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American Friends Service Committee Mennonite Central Committee

In Cambodia

Report by:

Mr. Neb Sinthay

Ms. Janet Ashby

Phnom Penh 28 July 1998

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

Research on the question of whether and how it might be feasible to reduce the number of weapons in Cambodia and the practice of using weapons to solve problems found that:

• The security situation varies widely from area to area, depending on the recent history there. Some places are characterized as ‘the Wild West 2.’ Others are relatively secure, with few robberies, murders, etc. However, even in these areas people do not feel safe; they fear vengeance from old grudges, or that the situation will change for the worse.

• The security situation strongly influences the weapons situation in each area. In some places, almost every household has at least one gun. In other places, only members of the armed forces, civil servants, and people with criminal intentions have guns.

• There is only one organized weapons market in Cambodia, at Tuk Thla in Phnom Penh. A wide range of weapons, including sophisticated pistols and heavy weapons, are available. However, weapons such as basic AK47’s are easily available almost everywhere, through networks of relatives, friends, and some members of the armed forces, for prices ranging from US$ 5 - US$ 50, depending on the part of the country and the condition of the gun. In some parts of the country more sophisticated weapons are also easily available: B-40 rocket launchers with four explosives can be bought for US$ 32, and pistols generally start from about US$ 120. Ammunition is easily available for most weapons in most places.

• There is at present little import or export of weapons to other countries, but this could quickly change. Weapons flows are very fluid, and weapons dealers in Cambodia have the connections they need to expand international trade.

• It is becoming increasingly common that people think of guns as their first solution to solving problems. The researchers heard of examples where youths threaten people with guns when there is a small traffic jam and they want to get through, where you cannot graze cows without a gun for protection, where B-40 rocket launchers are used to do simple robberies, and where a young woman was shot dead by a stranger for accidentally bumping his wife with her shoe.

• Guns are simultaneously becoming a status symbol.

• The ‘mafia’ - organized gangs of criminals - is fairly new here, but rapidly growing and becoming more sophisticated. Easy access to powerful weapons will make it possible for them to grow into a force which will be very difficult to control later.

• The government leadership has made efforts from time to time to clean up illegal weapons and to impose more discipline on the carrying and use of weapons by the armed forces, but the implementation has been sporadic and selective. At local level, there are some very committed civil servants and members of the armed forces who have tried their best to control the weapons situation in their area. However, there are also other members of these same groups who use their access to weapons to protect and profit from illegal activities.

• In the interviews the researchers conducted among many people in nine areas around the country, there was a strong consensus that:

1. the present weapons situation is a serious problem and very dangerous to individuals and communities
2. if there were real political will and follow-up, the government could clean up the illegal and improperly used weapons
3. if people felt ‘secure’ most would voluntarily give up their guns

• Most people interviewed initially viewed the weapons situation as something only the government could do anything about. After discussion, many of the people interviewed began to think of ways that communities or groups of citizens could also work together to improve the situation. There is a lot of support for something to be done to reduce the number of weapons and the practice of using weapons to solve problems, from both top-level generals and lower level armed forces, from government officials, from NGOs, and from ordinary citizens. However, the support is not mobilized.

• There are four general categories of action which citizens could take:

a. collecting and then destroying weapons (this could only be done with the agreement of the government)

b. public education to raise awareness, change opinions, and change behavior related to guns

c. community- or sector- based work, where citizens or staff of institutions develop plans to work together based on their common interests and perspectives on reducing weapons; examples would be the medical sector working on weapons as a public health issue, a committee of elders working to make their community a weapons-free area, or NGOs including the issue of weapons and violence into their overall development work

d. supporting and challenging action by the government

A Proposed Action Plan is attached. It includes both actions that a core group would need to be responsible for and actions that other organizations or individuals could take up independently. The goal of the Steering Committee of this feasibility study was that the results be useful to anyone interested in acting to reduce the numbers of weapons in Cambodia or the practice of using weapons to solve problems.

The research shows that weapons and the fear of them is blocking progress toward development, democracy, and a peaceful and healthy society. We recommend that a campaign to reduce the number of weapons and the practice of using weapons to solve problems start now.

We hope everyone will use this report as a basis to begin to act. For further information please contact any of the addresses below.

II. Forward

When we started to research whether it is feasible to reduce the number of weapons in Cambodia and the practice of using weapons to solve problems, we discovered that most people feel the current weapons situation is an extremely serious problem, but they did not know what could be done about it. Then, after discussing the issue, one by one people began to think of possible ways to respond.

As for myself (Sinthay), when I first heard about this work, I immediately thought it was very good, that it would be possible to do, and that it was very important. Later, after meeting with a former weapons trader, I thought that it would not be possible to achieve any disarmament, because there are so many weapons in Cambodia, there is so much illegal weapons trade, and the people who trade in weapons are people with power (including the level of generals of the armed forces and high ranking civilian officials). I lost hope and motivation to continue this work. But when I kept meeting and discussing with many other people, both Cambodian and foreigners, it showed many ways forward and strategies to respond to this problem. This rejuvenated my hope and motivation, until I now have the strong hope that it is possible to do this work, to the extent that now I want to participate in this work in the future.

As for myself (Janet), I come from a country where many people have guns, and where for years people have been gathering statistics and trying to reduce gun ownership and gun use. I have watched with great concern the growing role of weapons in civilian life in Cambodia and how weapons compound the lack of trust between people and the lack of human resources, which are two fundamental problems in Cambodia stemming from recent history. The research process - hearing people’s stories of how weapons and fear directly affect their lives, and seeing them start to identify weapons as a specific problem about which something could be done - was thrilling. It gave me confidence that we could really make an impact. Then, while watching a group meeting on the subject, I realized that we have a long road ahead. It requires that people, one by one, change their ideas and realize that they can act on this problem, not just wait for the initiative of ‘the government’ and ‘the powerful people.’ Now is the best time to start down that road, step by step.

We share these personal reflections because we ourselves, and the people we interviewed and discussed with, all seemed to have to go through a thought process before having the understanding and confidence that it is possible to have an impact on the weapons situation in Cambodia. We think this is one key in stimulating people to join in the solving the problem.

We would like to give deep thanks to everyone who allowed us to meet and discuss with them, giving freely of their valuable time and offering excellent ideas, whether positive or negative. Their input will be a resource for other people who participate and share in the process of a campaign on reducing weapons and the practice of solving problems with weapons.

It was extremely encouraging to meet with so many people who care deeply about the problem and are working, in their own roles and institutions, for a nonviolent Cambodian society. We are hopeful that the results of this study may serve as a small beginning for a campaign which will, in the future, reach to all corners of Cambodia and result in a Cambodia free of danger from weapons and other violence.

Phnom Penh ____July, 1998

Neb Sinthay Janet Ashby

III. Introduction

This report shows the results of research on the possibility of reducing the numbers of weapons and the practice of using weapons to solve problems in Cambodia.

