 years. Because the irrigation target area has good land and is close to Phnom Penh, it has been the focus of considerable small-scale irrigation development by both government and NGOs. For example, World Vision staff said that in 1997, the Cambodian government built a weir at the cost of $1 million so that farmers in their project area could do dry season rice. This being the case, it is quite possible that the increase in production which could be brought about through double cropping is considerably less now than it was in 1991, and that the benefits of the proposed irrigation scheme are accordingly diminished.

According to the 1991 report, the power station attached to the dam could produce between 44.8 GW/year and 45.2 GW/year, depending on which irrigation option is chosen. While the location of the dam is certainly excellent (close to both the factories sprouting along Highway 4 and Phnom Penh), its output is much less than many other proposed dams in Cambodia. For example, the Se San and Sre Pok hydropower projects would produce 3-5,000 GW/year, primarily for export. The actual profitability of power generation will depend on future demand and competition from other sources of energy.

At the time the 1994 study was done, Kampong Speu was a net importer of fish, due to in part to a decline in local fish populations due to over-fishing, destruction of habitat, and irrigation structures at Tonle Bati, Tuk Thla and Kampong Tuol that hamper migration and reproduction. This suggests that the use of the reservoir as a fishery could help improve the local economy and diet. However that benefit would depend on the resource being sustainably managed, something which has not been achieved elsewhere in Cambodia. The 1991 report recommends promoting community fishing over commercial fishing, with development assistance in order to maximise the number of local families that can benefit, but again, this has not yet been achieved elsewhere.

Government officials, particularly Minister of Public Works Khy Taing Lim, claim that the reservoir can be developed for ecotourism. However the 1994 study specifically states that potential for tourism would be limited due to the annual draw down and lack of attractions such as shoreline vegetation, islands, or wildlife.⁵ Possibly local people might come to picnic along the edge of the reservoir and generate some income for vendors.

⁵ Nippon Koei Co. Ltd., "Prek Thnot Multipurpose Project: Environmental Study Report." (Phnom Penh: Nippon Koei Co. Ltd., 1994), p. 24.

2.1.6 Transportation

Another claim is that the more stable flow of the river could be used for transportation between Kampong Speu and Phnom Penh. This may be possible, but no studies have been done that demonstrate the likely traffic flows.

Some government officials claim that water from the reservoir can be used to re-afforest the hills. However since the water would have to pumped uphill at considerable cost, and since flooding the reservoir and resettling people higher up the slopes will increase the pressure on the forests, it is unlikely that the net benefit would be positive. More research would need to be done on this point.

This assertion depends on the assumption that the cheap electricity from the dam will increase investment above what it would otherwise have been, and that the new businesses thus generated will employ significant numbers of local people. However this scenario needs to be balanced against the possibility that if resettlement and downstream effects are not well managed, any decrease in migration due to investment could be offset through and increase in migration by local people who have lost their land and have no where to go but Phnom Penh.

Although not mentioned in any of the studies, national pride and "development" inevitably surface in discussions with government officials. For example, the District Chief of Oral said that villagers wouldn't mind moving because they would be proud to have such "development" in their part of the country (the same villagers had told the research team the previous day that they would really prefer that the government not build the dam). Several officials pointed out that all the other Mekong countries have dams and only Cambodia does not. The Under-Secretary of State for Water Resources expressed frustration that the ADB and the World Bank now seem to interested only in small dam projects, with which "Cambodia cannot develop in 100 years." However, it would be a pity if poor villagers lose their homes and fields and future generations of Cambodians are forced into debt just for national pride.

In summary, the proposed Prek Thnot dam project does hold out the promise of some benefits, which may appear even more appealing in a poor province such as Kampong Speu. However, the most recent data on the primary benefits are ten years old. Furthermore, a number of spurious claims are also being made without proper evidence or analysis. A thorough and professional re-calculation of the projected benefits of the project, based on current information, must be made before any commitment is given to this project.

No proper environmental impact assessment of the proposed Prek Thnot dam has ever been done. In the 1960s, such things were not considered necessary. The 1991 report was not able to do a proper study because of security, and instead recommended an additional six-month study to fill the gap. The subsequent 1994 Nippon Koei "Environment Study" in fact spent less than one month collecting data in the field and does not appear to have added much new knowledge of the situation.⁶ The same can be said of the later papers on the dam, which for the most part simply review information from the first two reports.

⁶ According to the preface to the report, the collection of data and a field survey were carried out from April 20 to June 14, 1994.

Despite the lack of proper field research, all of the reports do discuss potential impacts. The general consensus is that the impact on mineral resources, archaeology, history, culture, and ethnic minority groups will be minimal. There is some disagreement on the impact on forestry and wildlife. On the one hand, the area that would be flooded by the reservoir is already logged out and probably contains relatively little wildlife of interest. On the other hand, resettling thousands of people higher up in the watershed will affect forest and wildlife there, and some reports assert that these areas have not been properly studied yet.⁷ It is probable that the fish population downstream will decline due to disruption of migration patterns, although it is already declining to other factors. Similarly, the reservoir is likely to promote the spread of malaria, but malaria is already prevalent in the region.

Despite disagreements over the degree of different impacts, all reports agree that the biggest environmental impact from the Prek Thnot dam will be the displacement of the large number of people living in the proposed reservoir area, and that the costs of adequate compensation will be considerable.

⁷ According to one study, there are still some wildlife of conservation interest, such as elephants, in the watershed area. See "Preliminary Review of the Environmental Implications of the Prek Thnot Hydro Electricity Development Project," (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment, October 1996), p.8.

The Cambodian government has made the proposed Prek Thnot Hydroproject one of the three top government priority projects for Cambodia since at least 1996. This year the government put Prek Thnot on its list of requests for the Consultative Group meeting in Tokyo, and there are rumours that the Japanese government has already agreed to loan $100 million.⁸ The government also claims to be looking for private financing, but it is not clear whether any private investors would want to put money into such a risky project with relatively little prospect of commercial profits.⁹

⁸The Japanese government's interest appears to be based on Japan's position as original funder of the project in the 1960s and current largest donor to Cambodia. Maeda, the Japanese engineering firm that began building the dam in the 1960s, is known to be eager to complete the project. Phnom Penh Post, op.cit. p. 20.