The research was commissioned by the Peace Partnership; the Peace Partnership members are the Dhammayietra Center, American Friends Service Committee, and the Mennonite Central Committee. The research was done by two staff of Star Kampuchea during the period 9 April - 14 July 1998.

The objectives detailed in the Terms of Reference were:

1. Review lessons learned from civilian disarmament campaigns in other countries, by reviewing gathered information and creating a summary.
2. Assess the political, economic and social factors in Cambodia, in terms of the impact of those factors on a successful civil disarmament campaign, by conducting research with people with a variety of viewpoints and creating a summary.
3. Assess possible directions of a civil disarmament program, by presenting strategic options and methods that might work in Cambodia to a meeting of interested persons.
4. Based on their feedback, develop an action plan for implementation of the program, by presenting a report on the research, and recommending steps that could be taken along with time frames.
5. Begin the development of a network of persons/organizations interested in civil disarmament, through work with a steering committee for the study, and through contacts made during the study.

The research was supervised by a steering committee with representatives from the following organizations: American Friends Service Committee, Cambodian Center for Conflict Resolution, Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation, Dhammayietra Center for Peace and Nonviolence, Human Resources Development Program, Mennonite Central Committee, Oxfam GB, and Nonviolence International in S. E. Asia. The steering committee was extremely helpful, giving a free hand, strong support and well considered suggestions.

During the research, voluminous documentation about the weapons situation both internationally and in Cambodia was provided by Ms. Judy Saumweber (AFSC) and Mr. Yeshua Moser-Pungsuwan (Nonviolence International). Nonviolence International also assisted considerably by summarizing the lessons from international disarmament by non-governmental actors which seem to relate to the Cambodian situation. The summary is included as Appendix B. AFSC also helped a lot by facilitating contacts and travel logistics.

Methodology

The first research step was to review the literature about the light weapons internationally and disarmament efforts in other countries.

Next followed interviews with people knowledgeable about the military situation in Cambodia who were able to give an overview of the weapons brought into the country and circulating as a result of military conflicts.

Most of the rest of the research consisted of talking to people - people at all levels of society: market sellers, human rights workers, development workers, weapons sellers, soldiers, heads of villages, communes and districts, heads of provincial and municipal police and military police, provincial deputy governors, top-ranked generals. They included elders and youths, women and men.

A total of 254 people were interviewed. They were chosen according to availability within the categories of people which had designated: staff of human rights and development NGOs, medical staff, monks and nuns, people in the market, staff of government ministries, police, soldiers, military police, village militia, and provincial, district, commune and village officials, and villagers. The interviews were conducted in Phnom Penh and in the provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Koh Kong, Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, and Svay Rieng. The places to interview were specifically selected in order to compare places with different security histories and situations. The names of the places visited and the numbers and kinds of persons interviewed are listed in Appendix II.

The interviews were adapted to each situation, but in each we asked questions to elicit people’s ideas about the security situation in their area, the weapons situation in their area, and possible ways to reduce the numbers and use of weapons. Because one of the initial ideas behind organizing such a study was to assess whether a civilian weapons collection program might work, we regularly asked people what they thought about such a strategy - but only after people had finished sharing their own ideas.

On 26 June 1998 there was a meeting in order to present the results of the research to date, get feedback, discuss additional strategies, and prioritize activities.

After that meeting a proposed action plan was finalized. It is shown in Appendix I.

In this report the word ‘weapons’ refers to pistols or rifles which can be carried and used by one person and to grenades.

All monetary values are all given in US dollars, the currency most often used in Cambodia for quoting prices of expensive items.

Although the issue of weapons in Cambodia is closely related to the question of demobilization of armed forces, the latter is not a focus in this study. The Cambodian government and various international institutions are considering this issue.

There are very few statistics relating to weapons presently available. There are no good statistics on the numbers of weapons in the country, no good statistics on the number of weapons which are covered by some sort of registration permit, no regularly collected statistics on the numbers of deaths or injuries from weapons in non-war situations. The percentages and numbers which are cited in the report are, in most cases, either the personal estimates or aggregates of estimates of the people we interviewed. This lack of statistical information points to work which needs to be done in the future, but does not compromise the results of the core question of this study: that it is feasible and urgent to act.

IV. International Weapons Situation

Internationally it is now being recognized that countries which have been at war suffer a new burden: the flood of light weapons which come into a country with conflict and then remain behind to fuel robberies and intimidation, local warlords, the mafia, and distrust among neighbors.

Why is this new? Because weapons are now manufactured in so many places, they are so cheap, and they are so lightweight (which means that during conflicts many sides in a conflict arm also child soldiers). Also, previously most wars were fought by regular armies, and those soldiers were disarmed when they were demobilized. Now many sides are assisted by ‘militias’ and other ordinary civilians who are given guns and told to be loyal to one side or another. In the conflict zones the same villagers may be armed several times. And now effective weapons can be manufactured or repaired even in remote villages.

The ‘arms control’ of the international UN policies, regulations and reporting are for nuclear, chemical, biological, and heavy weapons. The UN does not even have good data about which countries manufacture, export, or import light weapons - but these weapons are the ones which kill the most people, and the most civilians.

There is now a movement to put the issue of light weapons onto the international and UN agendas. In the meantime, individual countries which are struggling with the other effects of war also have to try to figure out what to do about the problem of all the weapons in their land, with very few models or examples to refer to. Cambodia is a prime case of this.

The weapons situation in the various areas of Cambodia differs because of differences in recent history and security. On the other hand, the weapons situation helps to determine the present security situation. Security, as measured by numbers of robberies, kidnappings, murders and such, varies widely from province to province and within the different areas of some provinces.

Appendix III. shows a table summarizing some key points about the security situation in each area which we studied, as seen through the eyes of the people interviewed there. The comments shown in the ‘Perceptions About Security’ column were made by people in the province shown, but many apply to all the places we visited.

Perceptions of security are very important. Even in places with few robberies, kidnappings, rapes or murders, and no military conflict, people do not feel secure. They say they fear grudges and vengeance, and do not trust their neighbors or police to help if they are attacked by people with weapons. In every place we visited there was a feeling that the security situation could easily deteriorate. The widespread availability of weapons contributed to that feeling - and a widespread desire to own guns is a consequence.

Weapons law and policy

People throughout the country assume that the entire issue of weapons is not handled within a framework of law. People are not aware of any violators being prosecuted in court and punished for illegal gun possession and use. Instead, the gun is taken away. Sometimes a bribe must be paid, and sometimes there are other consequences as well, but not those defined by law.

There is, however, a legal framework. A law passed on 31.1.1992 entitled, ‘Penalties for Having Weapons and Wearing Uniforms Against Regulation’ (non-official translation) stipulates in Articles 2 and 3 that there are penalties of 1-5 years in jail for having, selling, buying, renting, lending, borrowing, keeping or producing explosives, ammunition, or weapons without authorization.

A 31.7.95 subdecree ‘Controlling the Use of All Kinds of Weapons and Explosives’ (unofficial translation) clarifies that the Ministry of Defense has authority to supervise use and issue permits for explosives or weapons for the military, military police and militia, while the Ministry of Interior has the same authority for the police and civilians.

The subdecree also specifies which individuals have the right to have a weapon:

• civil servants in a Ministry from the level of Head of Department on up

• civil servants in provincial and municipal administrations from the level of Deputy Head of Office on up

• district officials from the level of Deputy Head of Office on up

• military, militia and police from the level of Deputy Head of Office on up, and from the level of Deputy Platoon Leader on up

• others when given specific mission orders

• customs and tax officials, officials from forestry, fisheries, rubber factory companies, environment, and the national bank, all from the level of Deputy Head of Office on up - but only when fulfilling duties

Rifles are not authorized for any private use, but only for missions in insecure areas or for security for institutions, units, warehouses, or the residence of specified dignitaries. Soldiers’ weapons are not to be taken into towns areas but kept at base.

In July 1997 there was armed military conflict between political parties in the government. In August 1997 a declaration of ‘8-Points’ was issued. The points which relate to weapons are:

• continue to surpress armed robbery groups, kidnapping, illegal connections and drug trafficking, counterfeiting money, and gambling houses, which are a source of intimidation in the country

• supervise weapons and explosives closely, and investigate and take weapons which are used or transported against the law - destroy a number of weapons which are not needed for the national armory and security, and do not allow that weapons are taken out of warehouses and given into the hands of criminals

• collect weapons from the village and commune militia, and either warehouse or destroy those weapons. It is permitted to keep the militia in the areas where the Khmer Rouge are active; the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and National Police should identify the areas from which weapons should be collected from the militia, the areas where a number of weapons should be kept, and the kinds of weapons which should be kept and destroyed

• clarify again those who should have the use of weapons, check the permits

• set the numbers of bodyguards or security guards allowed in various situations

Frequency of weapons

Nationally

In 1993, UNTAC collected statistics from the 4 sides in the conflict; a total of 320,443 light weapons and 80,729,175 items of ammunition were reported. It is thought that the real numbers were considerably higher than these reports.

Col. David Mead, former Australian Defense Attaché in Cambodia, has estimated that there are at present at least 500,000 light weapons in Cambodia, of which about half are with the armed forces and half are with civilians. That is one gun for every 20 persons in the country. There are probably also at least 10 pieces of ammunition for each person in the country.

A large majority of the weapons in the country are very durable. For example, AK47’s can be simply wrapped in a cloth and buried in the earth or hidden in the mud at the bottom of a pond, and then just taken out and cleaned for use months later. As a result, not only military bodies, but also ordinary villagers have useable weapons cached away all over the countryside. Ammunition is somewhat less long-lived, but there are also widespread caches of useable ammunition in the country.

At present there are not major movements of weapons in or out of the country. However, that can change quickly. During the UNTAC period there were many exports. During the period before 7/97 there was a lot of weapons movement both in and out of the country.

Below is a summary of the frequency of weapons in different parts of the country, as seen through the eyes of the people who live there. The numbers and types of people we interviewed in each province are shown in the attached Appendix II.

Banteay Meanchey - Sisophon: high frequency

Before 7/97 almost every house had guns - maybe three. After 7/97, and some government weapons cleanup, many houses still have 2 guns. Virtually every house of soldiers, police, and civil servants has at least one gun, and maybe 20-30% of ordinary civilians do. Even laborers have guns. Even monks and wats have guns. The number of people openly carrying weapons is less than before 7/97 but still quite high. For example, you can see people with no shirt but a weapon driving a motorcycle. Rich youths carry guns to show off.

Banteay Meanchey - rural areas in general

Most Cambodians we interviewed think the rate of gun possession is much higher in rural areas than in town. Some people estimate that before 7/97 almost every house was armed. Now maybe 80% of all homes have at least one gun; or 30-60% of simple citizens have a gun, in addition to all soldiers, police, militia, and civil servants. Even some moto-taxi-trailer drivers have 1-2 weapons at home.

Banteay Meanchey - Phnom Malai: high frequency, but well disciplined

In Phnom Malai most of the weapons are AK47’s, and almost every house has at least one. It is completely normal to see someone taking an AK47 to go hunting. There are lots available, and more buried in caches. However, discipline in the area is good and there is not an atmosphere of people casually intimidating others with guns.

Banteay Meanchey - Thmar Pouk: medium frequency

People estimate that about half the houses have a gun. There is a strong ‘culture of the gun’ - if you don’t have a weapon people look down on you. People are now asking for permission to keep a gun even if they do not have a reason to need one. It is not uncommon for one person to have three guns. The militia use CKC’s left over from the 1980’s. The military and robber groups have AK47’s, B40’s, and high power weapons such as RPD’s (small machine guns).

Battambang: high frequency in some districts

Before 7/97 there was a lot of movement of weapons, because the various forces were arming their allies. Weapons and ammunition became expensive then because demand was high. After 7/97 many weapons were collected under the ‘8-Points’, reportedly mostly from supporters of one party, but there are still very many weapons in the province. Soldiers regularly carry AK47s and M16s rifles around with them, particularly since many are in military units that are not assigned to a military base.

There is a large variation in frequency among the different districts in Battambang

Some estimate that about 30% of the houses in Battambang Town have weapons. People with important positions are accompanied by visibly armed bodyguards. Ordinary civilians do not usually carry visible guns.

In Banan District, out of 5 houses asked, all had at least one gun, and several had 2-3. However, an NGO in the area estimated that only about 5% of ordinary civilians in the village have guns now. It is less usual now than before to see either soldiers or civilians openly carrying weapons.

In Anlongville Town, the capital of Sangkae District, it is estimated that virtually every house has weapons.

Koh Kong: high frequency on islands and trading routes

In Koh Kong Town and many of the surrounding islands and areas, lots of people regularly carry high-power weapons, including into public places such as restaurants. All boats are assumed to have and need weapons, and businesses such as logging have heavy armed protection.

The civilian government reported collecting 280 illegal weapons after 7/97, and they estimate there are another 500 to collect. They are starting to search and collect illegal weapons again in preparation for the July 1998 elections.

In Sre Ambel District, authorities report collecting slightly over 100 illegal weapons after 7/97 (from a population of 40,000), and they estimate there may be 100 more hidden. Weapons carrying is not so obvious as it was in Koh Kong Town or other islands. People estimate that perhaps 50% of the houses in Sre Ambel Town have weapons, and perhaps 60% of the houses in rural areas have weapons, including grenades. Soldiers often have 2 or more weapons.

In Koh Kong there are many current sources of weapons - the Khmer Rouge areas and soldiers coming back from the battlefront - as well as weapons left behind when Vietnamese soldiers left the country in 1989.