⁹ Prek Thnot would produce little electricity compared to other proposed dams, and all of it would be for the domestic market. It is also doubtful whether the additional irrigation development would be able to generate more than operating costs, according to Ea Piseth, Chief of Hydrology for Kampong Speu Province. The irrigation might raise standards of living and (in the long run) taxes, but most investors would probably prefer higher and quicker returns for their investment. Author's interview.

3. Impact on land access

3.1 Impact in the reservoir area

It is difficult to estimate the exact number of people who will be displaced by the dam. Until the Khmer Rouge defections at the end of 1996, the population could not be accurately counted because much of the area was unsafe. Since then, there has been considerable population movement both in and out of the proposed reservoir area as internally displaced people have moved from camps back to villages located within the proposed reservoir, or have left villages within the proposed reservoir to return to their homes elsewhere. Migrants have arrived from other parts of the province seeking better economic opportunities, and the birth rate has been and continues to be high [see Appendix 3 for a map of the proposed reservoir].¹⁰

¹⁰ The District Chief of Phnom Srouch claimed that people have been migrating into the affected districts, especially O commune. The District Chiefs of Oral and Samrong Tong said that the primary cause of population growth in those two provinces was the high birth rate. Author's interview.

Using population statistics gathered by the commune offices, the 1994 Nippon Koei report estimated that 17,700 people in 43 villages would be displaced if the dam were built at that time. Some villages would lose only rice land, while others will be completely submerged. Phnom Srouch would be the most heavily affected (5 communes, 33 villages), followed by Oral (2 communes, 9 villages), and Samrong Tong (1 commune, 1 village). If the population figures for each of these villages are updated, using current LWS population data and information from District Chiefs in Oral and Samrong Tong, approximately 17,600 people (3,491 families) will be affected by the dam.

However 17,600 may be an overestimation. LWS staff in Kampong Speu have plotted the current location of villages in the communes where they are working against the 60 meter contour line, and found that the reservoir would only submerge 25 villages in Hong Samnam, Tang Samrong, Kraing Devay, and Tang Sya communes, compared to 30 villages listed in the Nippon Koei report. This number, added to the Nippon Koei population statistics for villages in O and Prey Rumdoul communes (where LWS is not working), gives a revised estimate of 15,200 people or 2,967 families that would have to be resettled. Whichever estimate is accurate, the population will continue to increase in the future due to the high birth rate and in-migration.

The amount of occupied land that will be submerged is also difficult to estimate. The reservoir will submerge around 22,000 hectares, but not all of that land is claimed as private property. The 1994 Nippon Koei report estimated that families living in the reservoir area had an average of 3.6 hectares (rice land, garden land, and house land) per family, and that a total of 10,566 hectares that would be lost if the dam were built. This accords with the claim made by people in the five villages visited by the Oxfam research team that each family had three to four hectares of rice and garden land However LWS baseline statistics suggest that the average land holding is 1.94 hectares. The District Chief in Oral also asserted that families in the affected villages in Hong Samnam have at most 1.5 hectares of rice land – if they are farming 3 or 4 hectares, why don't they have enough to eat?

The disagreement over the size of average land holdings seems to have three sources. First of all, a natural tendency of villagers to exaggerate their holdings in the hopes of increasing compensation. Second, NGO staff suggested that (in the case of the Nippon Koei estimates) local officials may have exaggerated the land holdings of villagers in hopes of confiscating the difference when compensation is paid. Third, villagers often refer to "tail fields" -- forest land in back of their fields which they hope to clear in the future – as "their land." Although there is no legal basis for laying a claim to forest land which has not yet begun to be cleared, the custom appears to be wide spread and the research team was frequently told that all the forest land near a village "already had owners." The issue of how to evaluate claimed but uncleared land will need to be dealt with as part of assessing a fair and just compensation.

In addition to the issue of tail land, there is the broader question of compensation for forestland. Although legally villagers may have no claim to the forestland, they do derive important benefits from it. Villagers currently cannot support themselves by farming alone, but depend heavily on logs and charcoal for extra income, as well as forest foods in times of crop failures. If this dependency is not taken into account during compensation and resettlement, either standards of living in the resettled areas will fall, or the resettled communities will maintain their standards of living by cutting the remaining forest higher up in the mountains. This would cause deforestation and erosion, which would (among other things) shorten the life of the reservoir.

The reservoir area is primarily parched scrub criss-crossed by dirt ox-cart tracks linking the villages huddled along the three rivers that drain the watershed. The road to Hong Samnam commune is at times only two tire tracks through the jungle. All past surveys or field visits – 1991 (ACR), 1994 (Nippon Koei), 1996 (Ministry of Environment), and this study – give a consistent picture of the people who would be resettled if the dam were built: subsistence farmers, growing rain-fed rice once a year, planting garden crops (potatoes, melons, corn), raising animals, making charcoal, and travelling to the remaining forests to cut trees to sell for timber. They have very little education and no crafts or other skills besides agriculture. In the villages that the Oxfam research team visited, melons, corn), raising animals, making charcoal, and travelling to the remaining forests to cut trees to sell for timber. They have very little education and no crafts or other skills besides agriculture. In the villages that the Oxfam research team visited, people said that their main problem is water – both for drinking and for growing crops. In the past two years, they were short of food because of drought, but this year the situation is a bit better because there has been enough rain. In addition, health (especially malaria) was raised as a problem in Oral. Although villagers did not describe the disappearing forests as a problem, it will undoubtedly affect their ability to earn a living in the future.