Kompong Cham: high frequency

People estimate that 20-40% of houses have guns. Many armed forces carry guns openly. For example, in public places you can easily see: 1 motorcycle carrying 3 police, of whom 2 have guns; 1 motorcycle with 2 armed soldiers; and cars with armed bodyguards.

Kompong Som: low frequency

People estimate that:

• 100% of government officers such as customs officers have guns

• about 90% of rich people have guns

• 10 - 20% of ordinary and poor people have guns. (Poor people would have guns only if they wanted to use them for criminal activities.)

Soldiers and police are regularly seen carrying rifles. Ordinary people do not carry rifles on the street as much now as they did before 7/97, but at night they sometimes do.

Kompong Thom: high frequency

In some areas where armed conflict went back and forth, and in the provincial town, weapons are very frequent, because Kompong Thom was one of the areas where both Khmer Rouge and government troops kept giving weapons to villagers. In some areas - for example one just north of the provincial town - virtually every house has at least one gun, and neighbors can list the numbers and kinds. Estimates about frequency are that in town 25-50% of the houses have at least one gun, and in rural areas 10 - 15% of the houses have at least one gun. (In rural areas guns are also used to hunt animals.) The communities living on and around the Tonle Sap are considered heavily armed. The districts with the most guns are considered to be Baray, Sandan, Stung Sen, and Stong.

Siem Reap: medium frequency

People in Siem Reap feel there are ‘not many’ weapons in the hands of ordinary citizens. No one we met was willing to guess a percentage of houses with guns. People assume top level civil servants have weapons, but they do not carry them openly. We saw very few people carrying guns.

People estimate there is a higher percentage of guns in rural than town area, particularly in the areas where there was recently fighting. Apparently additional guns were recently distributed in Kralanh District.

The Military Police statistics listed slightly over 200 weapons for their forces.

Svay Rieng: low frequency

Almost no one carries guns openly - not even police or military police. There are still about 10 to 15 militia with weapons in each commmune, but they do not regularly carry their weapons. It is assumed that there are quite a number of weapons now hidden away, but even during Khmer New Year and storms there is no shooting heard. (In recent Cambodian tradition the New Year is welcomed with shooting and people try to chase storms away with shooting.)

There is only one real weapons market, Tuk Thla, in Phnom Penh. It is an ‘illegal’ market. There are weapons-related materials openly on display there; if you want a weapon or ammunition you tell someone what you want and they get it for you from nearby or from a warehouse.

In the rest of the country, if someone wants a gun, they either come to Tuk Thla Market in Phnom Penh or they request, through friends or relatives, that a soldier or police or government official help them get one. There is almost no one in the country who can not get a gun if they want one.

The practice of owning and using weapons is strong enough that, even if all commercially manufactured weapons were collected, a large number of people could still have weapons - they know how to make their own, out of locally available materials.

Attached as Appendix IV is a table showing the prices which various people gave us for their area. Because there is not a large established market, those prices obviously depend on the connections and experience which the people we interviewed had. However, we believe they fairly show the pattern of prices in the areas where we were.

The table confirms what common sense might suggest:

• Weapons, especially rifles, are very cheap in areas with recent military conflict, such as Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kompong Thom

• Weapons are most expensive in the Phnom Penh Tuk Thla Market (at least for people who are not regular customers)

• Pistols are a luxury item and fairly expensive throughout the country

• The frequency of weapons such as B-40s and grenades varies quite a lot from region to region

• Ammunition is basically plentiful, though some rural areas, such as near Sre Ambel and Phnom Malai, do not have easy access at present. However, the price changes significantly when demand rises (as before 7/97).

Registration and controls

The information below about registration practices in different areas is not official. However, it does seem to be at least partly accurate, because different people gave similar answers.

In general, people are now very cautious about registering guns they have:

• registered guns are the ones that are easy to collect when guns are being collected

• admitting you have a weapon (by asking to register it) can cause you trouble with the authorities later

There is no provision in the law for ordinary citizens to have guns. There are laws and regulations which designate which government military, police, military police, and civilian officials may own their own guns (generally Battalion Leader or Deputy Director of a Department or Provincial Ministry Office or a Province and up), and the circumstances under which those same groups may be issued weapons for their work. All civilians are to register their guns through the police, usually at commune level.

However:

In Phnom Penh, weapons sellers at the Tuk Thla market also offer to get the weapons they sell registered for civilians. The price quoted to a foreign woman was US$ 150 for a pistol registration.

In Banteay Meanchey, many government servants can register a pistol. They should re-register the weapon every 6 months, but only have to appear themselves once a year. Business people needing to protect their trading goods go to the provincial office. People who have obtained a gun from a soldier can also just get a letter from that soldier stating that the soldier is giving them permission to keep and use the gun. Provincial police will also authorize use of explosives (for fishing). Before 7/97, civilians could register a weapon for $12-20 - the price may have now changed.

We were told that, in theory, the penalty for illegal possession is 6 months, for illegal use 1 year.

In Battambang, civilians can get a rifle registration which, in theory, only permits keeping the weapon in the house. However, people also carry the guns with them. Almost no one would bother to register a rifle. A pistol registration for 6-12 months costing $ 30 included the permission to carry it throughout the province. People can also get ‘special mission’ letters through their connections; such letters substitute for regular registrations.

In Koh Kong a top level civil servant stated that all people have the right to use guns. Government staff of customs, taxes, fishing, environment, and most other offices regularly carry guns. Commune police issue registrations to civilians who say they need a weapon to defend their boat or home. It seems to be the custom that if someone is caught with an unregistered weapon they are given a temporary registration and told to get an official registration. (No one - not even police or military police - was able to state the penalties under law for illegal possession.) However, the practical details vary from district to district. In Koh Kong Town, police have authorized civilians to carry handguns for one year at a time. In Sre Ambel, the district police apparently issue permits for 2 months at a time, technically only for keeping in the house. Also, many people get letters of authorization to have a gun from the friends or relatives (who are soldiers or police or civil servants) who have given them a gun to use.

In Kompong Cham, registration is through the provincial police.

In Kompong Som, registration is through the commune level police but people also use ‘authorizations’ from their friends and relatives who are police or soldiers.

In Kompong Thom, you can get a pistol registration for 3 years, a rifle registration for an unlimited period. People also estimate that almost no weapons are registered - maybe 1% only. In one commune near a Khmer Rouge area every male over the age of 18 has the right to have a gun (and guns were reportedly given out again very recently).

In Siem Reap the ordinary civilians we talked with did not know how to register - they seemed unfamiliar with the idea. A military police recited to us properly the official regulations.

Women’s Perspective

In general, women are less familiar with guns, less able or confident to use them, and less likely to want to have guns in their house. Women complain that men like to keep guns to boast about and show off. They are also afraid that their men will get drunk and use a gun to harm someone in the family.

However:

• Women generally believe than having a gun increases security against outside attacks

• Women who know how to use guns want to have them in the house

• Women from families where there is something to steal - such as the houses of shopkeepers or traders - want to have guns in the house

• Widows who have enough money to afford guns have them, or armed bodyguards

In one example, there is a very poor village in Battambang where almost all the men go to Thailand or to other distant places for labor, and are regularly gone for days at a time. Many of the families have guns, but the men bury the guns near their homes when they leave. The women do not know where the guns were buried or how to use them, although they think the guns help provide protection and they feel very afraid of attackers.

It would be wrong to think that women in general are more gentle, less violent: some suggested that they want to be able to immediately shoot kill robbers, or to cut off their fingers, and so on. No woman responded with Buddhist ideas when we talked about disarmament, except one nun and one Dhammayietra activist.

 IV. Strategies AND IDEAS GATHERED DURING INTERVIEWS

First, in many provinces the government is really making an effort to clean up a large number of illegal weapons now, in advance of the July 1998 elections, to help eliminate violent incidents. Also, the government has issued orders and worked to collect illegal weapons several times in the past, most recently following the ‘Eight Points’ issued in August 1997.

Second, it is important to note that almost every person we talked to believes that, if the present top level government was really committed, and really gave strong orders and followed up with the lower levels, the government could collect almost all the weapons now.

Also, most people believe that the local authorities really know who has guns in their areas: the guns are used when it storms or at Khmer New Year, when people get drunk they boast about their guns, and neighbors know who has what kind of gun.

However, it is often difficult for local authorities to collect guns. The guns are often owned by people with powerful friends or relatives. Sometimes the local authorities really believe that in their area a family needs a weapon for self-protection or for hunting food. These are reasons that people think a real commitment and follow-up is needed from the top levels of government.

Third, almost everyone said that, if people believed there was good security in their community, there would be no problem to collect all the weapons. However, the definition of ‘good security’ still has to be realized.

Because there are so many problems with illegal weapons and with weapons used illegally, people had many strategies to suggest when we interviewed them. These strategies, and ideas how to implement them, are shown below, together with either supporting or opposing arguments.

The ideas here are not a ‘final list’ of all ideas, but rather resource ideas for everyone interested in disarmament. A strategy may work well in one place but not another. The positive or negative observations about an idea which are shown here are not the opinions of the researchers, but the opinion of at least one person interviewed. The positive or negative observations are all shown equally, regardless of whether one or 100 people had the opinion.

A. Collecting Weapons

The assumption throughout this section is that any weapons collected would be immediately destroyed. The Steering Committee has set this condition for any work in which they would cooperate, because otherwise the number of weapons in society is not reduced. It just shifts the location and ownership of weapons. However, it is of course possible that the government would, by itself, also work to collect and warehouse weapons.

Amnesty

It would be essential that the government approve and support an amnesty so that people who now have illegal weapons could give them up without being prosecuted.

People in almost all areas were afraid of the consequences if the government knew they had an illegal weapon without the agreement of government authorities (even though no one had a very clear idea about what the consequences should be, by law).

Some people think that if government staff were present when weapons were collected, people would be afraid that they would be punished later, under the pretext of some other excuse. Thus, there is a suggestion that the people collecting the weapons be:

• from outside the area

• preferably from NGOs

• preferably include a foreigner

Mobile team to collect weapons: the idea described here is one possible model, put together from the ideas of several people with related experience.

• Have agreement from the government that a mobile team could accept and destroy weapons, and that people bringing weapons would not be punished.

• Publicize in advance that a mobile team will be coming to the commune level : why they are coming, what they will be doing

• Accept weapons from anyone - ordinary citizens, children, soldiers, commune chiefs, drunk people - and ask no questions about where the weapon comes from

• Give some sort of payment for each weapon that is useable

• Accept weapons in the morning, publicly destroy them in the afternoon

• Stay approximately 2-3 days in each commune.

This approach might need 15-20 persons to work in one province at a time. Very good logistics would have to be in place, in cooperation with government authorities. It would be essential to have strong backing from the government for this.

One person with experience in a similar approach says that this could not only collect the weapons from poor people who give up their guns because they want the reward, but also from rich and powerful people, because children or their supporters or others will take their guns and turn them in for the reward also.

 Payments or trades for guns

Government authorities have already used incentives in many areas at different times (1989, 1993, etc.) - they gave for example 100 kilos of rice for an AK47, 50 kilos of rice for a CKC, or a chicken, 20-30,00 Riel for information, etc.

The range of opinions about this idea is quite wide.

• Don’t trade or pay anything, because:

• People will be glad to get rid of dangerous things, and glad that the government can not arrest them for illegal weapons any more

• People might kill someone else in order to get their gun to turn it in

• People would just use the profit to buy a cheaper gun (this is in an area where you can buy one for $5 or ask for one for free from friends and relatives)

• It would not be possible to create an incentive big enough to attract rich people’s weapons; if the incentive were high enough to attract them it would be high enough that they could use the profit to buy another weapon

• Give a small reward or encouragement for guns turned in (e.g.. 10-20,000 Riel)

• Give a ‘spiritual’ reward for guns turned in - for example, in India people were given a token that they had gained merit for turning in their guns.

• Give a standard price for each working weapon of a certain type - not full market price, but enough to make it worth people’s while to travel and bring it

• This stops arguments over what a weapon is worth and accusations of favoritism and corruption

• This encourages everyone that to understand that turning in a gun is worthwhile, and no one feels disappointed

• Give a fair market price in money or rice - this means the value of each gun must be assessed

• No - this would encourage bargaining over the value of each gun, and making people see the effort as just a financial transaction

• No - people would not give up guns for the ‘fair market price’ in many places, because they can use the guns to ‘earn’ more than that

• No - you may end up increasing the flow of weapons into Cambodia as people come to sell them here [Note: we would have to research the prices of weapons in neighboring countries and in the region.]

• Give what people need for development - a cow, a hoe head, rice seeds...

• Yes - this helps people to think of turning from war and violence to peace and prosperity

• No - this is complicated and logistically much more difficult than money or rice

• No - this assumes that people don’t know what they really need, or don’t have the discipline to use their resources well

• Give more than the market value of the gun - otherwise people won’t turn guns in

• No - people could use the profit to buy another gun, and it would attract guns in to Cambodia

• Give some sort of community benefit, if a whole community turned in a certain number of weapons or declared themselves a weapons-free place, such as a school or a clinic (Only one person supported this idea when we suggested it; no one thought of it themselves)

• Yes - it would encourage people to think of the community and not just themselves

• No - it is too complicated

• No - it requires too much of a focus on the future

• No - people now work just for themselves, not their community

• Give the commune leaders some benefit (e.g. $1.00) for each gun turned in - ‘for their community’ so that they actively support and encourage the work

NOTE:

In general people were not very interested in incentives in the areas where:

• there have already been gun cleanups, because the people who respect authority have already turned in their guns, and the people who wrongly kept guns have bad intentions and plan to use the guns for a higher profit than they would get by turning in a gun for an incentive payment

• people really feel they and others need guns to protect their livelihood (to guard against cattle thieves, to take on fishing boats, to shoot animals to eat, to keep their work guarding logging convoys, to earn a living as thieves, etc.)