Villagers and LWS staff confirmed that villagers do not have land use certificates or even receipts. LWS staff estimated that current land prices within the reservoir area are between $80 - 200 because the land is not titled. People interviewed in the villages said they didn't know the price of land because no one bought or sold land in their village. People acquire land by clearing it, or simply laying claim to it. Despite this undocumented state of affairs, there do not appear to be many conflicts over land inside the reservoir area, most likely because the land has so little value. However outside the reservoir, where LWS has put in roads and MAG has done demining, there have been a number of cases of military seizing land that has been distributed to civilians.¹¹

¹¹So far, MAG staff say that they have been able to get the land returned to its rightful owners.

3.1.4 Concerns about the dam

At the beginning of group discussions in the villages and wat visited by the research team, people denied having heard about the dam. However, as discussion went on, some people remembered about the dam from the 1960s, the survey in 1994, or from what LWS had told them. However no one had heard anything recently, except from LWS. People's main reaction was worry about what would happen to them if they had to move. Villagers living close to the edge of the area that would be flooded (Oral and Samrong Tong) were somewhat less frightened about moving, perhaps because they had some ideas about places nearby where they could go. However the villagers in Kraing Thom, whose village lies deep in the reservoir area were very distressed and had no idea where they could move to because everything they know will be under water.

Despite differing levels of anxiety, people's concerns about the dam were consistent across districts. First, they worried about whether they would be able to find rice land as good as the rice land they would have to give up. "If we leave this village we have no hope because there is no rice land elsewhere," said one woman in Kraing Thom. Most of the villages are situated along rivers where the best soil is, and the only available land that people know of is forestland higher up on the mountains. Some people also worried that they wouldn't get as much land as they gave up, for example getting only one piece of land in the new village when they had owned two pieces of land in the old village.

A second major concern was the cost and effort of clearing new land and starting over. Villagers in Samrong Tong and Phnom Srouch were especially frightened by the hard labour and danger involved in clearing mountain forest. Villagers stressed that older people and female-headed households would find it very difficult to clear new land and that some might even die in the attempt. Even if the government cut the trees, levelled the hills, and prepared the land for them, it would take a lot of work to make the new village as comfortable as they and their ancestors have been able to make their current villages. Reflecting on the prospect, one older man in Kraing Thom said he didn't think he had enough energy -- "It's difficult to start over."

Other concerns were malaria and being sent somewhere far away without schools, clinics, roads, or markets. These concerns were expressed most strongly by people in Phnom Srouch and Samrong Tong who are somewhat better off and do not live in malarial areas. "If they don't build the dam, we will be very grateful," said one man, and got a murmur of support from the group. However even people in Kraing Tava (Oral), who only returned to their village two years ago and are confident they can resettle by moving a few kilometres up slope, were not happy about the idea of moving. "It's best if the government does not build the dam," was one comment.

Despite a stated preference for not having to move, villagers also said they would be willing to move if they were given adequate compensation. When asked what they considered "adequate compensation," all the discussion groups started by saying that it was up to Angkar Leu (the higher organisation, i.e. the government – also the term used by the Khmer Rouge for the own regime). One older man in Kraing Tava added, "The people won't dare to complain even if they lose everything. If the government wants to do this, they will do it and the people won't dare complain." However, as the discussion went on, participants became more confident in expressing their views and by the end several had become quite militant and said they would protest if compensation was not adequate or if they lost too much land in the transition.

Villagers defined the most important part of fair compensation as provision of rice land of equal quantity and quality. When the research team asked what people thought about receiving cash compensation, people in all villages replied that money was not as good as land, because cultivated land like they have now might be very expensive elsewhere and buying land is difficult. When asked whether people could take cash and find some other occupation, villagers answered that the only thing they know how to do is rice, so therefore what they need is rice land. Since the only land likely to be available is forest land, this means that the government should either pay them for the cost of preparing the new land (and provide the necessary tools to each family, plus special assistance for older people and female headed households) – or even better, the government should prepare the land in advance using tractors and other machinery, and build houses and other buildings in advance of resettlement. People in Kraing Tava suggested that representatives of the government and the villagers could work together to supervise the preparation and construction. People also wanted the government to give compensation for improvements to the land, such as fruit trees, since labour is only thing they have to invest and they have invested a lot of labour in their current land. Another point, which was stressed primarily by women, was the need for infrastructure and services such as roads, schools, clinics, and markets. Although not insisting on it, several people said that money to help during the transition would be welcome.

In summary, compensation and resettlement does appear to be possible. While nobody wants to move and some people said they would be sad to leave the villages that their ancestors built, most people's concerns focused on the practical aspects of adequate compensation. The villagers' conception of compensation is very modest – perhaps too modest. For example, Concern and LWS (two organisations with considerable experience with resettlement) both told the research team that transition support is not an optional part of resettlement but a necessary one for at least one and probably two years, if people are to successfully establish themselves in a new place.¹² This is more than any of the villagers claimed during interviews. A great deal of in-depth discussion (not surveys) with villagers would be necessary to help them clarify what they will need to rebuild their lives and to feel comfortable and confident to express their ideas.

¹² Transition support is financial assistance during the time that old livelihoods have been disrupted and new livelihoods in resettlement sites have not yet been established.

3.2 Proposed compensation measures

As evidence has mounted of the disastrous consequences of large dams for the people they displace, multilateral lending institutions have developed resettlement guidelines to try to mitigate the worst consequences of displacement. Although implementation of the guidelines still frequently falls short, they do provide basic standards. Table 1 summarises the ADB guidelines as an example.

Both the 1991 Reappraisal Report and the 1994 Nippon Koei Report both contain brief proposals for the resettlement of people displaced by the who would be displaced by the proposed Prek Thnot dam. Both fail to meet the first two ADB resettlement principles, since there is no evidence that any attempt has been made to avoid displacement or to minimise the number of people displaced. Principle 8 also seems to be ignored in most discussions of the project, which use the 1991 figures for the cost of the project and fail to note that the 1994 compensation and resettlement plan would add another $35 million to the total cost.