Some people were very interested in incentives in areas where:

• there are very many weapons in the area because it has been a conflict zone

• people do not use their guns for their livelihoods and they are now very hungry. (However, while it would be easy to implement a gun trade-in in areas where people are very short of food, the result would not necessarily create any more safety or indicate any change of belief about the value or disadvantages of weapons.)

Payments for information about who has guns

Give the cost of transportation, or more, to people who secretly give information about who has guns and where they are hidden:

• Yes, because otherwise even if the leader of an area knows about some guns they might not tell, if the gun owners are their friends or relatives

• No, because it increases suspicion and distrust among neighbors

• No, because it leads people to forget their role - they would stop telling to help the community, and just tell to collect the reward. When the money runs out they would stop cooperating.

• No, people would be scared to tell if they thought government officials would get the information, because the government officials might not keep the secret and there would be vengeance on them.

• This idea only applies to government efforts. 

The ideas above were collected from a wide range of people in Cambodia. Of them, two had had specific direct experience in trying to collect weapons in Cambodia and were clearly really committed to reducing the number of weapons and increasing peace and security for citizens - they were a former refugee camp governor and a deputy district governor. They strongly supported collecting every gun possible as soon as possible, without doing any complicated or extensive public education first - they thought the education could come later.

In some other countries which have suffered chronic war and the consequent large and uncontrolled numbers of weapons, there have been programs to collect weapons by buying or trading for them. Key lessons learned from those efforts include that strong emphasis should be placed on understanding and building on the reasons people are holding weapons. The security value which weapons seem to offer must be compensated for - but this cannot be done simply with monetary payments. Other steps to enhance personal security must accompany any such program. It is a high priority to keep the program nonpartisan. It is important to structure such a program so that it does not stimulate commercial arms trade. (For examples of the experience in specific countries and more observations related to the situation in Cambodia, please refer to Appendix V., "Summary of Micro Disarmament Programs in Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Mozambique and their relevance to efforts to disarm Cambodia," a report prepared by Nonviolence International SEAsia.

B. Public Education

Do guns increase or decrease security?

At present most Cambodians think that it is safer to have a gun than to not have a gun, that robbers or other attackers do not come so often to houses with guns, and that the robbers often know who does or does not have guns.

However, in other countries where statistics are available, guns do not decrease the number of robberies but in fact increase them, and guns are themselves a target for theft. These stolen weapons are then used for crime. Statistics also show that, in other countries, weapons which people have bought in order to protect themselves and their families are, in fact, are far more likely to be used to injure or kill a family member or friend than an outside attacker.

• In order to try to answer the question whether guns increase or decrease security in Cambodia, collect good statistics in a few locations over a period of time to test what is true and then use the information to educate.

• A few top armed forces and civilian persons (both Cambodian and foreigner) say clearly that they are safer when they do not carry guns. Broadcast interviews with them about this.

• Have people who formerly used and depended on guns explain why they have stopped - similar to work with alcoholics or drug addicts

• Collect and tell true stories about people shooting family members in accidents. People know that other homes have accidents from guns, but they think that in their own home no one would be so stupid.... Show real life examples.

• Collect and tell true stories about people who, in their sleep, got guns and threatened or killed people they loved. (The Cambodian word for such a gun - with a blood thirst which tries to make someone use it to kill again - is ‘loang’ )

• Collect and tell true stories about drug addicts using guns they can find to kill and rob in order to get drugs

Guns block development

• Collect and tell true stories about the impact of guns on development. For example:

• compare an area with violence and no development versus an area with little violence and development

• in Kompong Som the traders have a hard time to transport things back and forth

• in Siem Reap the tourists stay away when there is violence

• in Kompong Som new sewing factories have started now that security has improved

• in Banteay Meanchey traders now prefer to travel through the former Khmer Rouge areas because there is good security; in contrast, in the areas formerly and still under the government, there is arbitrary and high tax collection carried out through threats of violence.

wwhen there are many weapons, people are afraid their property will be destroyed

wwhen there are many weapons, people can’t travel easily; when roads are unsafe trading and NGO activities stop

Guns block personal and cultural achievement

• Now in some places if someone does not have a gun, people look down on them. Change that to "If you have a gun people look down on you."

• Now if someone has a gun they feel confident. Change that to, "If you need a gun it means you are weak."

• Buddhist morals teach not to use violence or weapons

• If you see someone about to commit a sin and you don’t try to stop them then you are also committing a sin

• Weapons block democracy

• Weapons are part of war - we in Cambodia want to come out of war

• Consider the general question of using violence to solve problems (which has already been identified in Cambodian culture from the old days, and can be seen in traditional stories such as Tiem Tiev, etc.)

• Target youth and students: ads on prime time TV, essay contests, role plays, etc.

• Have a moratorium on violent TV programs for some days before the elections. Have a debate about why violent shows are popular.

People don’t know the proper role of guns in society

• Publicize law on gun possession and use: who is / is not allowed to have a gun, penalties, compensation, etc.

• Publicize what is ‘normal’ in a peaceful civil society

Possible approaches for public education

• It is usually difficult to use public education to really change people’s behavior. There is a suggestion that a campaign should study lessons from AIDS public education efforts in order to try to make these efforts more effective. Both AIDS and weapons kill, and prevention of both requires change of behavior.

• A core group of people who really believe should be identified and prepared so they can publicly serve as speakers and models

• Find a symbol and use it

• Have regular (monthly?) events - e.g., support the government to search monthly, publicize the lists of civilian deaths by guns, etc.

• Work with the media on how they report about gun-related violence

• Ads on TV, video cassettes to send through the provinces, posters, etc.

• Essay or photo contests

C. Community- or Sector-Based Work

Committee of elders

Form a ‘Committee of Elders’ in villages or communes. The committee could have a number of possible roles:

• educate people about guns and violence

• be the ‘eyes and ears’

• investigate who has illegal weapons

• encourage people to give up their illegal weapons

• encourage local authorities to take illegal weapons

• follow-up how the authorities have implemented the law

This committee would have to be composed of people who are really neutral and can keep secrets.

However, some people said not to try to create such a committee, because poor and regular citizens are never chosen for such committees. The committee would end up with the village leaders and their relatives and representatives as members, so it duplicates the present power structures and just makes things more complicated.

Relation to development work

• Try to get NGOs to include nonviolence and non-use of guns in their development work - because if there is violence, it blocks development.

• Try to get NGOs to commit to do their development work in areas where the local people have made a commitment to disarmament and nonviolence. (But some people say this would contradict other criteria for choosing areas to work in.)

• Try to develop a cottage industry to use bullets or old gun pieces?

• Try to get sectors to develop a common approach: e.g. the medical community identify weapons as a public health issue

Perception of security

Work with people on their perception of ‘security’: what is security, what gives security, why don’t people feel secure now, how do weapons make people feel more secure, do weapons really make people more secure, etc.

Community activism

In Kompong Som fisher people had a demonstration on 22.4.98 to protest against high and frequent illegal taxes extorted with violence and guns. 327 fisher people signed a complaint. It went to provincial level, was not solved, and then went to Hun Sen. There is now a committee working on it.

Perhaps some other communities suffering from high levels of violence also want to act against it.

Use a signature campaign as a tool to build awareness, generate personal identification with and commitment to a no-weapons stand, and use as a foundation for lobbying.

D. Supporting and Pushing Government Action

Get political commitment

• Work for true commitment from political parties in power

• Organize an opportunity for each political candidate or party to state their position on weapons and disarmament, and publicize those positions BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

Close illegal weapons market

• Close the illegal weapons market at Tuk Thla - and keep it closed

• Research more deeply into who controls this market

Rationalize weapons registration

• Develop and enforce standard rules about who may register weapons, e.g. all registrations must be sent to the central level of the Ministry of Interior, registrations are only for a set number of months at a time, registrations do not allow use outside the house but only allow weapons to be kept in the house for self protection, etc.

Carry out house-to-house disarmament (again)

• Divide each area into zones, with specific police responsible for each zone

• Use a mixed group of police, military police, soldiers and civil authorities

• Include a foreigner in the mixed group, to increase confidence

• Require each household to swear and sign/thumbprint a paper that they have no unregistered guns in their house or possession

Review, revise, implement, and follow-up laws on weapons

There are at present clear laws. However, they are not implemented, and the penalty for every violation - illegal possession, use, buying, selling, loaning, etc. is the same: 1-5 years. Without a more graduated penalty for minor offenses, judges may be reluctant to sentence (if a case ever reaches them). Now things are ‘smoothed over.’

• Review and revise the gun control law and regulations. (Note: The ‘8-points’ is not a law but a declaration.)

• Have realistic and useful penalties specified for illegal gun possession and use: jail, compensation to the victim, public service time, etc. Now the authorities tend to help ‘smooth things over’ [We never heard of one clear case where someone was arrested and punished for illegal gun possession in the provinces. In a few cases people were picked up but released after a bribe. Other cases were reported to us as political harassment. Even most lawyers and government officials were not able to tell us what the penalties for illegal gun possession or use are.]

Work for disciplined armed forces and good security

• Work for a really politically neutral armed force, where soldiers, police and military police:

• receive rank by competence, not by connections

• get a decent and regular salary

• get training in discipline and how to behave

• are professional: now Ministry of Defense personnel and Ministry of Interior personnel often do not work well together, and if one tries to prosecute or collect weapons, the other protects the person with the weapons

• enforce the rules that already exist: no guns off military bases unless carrying a mission letter, etc.

• help soldiers’ families to feel secure (though soldiers’ background is that they don’t trust anyone or the social structures)

ŸAssist the government to demobilize well, with training

ŸAssist the government to build military bases - in some areas now soldiers have to carry their weapons with them everywhere they go, because they have no military base

ŸWork so that the government and security forces provide good security and people no longer feel they have to provide their own security.

V. Conclusion

Cambodia has suffered civil war for many years already. One major reason has been because superpower countries (both capitalist and communist) used Cambodia as a place to match forces and test armament. They still support different factions of Cambodian leadership. In a real example, after the events of July 1997 the government of the People’s Republic of China sent 186 military vehicles to the government of Cambodia in December 1997. At that time, it was not publicly announced that weapons were included, but after the delivery there were reports from soldiers in the intervention forces of the generals and from citizens in the provinces who were aware that new Chinese-model AK47 weapons were being given out in the conflict zone areas such as Siem Reap, Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kompong Thom, Koh Kong and other provinces. This kind of situation has, over many years, caused the number of weapons in Cambodia to increase until the country is flooded with them.

In our research, we saw that today there are large numbers of illegal weapons in the hands of ordinary citizens, civil servants, soldiers, police, and military police, and that the number of deaths and injuries from weapons is increasing significantly, because the use of weapons to kill others and commit other violent acts is increasing.

For our research we met, interviewed and discussed with many people. Some - less than 15% - think that the work of reducing the numbers of weapons is the work of the government and that the weapons issue is very complicated. They question why NGOs want to know about this issue, which is the internal business of the government, and they think NGOs cannot and should not do anything in this field. However, most people, including civil servants and members of the armed forces, are extremely interested that NGOs participate in solving the weapons problem and think NGOs could contribute very effectively.

In the plan appended to this report, there are two main goals: 1) to reduce the number of weapons in Cambodia, and 2) to reduce the practice of solving problems with weapons. The plan has five objectives, and for each objective we have shown many possible activities. On the basis of the research we have done so far and the results, we believe that all the activities we include in the plan are feasible and would have a good impact.

It is not necessary to try to take on everything at once. Many components of the plan could be picked up and worked on separately by various groups according to their sector and interests. However, in order to progress to an effective campaign throughout the country, there would have to be a base of activities first and then some ongoing coordination. This would require an institutional home, some regularly assigned staff, and access to some materials and equipment. A first fundamental strategic priority is to expand the base of people who support and believe that it is possible to address the weapons issue, and that they and we should do something.

Reflecting about the situation now and in the future, we are concerned that if there is not a program to reduce the number of weapons and the practice of using weapons to solve problems, the work of democracy, human rights, civil society, environment, and development, which are just now starting in Cambodia, will be very fragile and vulnerable.

If we want many people in Cambodia to dare to express their ideas, to participate actively in development activities, or to join together to oppose injustice, corruption, activities which harm the national interest, or other things which they do not like from the leadership or from those with power, there must be a more reasonable situation and security.

This work is urgent, because there are now uncountable numbers of weapons in the hands of individual Cambodians who are using weapons to earn a living through intimidation and violence against others. When people have become dependent on illegal use of guns to support themselves and their families, it will be more and more difficult to change the situation.

We recommend that a campaign to reduce the number of weapons and the practice of using weapons to solve problems start now.

APPENDIX I.

Proposed Action Plan

Goals

- To reduce the number of weapons

- To reduce the practice of using weapons to solve problems

 Note:

In the heading of the chart below, T = priority of timing and I = priority of importance

It is not necessary to try to implement this whole plan - rather, the activities here are options which can all contribute to the

goals. Some can be done independently, others depend on previous actions or on coordination with other activities.

Objectives and Activities

1. Develop a network of allies and resources working actively for disarmament

1.1 A core group of organizations is structured to coordinate so that the work of the campaign moves forward, with a decision-making body, record-keeping and communication functions, etc. That core group of people should be able to explain to other interested people what actions they can take to cooperate with the campaign.

1.2 Collect and develop related information as a resource for all other parts of the campaign, including:

1.2.1 - An information packet to give to organizations which want to know, "What can we do about the weapons issue?"