The 1991 report estimates that each family that would need to be resettled has 0.9 hectares of land and suggests that resettlement should include compensation for the land, rebuilding of infrastructure, development of water sources and irrigation structures, some medical treatment, and extension and support services for a three-year relocation adjustment period. The cost of resettlement is estimated to be $9.1 million for 2,300 families. Although the plan does have some good features – particularly budgeting for building water sources and irrigation structures to make the resettlement land useable, and a three year period for transition support – it is too brief and out-of-date to be of immediate use.

The 1994 Nippon Koei report (which makes no reference to the earlier 1991 plan) presents a somewhat more detailed resettlement plan. Referring World Bank and Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund guidelines, the report proposes the following resettlement principles:

• to take a land for land approach instead of a money for land approach
• not to change the people's occupation unless they are willing to change
• to set up resettlement sites suitable for rice cultivation in the vicinity of the reservoir
• to give displaced people options to select a resettlement sit preferred by them
• to pay compensation amount with proper counselling for promotion of smooth resettlement of the displaced people; and
• to consider the impacts on the second generation.

While the principle of "land for land" is appropriate to both past resettlement experience and the ideas of the villagers to be resettled, the 1994 plan fails to live up to its own principles almost immediately by estimating that people in the reservoir have about 10,360 hectares of private land, and then identifying three resettlement sites with a total of 9,000 hectares of admittedly poorer quality land.¹³ After saying that each family owns an average of 3.6 hectares, the report goes on to evaluate the resettlement sites based on how much land (1.2 - 2 hectares) would be sufficient to support a family and therefore how many families could be resettled there.¹⁴ This appears to contradict the stated principle of land for land, and the discrepancy is not explained. How impacts on the second generation will be mitigated is not discussed at any point after the statement of principles.

The 1994 resettlement budget also includes provision of roads, drinking water supply, drainage and garbage disposal systems, and an electrification distribution system. While roads and drinking water are certainly necessary, the inclusion of drainage and garbage disposal systems for villages in the mountains of rural Cambodia is a rather novel idea and probably one that has not occurred to the villagers they are intended for. At a cost of $173,000, latrines and training in composting techniques might be more appropriate, although less profitable for the contracting company. There is also some question as to whether resettled people would be able to afford the electricity thoughtfully made available to them at a cost of $810,000 – although again, it would be quite profitable for the contracting firm. The plan does include mention of the need for a transition support program and social development programs (agricultural assistance, handicrafts, and women associations) but no budget is allocated for them.

In summary, neither of the previously prepared plans provides a good basis for fair compensation or successful resettlement. If the dam were to go ahead, a new process for developing a proper plan, involving professionals with experience in resettlement and using appropriate participatory techniques, would be necessary.

¹³ One government official at Cambodian National Mekong Commission suggested that this didn't matter because the land was irrigated and therefore of better quality – conveniently forgetting that the irrigation target area is more than 30 kilometres to the east of the rim of the reservoir where people would be resettled and already has owners. Author's interview.

3.2.2 Availability of land for resettlement

The availability of land in Kampong Speu has changed dramatically since the 1991 and 1994 studies. Up until the defection of the Khmer Rouge in late 1996, insecurity prevented access to much of the land surrounding the reservoir area. Now that security and road access have improved (particularly since 1997), vast tracts of uncultivated land have been handed over to private owners – primarily by former Khmer Rouge officers, Royal Cambodia Armed Forces officers, high ranking officials from Phnom Penh, and foreign companies with political connections. In some cases, local commanders have staked their own claim to a piece of land that they like, in some cases local officials have brokered the deal, and still other transactions have been arranged by high ranking officials in Phnom Penh without the knowledge of the local government officials. The largest single land transfer which the research team encountered was a plantation concession of 20,000 hectares in Oral and Phnom Srouch districts which were recently granted to a mainland Chinese company by Hun Sen.¹⁵ These transactions do not appear to be connected to the dam. Rather, now that the region has become safe, it has been opened up to the same pressures affecting the rest of Kampong Speu. However this is no guarantee that speculative pressure (even coercion) won't begin once a decision has made to build the dam.¹⁶

¹⁴ Nippon Koei, op. cit. p. 29-30. The report also failed to note that the Hong Samnam site contained land mines, which raises questions about the quality of information in the report.

¹⁵ Author's interview with the District Chief of Oral.

¹⁶ For example, villagers in Thailand have come under intense pressure from local government officials to sell their land once dams have been approved, and sometimes have been punished for opposition. See "Local Participation and the Kaeng Sua Ten dam controversy" Watershed, March-June 1997, p. 23.

The three sites designated in 1994 (a total of 9,000 hectares) are no longer available for resettlement. Three to four kilometres of land to either side of Road 42 into Oral (formerly designated as the Hong Samnam site) has been claimed by RCAF officers or "people who work in Phnom Penh." Although the research team observed no signs of clearing or development, wooden signs with initials and dimensions have been nailed to trees along Road 42, and both the District Chief of Oral and local community development workers said that the soldiers and others who have claimed the land have proper titles. Although the research team was not able to visit the Tang Samraong or Cambok resettlement sites, NGO workers said that the Tang Samraong site has been settled by ex-Khmer Rouge, and that the Cambok site also appears to be occupied – with 500 hectares (one-third of the site) owned by Chea Sophara, the Deputy Governor of Phnom Penh.¹⁷

Despite the rate at which land is being privatised, both District Chiefs and villagers in Oral and Phnom Srouch agreed that there is still land available for resettlement further to the interior of both districts. In Oral, both villagers and the District Chief suggested that there is still room between the titled land along Road 42 and the proposed reservoir limit, and that displaced people can simply move north of their current locations. This land is of course less fertile than some of the land along the river which they now farm, is farther from the road, forested, hilly, and malarial, and would require considerable labour to clear and level. The villagers interviewed in Phnom Srouch had no idea where they could go, but the District Chief of Phnom Srouch said that there is still land available (although he was not specific about where). However he also cautioned that while there is land now, there won't be if the project waits for too long. In either case, remaining land will be forested and hilly, and will require a lot of effort (and probably machinery) to clear and level.