1.2.2 - Information from Ministry of Interior: statistics, weapons registration procedures and statistics

1.2.3 - Statistics in selected communes on weapon-related deaths and injuries: Are they committed by strangers or by family and friends? Under what circumstances? What other indicators can help establish whether it is safer to have a gun or no, and under what circumstances?

1.2.4 - Successful actions against weapons and violence

1.2.5 - Bad things that happen to people or communities who have guns (accidents, lack of development, etc.)

1.2.6 - The on-going situation of weapons trade in Cambodia and the related areas of the mafia, etc. (Review and summarize every 6 months or whenever it is suspected that the situation has changed.)

1.2.7 - Prices of weapons in neighboring countries

1.2.8 - International experience: global trade in small weapons, disarmament efforts (regularly collect; summarize every 6 months)

1.3 Work to build interest and support from various work sectors:

1.3.1 - Medical (weapons as a public health issue)

1.3.2 - Civil Society (because when there is weapons and fear people cannot freely be active in democratic processes)

1.3.3 - Human Rights (because weapons are so often the instrument to violate human rights)

1.3.4 - Community Development (because the fear and harm which weapons create damages the community trust and initiative which is needed for good development)

1.3.5 - Education (focus on weapons and violence as harmful elements in society)

1.3.6 - Forestry (because weapons are so widely used to carry out and protect illegal logging)

1.3.7 - Fisheries (because weapons are so widely used to intimidate and extort the fishing community)

1.3.8 - Culture (because weapons and public media have started to create the 'culture' that weapons = status, and violence is the first response to every problem)

1.4 Meetings in provinces

1.4.1 - First hold one meeting in each province about the current security and weapons situation and how people would like to respond; choose a liaison person

1.4.2 - Then regularly convene at least every 4 months in areas where there is interest to follow-up the situation, provide support, and decide if common action should be taken

1.5 Develop a speakers' bureau : a group of people who really believe in not having guns. Help them practice talking about the issues and answering difficult questions with role plays, debates, etc. Send them to speak at public gatherings, meetings, etc.

2. Cambodian citizens recognize and act on the fact that reliance on weapons has bad consequences for both individuals and society

2.01 Talk to AIDS Prevention and Ban Landmines campaigners to learn their ideas about how to do effective public education

2.02 A core of materials is produced for use in the campaign

2.02.1 - Create a symbol which can be given to people who have made some commitment against guns and can be worn publicly

2.02.2 - Develop and produce leaflets (one for illiterate persons and one for literate persons) on basic concepts: the problems of having weapons (use statistics, pictures, and cases) and the advantages of not having weapons. The leaflet should capture attention, persuade about the issue, and offer suggestions to the question, "What can I/we do about the weapons issue?"Distribute at meetings and through NGO networks and others who are interested.

2.02.3 - Develop and produce at least one poster

2.02.4 - Develop a T-shirt design which could be produced for special occasions and uses (eg. for people who publicly speak or declare themselves against weapons)

2.02.5 - Develop a one-half day and a full day curriculum which NGOs can incorporate into their training plans for their staff and participants

2.03 Coordinate people from the Speakers Bureau, organize more opportunities to present the issue

2.04 Start signature campaign; include both a statement of personal commitment regarding the use of weapons and a statement of expectations about what the government should do

2.05 A media campaign for youths to change the 'Hong Kong II" attitude and the idea that guns are status symbols. Try to find allies in the Ministry of Education to help with production, government approval, and showing it widely. Use:

- TV spots for broadcasting and showing by video in the countryside

- radio spots for broadcasting nationwide and playing on tape recorder

2.06 Organize an essay and art contest for youths to illustrate weapons and violence issues

2.07 Work with Buddhist leaders to develop an understanding that monks and wats will not depend on or use weapons; then support them in speaking about weapons (many have no 'moral authority' to do this now, since monks and wats themselves keep guns)

2.08 Talk to the media about how they show guns and violence and gun-related deaths; talk to the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Information about the amount and timing of television showing random violence

2.09 Use short term moratoriums on media violence as a symbol on special occasions

2.10 Later media work could be planned after assessing its affect

2.11 Find forums to research and reflect on the issues of; what is security? How is security achieved? What is the normal role of weapons in a peaceful society?

2.12 Cooperate with any groups working so that non-violence and conflict resolution are included in the national education curriculum

3. There is real commitment from the government leadership that guns are not seen are seen in Cambodia

3.1 Follow-up on any commitments relating to weapons and violence from political parties which were elected

3.2 Lobby that the Tuk Thla weapons market is closed

3.3 Have lawyers look at the whole related body of law (including registration, the legal status of the '8-Points,' armed bodyguards) and then lobby for changes as needed

3.4 Lobby that laws and regulations are implemented:

3.4.1 - organize reactions to violations. This includes supporting protests by citizens, citizens' groups, villages, etc. against wrongful intimidation and use of weapons (eg. the fishing community in Kompong Som)

3.4.2 - All permits which were previously issued voided and new registration procedures are tightened up

3.4.3 - follow-up that violators are actually taken to court (and not allowed to pay bribes) and the courts rule justly and independently, with the proper penalties imposed

3.5 Lobby international businesses and governments to encourage the Cambodian government to recognize the benefits of a society without violence and weapons - that violence and weapons harm development and breed anarchy and disorder in society

4. The Cambodian Armed Forces carry and use their weapons with discipline, and the number of weapons is greatly reduced

4.1 Present findings and intentions to key government figures

4.2 Lobby the government to further disarm the milia in all areas where it is possible

4.3 Cooperate with any groups working on demobilization issues

4.4 Train armed forces about human rights, the laws and regulations relating to weapons (note: a lot of human rights training has been done already)

4.5 Monitor and protest violations of discipline

4.6 Monitor government arms imports

5. No civilians have guns

5.1 Research and test a collection program, implement more widely if appropriate

5.1.1 - Research. May include directly talking with / visiting places that have implemented weapons collections programs

5.1.2 - Work so the government agrees:

- to grant amnesty to people bringing in weapons

- that we may collect and then immediately destroy weapons

5.1.3 - Design and then test in 3 different provinces, in one district each, with mobile team model, and:

- cooperate with local authorities

- pay a 'set-value-below-market-price' for weapons turned in

- do advance explanation of why the weapons are being collected and how it will be done

- pay a small amount to the commune for each weapon turned in there

5.1.4 - Use the experience to design a more community based development oriented disarmament, looking at the experience of Nicauragua. Test that model - at least the early steps of it.

5.1.5 - Then share the lessons from that test with the development NGOs which might be interested to implement it in the areas where they work.

Names of Places Visited and the Kinds of Persons Interviewed

Please note:

In order to preserve confidentiality about a subject that is sometimes sensitive, the roles rather than the names of the people who were interviewed are shown.

This table is arranged in the order that we visited the provinces.