In contrast, the District Chief, Deputy District Chief, and Commune Chief and villagers in Samrong Tong said that while house land could be found, all land suitable for rice had been claimed and would have to be bought. The Deputy District Chief commented that there was a lot of land available when the Nippon Koei study was done four years ago, but that now the growing population had made the situation much more difficult. However they also said that not all of the "rice land" which is claimed is being used, and therefore the government would still be able to buy rice land at a cheap price.

¹⁷Author's interviews with LWS, MAG and WFP staff working in the area.

3.2.3 Other support programs

Both the 1991 and the 1994 reports mention the need for additional support programs to mitigate the hardship caused by resettlement, although they do not include budgets for the recommended activities. Such programs include:

• transition support
• a forest management plan for the watershed area, including resettled areas
• land titling
• development of fisheries in the reservoir, managed so as to have benefits accrue to resettled families.

Transition support would be needed for at least a year, probably two, until people are able to support themselves in their new location. Even if the resettlement sites contain adequately prepared land and buildings, families will still incur costs moving from one place to another. Furthermore, intangible assets such as knowledge of the location of forest products or the social networks necessary to petty trade will all have to be built up again from scratch. If the transition support is inadequate, displaced people will not be able to survive in their new location and may migrate to Phnom Penh.

A forestry program would also would be very important to the people being resettled. As noted earlier, the people living in the reservoir area depend on collecting and selling wood and charcoal to supplement their farm income. If outside interests (logging companies and the military) can be controlled, it might be possible to involve resettled communities in a management plan for harvesting forest resources at a sustainable rate. Otherwise, resettlement will simply increase the rate of deforestation, undermine the livelihoods of the resettled community, and shorten the lifetime of the reservoir.

Equally important is a land survey and titling project, which would need to be carried out prior to the resettlement process to secure residents' claims to compensation and then again for the land that has been allocated for resettlement. One of the complicating factors in planning resettlement for the proposed Prek Thnot dam project is that the people who would be displaced do not have land titles, regardless of how long they have lived on their land. In contrast, powerful outsiders with money and connections who have never laid eyes on their piece of property can easily get official land use and occupation rights certificates. NGO staff working in the area a deeply concerned that as soon as it is known whether the dam will be funded, speculators will force local people off their land in order to get a share of whatever compensation money is given out.

The current system (or lack thereof) would also create opportunities and incentives for people with connections to manipulate the resettlement process against the interests of the people being resettled. Furthermore, such a project should not be left solely in the hands of commune and district officials, since they are frequently the ones responsible for arranging sales of land to outsiders. In addition to the danger that outsiders might use the resettlement process to expropriate land, there is also the danger that women could be dispossessed by the resettlement process. For example, if a husband and wife have each brought half a hectare of land to their marriage, but the official in charge of resettlement makes out the title of the resettlement land to the head of the household only, the wife is in effect dispossessed.¹⁸ Alternately, the husband (who is more likely to be literate and have connections with project officials) may arrange for all the household's land to be titled in his name, without his wife's knowledge.¹⁹

While a community fisheries program designed to help people displaced by the dam shared in the benefits, such an initiative would first need to determine whether people are interested. Next, it would require strong intervention to prevent the reservoir being sold to the highest bidder as is the case with most other streams and reservoirs in Cambodia. Canals and pumps allow the resettled people to use the reservoir for agriculture might be of more direct benefit.

¹⁸ The author saw a resettlement program in Nepal where this happened, with disastrous consequences for women's status and access to income.

¹⁹ This phenomenon was documented in Rhodante Ahlers and Sonja Vlaar, Up to the Sky: A Study of Gender Issues in Irrigation in Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: SAWA, February 1995), p.63.

The cost of adequate compensation and resettlement will be high, but more studies and planning are needed to establish a realistic cost. The 1991 estimate of $9.1 million for 2,300 families ($3,957/family) is probably too low, since it assumes only 0.9 hectares of land per family and does not take into consideration the costs of land titling or forest management projects.

In contrast, the 1994 report appears to be generous in terms of overall budget, but the unit prices and some of the items budgeted for illustrate some of the pitfalls of resettlement planning. The 1994 report budgets $45 million for compensation and resettlement, equivalent to more than 20% of the 1991 estimate for project costs. If this figure were ever integrated into the 1991 budget, it would radically change the economic rate of return, but the 1994 report does not discuss this point. The costs are divided into compensation ($15.9 million) and resettlement ($28.9 million). Compensation is included for land owned by local people, houses, and public facilities. This raises a question of why people should be compensated in cash for something that is being given to them in kind as well, since the resettlement budget includes money to clear and prepare land and build houses. In particular, it raises a question of who will receive the estimated $1.2 million dollars of compensation for public buildings, given that the plan also includes a budget for reconstructing those buildings in the new resettlement sites.

If one also considers that the per family estimates of land are rather high (3.6 hectares), and the unit price of clearing and levelling compensation land is almost certainly too high ($1,250 to $1,450/hectare), it is possible to see how much of the "resettlement" budget could be siphoned off and relatively little reach the people displaced by the dam.²⁰ The same point might also be raised about the $973,000 budgeted for drainage, garbage disposal, and electricity distribution systems which would provide employment for construction firms but appear to be of little use to the intended beneficiaries. Since the 1994 plan does not include transition support, compensation for improvements, medical interventions, fishery and forestry programs, land titling, or monitoring it could be described as grossly inadequate despite the large budget.

A final costing of compensation and resettlement will be very much affected by the availability and price of land at that time.²¹ At present, the price of land in the neighbourhood of the reservoir area varies from $80 to $220/hectare for untitled land in the reservoir area, $500 to $700/hectare for titled forest land in Hong Samnam along the Road 42, and up to $1,400/hectare along the road to Kirirom.²² Furthermore, it needs to be repeated that all of the past estimates are in either 1991 dollars or 1994 dollars, which means they will be much more today due to inflation – to say nothing of foreign exchange fluctuations.

With such sums of money involved, donors may find it tempting to try to push compensation and resettlement costs out of the official budget in order to improve the cost-benefit ratio of the project, leaving the Cambodian government to pick up the pieces. However, the likelihood of the government finding the resources necessary to compensate people adequately is slim at the moment. When asked whether the 1994 estimate of $29 million for resettlement affected the feasibility of the dam, one government official replied "We can be flexible about compensation.²³" This kind of response underscores the importance of the question asked by one of the village development committee members in Kraing Tava village – "If the government has money for the dam, but not for resettlement, what will they do?"

²⁰ Nippon Koei, Ltd., op. cit., Tables 3.4.3 to 6. All the unit prices for all three districts were supplied by the Phnom Srouch District office. It is not explained why the relevant district offices were not consulted.

²¹ Ea Piseth, Chief of Hydrology for Kampong Speu Province, expressed particular concern on this point, saying that the current management of land is "anarchic" and makes development very difficult since with all land sold off, the government's options for managing development decrease. He said that if land titling is not brought under control, he is not sure how the government will be able to manage development in the future. Author's interview.

²² Price information from LWS staff, the District Chief of Oral, and people living along the road to Kirirom. People living along the road to Kirirom also said that some of the land now valued at $1,400/hectare had been forcibly (i.e. "sell at this price or we'll take it anyway") bought from local villagers one to two years ago for about at $180/hectare. Author's interview.

²³ Veng Sakhon, Under-secretary of State for Water Resources. Author's interview.

While the strongest impact in terms of land access will be on the people displaced by the reservoir, the people living downstream may also be affected by speculation and the change in water regime.

3.3.1 Population characteristics²⁴

Some of the best land in Kampong Speu and Kandal provinces is located along the Prek Thnot River, but the entire target area also includes less suitable soils. Most of the land in the irrigation target area belongs to villagers who have been living there since land was divided in the 1980s. There are no large plantations or cash crops, nor large tracts of unused land, except along Highway 4. Most of the land along Highway 4 has been bought up by companies or real estate agencies in anticipation of the development of an industrial belt, but this does not appear to be related to the dam and is a small percentage of the total area.

The land access concerns downstream are primarily related to whether poor people will be able to take advantage of the new availability of water, and whether increased land prices will put them at risk of dispossession. The 1991 study makes the point that unless farmers have enough cash, they won't be able to afford the water and other inputs for dry season rice that the dam is supposed to make possible.²⁵ Ea Piseth, Chief of Hydrology for Kampong Speu, also noted that irrigation requires the development of water user groups to be effective. He said that twenty irrigation structures under his management were broken during the 1998-99 season because there were no water users groups and so no one takes care of anything. However the government has not yet been able to mobilise the resources, documents, and expertise needed to set up such groups.

²⁴The information in this section is based on interviews with NGO staff working and living in the irrigation target area and the District Chief of Samrong Tong. The research team did not visit the field directly.

²⁵ Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation, Ltd., Prek Thnot Multipurpose Project: Reappraisal Report, (Phnom Penh: SMEC, December 1991), p. 5-37.

Given what has happened in other parts of the country, it is easy to imagine that the increased availability of water -- especially if it is used of high yielding varieties of rice -- could accelerate the current concentration of land. For example, an NGO worker who is also a long-time resident of the area, says that landlessness and concentration of land has increased significantly since 1991 in many of the villages in Ang Snoul Commune. The immediate cause of sales is usually illness or inadequate income, but outside interventions have also played a role. A few years ago a credit NGO started a program in the area and some villagers who were accepted into program then loaned the money to poorer families who had not been accepted into the program. The poor people fell further and further into debt and ended up selling their land to members of the credit group. Recently, the children of government officials have begun offering money to villagers to pawn land and then (when the loan is not repaid) seizing the land.

A more worrisome scenario is that speculators could target the land. One of the World Vision staff responsible for Kandal Stung said that there have been international (Malaysian and Singaporean) and Cambodian companies coming into the project area to buy land along the road because the area is seen as a future industrial zone. He said that most companies approach a middleman who goes to the commune or village chief and says they need a certain amount of land in certain location, and then the commune and village chiefs encourage the villagers to sell their land to the company at a "reasonable price." The local officials receive a commission from the company for this service, of course.²⁶

One concern which could affect people's income or health, and therefore ability to hold on to land, is the impact on fish populations -- although given the current rate of over-fishing, this may be a moot point). Another concern is the impact of fertilisers and pesticides on aquatic life and water quality – although again, it seems likely that some impact has already occurred.

²⁶ While such fees for brokerage services are common in many countries, the fact that in Cambodia this role is being filled by local officials creates the possibility of conflict of interest and abuse of power.

3.3.2 Currently proposed measures

The 1991 report notes some of these risks and suggests that credit programs and land titling is necessary to help people get the most advantage from the new irrigation potential. The Ministry of Water Resources says they already finance the land titling department to issue land titles before putting in irrigation systems and organising water user groups. These measures, along with water quality monitoring, should help to mitigate the potential negative impacts of the dam downstream, but the question of how much they will cost and who will pay still needs to be considered.

At the time the research for this case study was done, it was not yet clear who would be in charge of implementing the proposed Prek Thnot project if it were to be funded. Several people suggested that responsibility for implementation would be with a committee of Ministries chaired by the CNMC. However other people pointed out that the Cambodian National Mekong Commission (CNMC) has neither the resources nor expertise to handle such a massive project as this. There are indications that the newly formed Ministry of Water Resources would like to take a leading role, but it is still in the process of establishment. Other ministries likely to be involved are the Ministry of Environment (MoE), the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy (MIME), the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Economics and Finance, and the Ministry of Rural Development.

Although the project is not yet funded, lines have already been drawn over Prek Thnot. The MoE staff interviewed were primarily concerned that the environmental and social impact assessment is properly done in a transparent manner and that displaced people are adequately compensated and resettled. Although not opposed to the dam, they are sceptical about the validity of many of the claims that are made for the dam, the likelihood that villagers will be properly compensated, and that their views will be listened to by the rest of the committee. On the other side of the line, most of the staff interviewed from the pro-dam ministries (CNMC, MWR, and MRC) expressed frustration and anger at the MoE, NGOs, and donors for suggesting additional unnecessary studies and causing "obstacles to development." Their position was that dams always have environmental impacts, but other Mekong countries have already dammed the Mekong and it is only Cambodia which is not profiting from the water. One official, waving a copy of the 1966 plan, argued that the dam has already been built and only needs to be repaired, therefore no further studies are needed.

What is of primary concern is that many of the Ministries that could have responsibility for implementing the project have little capacity for – or interest in – issues such as environmental and social impact or public participation. The issue of capacity is a matter of public record. For example, the 1998 National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) states that MIME and MoE have too few staff with the training and experience needed to manage the environment, no budget for equipment or transport and "therefore, both ministries lack the capacity to monitor and enforce environmental provisions.²⁷" A paper written on public participation in Cambodia noted "Cambodia has not experienced public involvement in development project planning and implementation or in conflict resolution. To date, public participation in planning and conflict resolution has not yet been an important part of the government policy."²⁸ While Environmental Units are supposed to be set up in each of the relevant ministries to handle such issues, it is not clear how far the process has gotten.

The lack of sensitivity to environment and social issues comes through in many of the statements that government officials make about the dam. One official complained that it is much more difficult to get money for dams from donors than in used to be because now everyone is talking about the environment. Local government officials, who are keen on the dam, see the government's role as educating the people on the importance of the dam so that they will be happy to move, rather than engaging in discussion about the feasibility of the proposed project.

There are no plans for a mediation or appeals mechanism that could adjudicate disagreements over compensation. The view of government officials (except from MoE) was that the government would handle things so there would not be any disagreements. "If they know that the government needs to construct the dam, they will be happy to move," was one optimistic statement. "If they don't agree, we will go ahead because according to the constitution, the government has the right to take land in the public interest.²⁹" However villagers, although clearly wary of the government (some cautioned that no compensation money should be distributed through government officials because it won't reach the people), also could not suggest particular people or institutions that might be able to mediate or arbitrate disagreements. Instead they suggested that disagreements could be settled by discussions between representatives of the villagers and government officials.

²⁷ Ministry of Environment, Cambodia: National Environmental Action Plan 1998-2002, (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment, 1998), p.55

²⁸ Ministry of Environment, "Public Participation and Socio-economic Assessment," (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment, 1997), p.4.

²⁹ Author's interview with the District Chief of Samrong Tong.

5. Legal frameworks for compensation, public participation, and social impact assessment

The right to compensation is clearly guaranteed both by the Constitution and the 1992 Land Law. Article 44 of the Constitution states that:

"The right to confiscate possessions from any person shall be exercised only in the public interest as provided for under law and shall require fair and just compensation in advance.³⁰"

The 1992 Land Law supports this statement:

"Violation of private property rights shall be forbidden except when the public interest requires in cases provided by the law. In this case the property owner has the right to receive in advance just and proper compensation." (Article 3)

"Nobody shall be forced to transfer his/her ownership, if the forcing is not necessary for the public interest, and no proper and just indemnity is paid to the owner in advance."(Article 20)

Unfortunately, there is no supporting legislation explaining either how to determine public interest or how to determine fair and just compensation. If the criteria for compensation are not properly defined, the Cambodian government could find itself in the situation of the government of Thailand, where villagers displaced by dams 25 years ago are beginning to bring lawsuits against the government for broken promises and loss of standards of living.³¹

³⁰ Translation taken from Cambodian Property Law (English Version 5E), published by the Faculty of Business in Phnom Penh in co-operation with the University of San Francisco, January 1998.

³¹ "Why does no one see the hearts of the people?" Watershed, November 1996-February 1997, p. 51.

³² Ministry of Environment, Final Report for TAM2723-CAM Institutional Strengthening and Expanding EIA Capacity in Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment, January 1999), Volume 1, p. 1.

In most countries, one of the key mechanisms for mitigating (or attempting to prevent) adverse impacts from large infrastructure projects is environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulations. These provide procedures to ensure that key issues concerning the environment are discussed and evaluated, and set standards that must be met. In Cambodia, the legal basis for EIAs is established in the 1996 Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management, but in practice EIAs have been done on an ad hoc basis, with no opportunity for public participation.³²

In 1998, the ADB funded a project with the MoE called "Institutional Strengthening and Expanding EIA Capacity in Cambodia" (TA2723-CAM) which produced (among other things) a draft EIA sub-decree. This draft sub-decree contains many provisions that could be relevant to projects such as Prek Thnot. In particular, it specifically requires public participation, social impact assessment, and mitigation measures (including resettlement) as part of the requirements for the EIA process. NGOs can be invited to join the Project Review Team, which receives and rules on EIA reports as ad-hoc members (able to give advice but not vote). Article 5.1c also provides mechanisms for enforcing the EIA process by interpreting article 39 of the Constitution to mean that citizens have a right to file a civil complaint with the courts to seek enforcement of the implementation of a project's environmental plan.

However, since the sub-decree has not yet been adopted, it does not have binding force. Furthermore, there is still the chance that the draft could be changed and important safeguards like Article 5.1c removed before it is passed. There is also the very real possibility that it could be implemented superficially or even ignored unless there is close public scrutiny and involvement.

In addition to the draft EIA sub-decree, TA2723-CAM also produced a set of four process guidelines (including Public Participation and Social Impact Analysis) and 18 sector guidelines to provide direction and standards for implementing the EIA process. The guidelines for public participation make a strong argument for public participation as "an integral part of project evolution, not as an end in itself, but as a tool to assure project suitability, acceptability and productivity," outlines different levels of participation, and recommends minimum requirements for public participation proposals and reports.³³ According to the guidelines, resettlement and large irrigation schemes both qualify for the highest level of participation. The guidelines recognise that "community stakeholders might need support in participation if they have a weak organisational structure, little experience with decision-making, lack leaders, or are suspicious of government and development," and suggests that mediation or advocacy by outside actors such as NGOs could be helpful. Similarly, the guidelines on Social Impact Assessment (SIA) specify general steps in SIA and minimum contents of the SIA report, including rather weak guidelines for resettlement. Some of the sector guidelines (particularly the section on large irrigation projects) are also relevant to a project such as Prek Thnot.

While these guidelines could be very useful in imposing standards and conformity on the EIA process, they are not legally binding. The final report of the TA project mentions that one way to strengthen them would be to have the MoE issue them as a prakas. However even if that is done, there is still more work that needs to be done in terms of specific standards and procedures for public participation and resettlement, and appeals mechanisms in cases of disputes over compensation. Also, unless someone – ministries, NGOs, affected populations, or public interest groups – puts considerable time, money, and expertise into making the process work, the guidelines will remain printed words on a page.

³³ Ibid.,Volume 1, p. 7.

Involuntary resettlement caused by dam projects such as Prek Thnot poses the question of who pays for and who benefits from "development" projects. If built, the Prek Thnot dam would dispossess between 2,900 and 3,400 families. Unless adequate (and very costly) compensation is made, their standard of living will fall sharply. While land is currently available for resettlement, it is not of high quality and would require a lot of preparation -- and at the rate land is being sold off, it is doubtful that sufficient land would still be available in five years. Therefore the land access implications are significant. Given the huge social and economic costs involved, and given that the economic benefits of the project are likely to have decreased considerably since 1991, it is essential that the costs and benefits of this project be re-calculated based on the current situation (and including compensation and resettlement costs) before a final decision is made to go ahead with the project – especially since the project would cause a significant increase in Cambodia's debt burden.

In the event that a decision is made to go ahead with the dam, it is essential that a proper compensation and resettlement plan be drawn up. The plan should be developed through iterative consultation with the people affected, making sure that they have enough information and time for reflection, and allowing them to discuss and choose more than one option. Elaborate infrastructure "gifts" (which tend to benefit providers more than recipients) should not be considered unless the people affected actively request them, nor should hypothetical benefits (such as possible employment in as yet un-built factories) be offered as a substitute for real compensation. The final resettlement plan should have a clear set of principles against which it can be judged, baseline information so that it is possible to monitor changes in standards of living, and at least three to five years of follow up monitoring to make sure that the goals are being met, and a neutral and accessible mechanism for receiving and acting on complaints.

While the net benefits of the project could certainly be increased by ignoring the above mentioned steps and "being flexible" about compensation, this implies a decision that cheap water and electricity for the towns (not to mention lucrative engineering contracts and prestige) should be paid for by the poorest and most vulnerable people in Cambodia. Should the villagers living in the proposed reservoir area sacrifice their homes and livelihoods to provide cheap electricity for the factories? Should the next generation be put into debt to satisfy the ambitions of donors and government officials?

The way to avoid such a situation should be through proper public participation in evaluating the environmental and social impact of the project. Draft legislation exists which could provide a basis for an adequate public participation and fair compensation, but it is not yet passed and is completely untested.³⁴ Apart from MoE, the Ministries who would implement the EIA and compensation process are neither interested in nor have experience with public participation or compensation issues. Therefore there is a strong need for NGO involvement, especially the development of NGO capacity to monitor and participate in the EIA process, and to make sure it is implemented properly. Donors also need to take responsibility for their actions, and condition grants and loans for large infrastructure projects such as Prek Thnot on proper EIAs and adequate resettlement plans – preferably beginning compensation and resettlement before construction begins so as not to lose the little leverage they have.

As has been noted before, the proposed Prek Thnot Dam project offers an unparalleled opportunity to establish transparent procedures and high standards for assessing the social and environmental impact of large-scale infrastructure projects, as well as a chance to pioneer Cambodian methodologies for ensuring adequate public participation in the process. Since Prek Thnot will be the Cambodian government's first post-war experience with such a large and complicated infrastructure project, the way in which Prek Thnot is assessed will demonstrate whether the government is interested in learning from the experience (both positive and negative) of other countries, and whether it is able to put that experience into action. If so, the process of assessing Prek Thnot could produce an approach which ensures that future projects chosen are of benefit to the nation as a whole, and that their negative impacts are effectively and efficiently mitigated. If not, it is the poor and the next generation who will bear the cost.

³⁴ The utility of such legislation has been well documented in other countries, but how the proposed process would actually work in the Cambodian context remains to be seen.

• Given the importance of the EIA sub-decree, should NGOs take a more active role in the adoption process? Possible activities include reviewing the current draft, monitoring its adoption, examining the issue of whether it would be beneficial for the MoE to adopt the supplemental guidelines as sub-decrees, and mounting a campaign to raise public awareness about the opportunities created by the EIA process. Donors could also be requested to abide by the draft EIA and guidelines, regardless of their legal status, so as to strengthen process.
• Would it be helpful if NGOs and other interested groups were to develop more detailed procedures and benchmarks for good public participation and resettlement processes in advance? Who could develop such standards and how?
• Should NGOs plan to participate in EIAs and in mobilising public participation? What would an effective role require in terms of resources (expertise, funding, networks, etc.), and how could these be organised?
• What is the proper balance between co-operation and advocacy on public interest issues such as Prek Thnot? There is already some hostility on the part of some government officials towards NGO interference, and distrust on the side on some NGOs. A completely adversarial relationship is unlikely to produce good results for anyone. On the other hand, NGOs need to maintain some independence from whatever procedures are set in place to avoid becoming co-opted.

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

Appendix 4

Appendix 5

[BACK]   [HOME PAGE]