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Who Is Really Mr. Hun Sen?
By Raoul Marc Jennar

The forty-fifth anniversary of the Independence of contemporary Cambodia should provide a good opportunity to examine the extremely tormented history of these past decades. Yet, it is precisely when a serene and exact view should be taken by Cambodians themselves about their recent past that a campaign to re-write history culminates, lead by a political party of opposition, that of Mr. Sam Rainsy, and systematically taken up by a few radical right-wing American members of Congress and a certain number of journalists.

Indeed, the discourse is eminently political. Unfortunately, each knows that politics, at times a remarkable human activity, can become a real business of perversion of thought when it is practised by demagogues.

Mr. Sam Rainsy leads the most radical of oppositions against Mr. Hun Sen. It is his right to do so. However, one must be aware of the fact that he uses any old method and, preferably, that which intellectual honesty and moral rigour object to.

The documents produced by himself, his entourage or his American relays should be studied with extreme caution. The false evidence which had been produced under his sphere of influence has already been mentioned before (refer to CRC 14). In documents for which he is directly or indirectly responsible, one must also take careful note of a series of procedures used which should caution the reader: strange mixture between persons and between facts, modification of facts and dates, out of context presentation of events to modify their understanding. In short, the manipulation of past events that completely alter the historical truth as a means to partisan ends has become common practice. And yet, historical truth has a right of its own. No one, of course, is in possession of it. This is the big dilemma of many historians and political analysts. There is, however, a big difference between those who strive to approach it and those who, systematically, try to change it.

So many inaccurate words have been written, spoken or insinuated, so many contradictory and incomplete versions of such or such an episode of Mr. Hun Sen’s life have been published that it seems necessary, today, to attempt to define better this figure, without leaving any areas of uncertainty or, at least, admitting them honestly.

Some American congressmen have just put forward a resolution concerning Mr. Hun Sen which has been adopted by a majority of their colleagues at the US House of Representatives. Evidently, none of the members of this assembly has the necessary qualifications authorising him to present himself as a historian specialised in Cambodia. And, it is not yet the congressmen of a country, be it the most powerful, who can establish the historical truth or define the law for all.

Of course, it is the reputation and credibility of those who adopted the resolution which is now tarnished. Indeed, they have brilliantly shown that they ignore all of the present and past realities of Cambodia and that they are quite happy to reprocess the slanders poured out by Cambodians of the opposition with very little scruples.

Thus, for example, when one of them, Mr. Porter, during the debate concerning resolution 533 of Mr. Rohrabacher, claims, on the 10 October 1998 at the US House of Representatives that "According to a new report from the relief group, Medecins sans Frontieres, Hun Sen was responsible for the deaths of 200,000 Cambodians as leader of Cambodia's Vietnamese communist puppet regimr from 1984 to 1989." Yet, such an MSF document has never been produced, neither in the past nor recently. There is a book. It was published 10 years ago as part of a collection of which MSF was a partner of the publisher Regine Desforges. This book contains a personal testimony of Ms. Luciolli. She recounts operation K5 (the “wall of bamboo”). She estimates that 50,000 persons died during this operation due mainly to malaria and mines. Of course, Mr. Porter is careful not to mention the fact that operation K5, decided upon in 1982 by a government which was not headed by Mr. Hun Sen, was aiming to protect the country against the incursions of armed groups of Pol Pot which had re-formed after 1979 with the active support of the US. We shall come back to this point later.

We realise then that, between the claims of Mr. Porter, which are part of Mr. Sam Rainsy’s campaign, and the personal testimony – testimony which underwent verification – of Ms. Luciolli, the misinformation from sources which were already uncertain has indeed made its impact. This is the type of manipulation that is more than commonly found in the discourse of Mr. Sam Rainsy and those inspired by him.

The present biographical note of Mr. Hun Sen reports facts that have shaped his life since birth. This note is the result of some ten hours of interviews with the concerned, as well as a number of witnesses of his life and relentless research undertaken for the last 10 years. The facts reported herein cannot be refuted by the scientific approach of the historical analyst. Indeed, they have been subjected to it.

This type of work has also been carried out, not only by historians, but also by the American intelligence services who, for years on end, have tried to find reasons to tarnish the image of the one who was, since January 1985, President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and later, of the State of Cambodia.

This is not an official biography. The author alone takes full responsibility for it.

Childhood And Youth Under Sihanouk (1952-1970)

Mr. Hun Sen was born on the 4 April 1952 in Peam Koh Smar, district of Stueng Trang, Kompong Cham province. His parents were modest peasants who cultivated mostly tobacco and rice on the bank of the Mekong, bank which was subject to the erosion of the large river. His mother, Mrs. Dy Yan (still called Dy Pok), who died in 1998, gave 6 children to Mr. Hun Neang, his father. Mr. Hun Sen has two older brothers and three younger sisters.

From 1958 to 1964, he attended the primary school in the village where he was born. Regularly, he showed himself as one of the three best students of his class. In September 1964, he arrived in Phnom Penh where he found a roof under the Wath Neak Kavoan pagoda in Tuol Kork district. He was taken in under the protection of a monk, the Achar Chreng. He attended secondary school at the Indra Devi school. It was at this time that the Achar Chreng as well as one of Hun Sen’s professors, Mr. Oeum Nim, started to talk to him about social and political issues. Whilst listening to them and discovering Phnom Penh, he became aware of the enormous disparities between the fate of the city dwellers and that of the rural population, of the poverty in the countryside and the wealth of the cities, of the social disparities created by the exploitation by the wealthy. As the young son of a peasant, forced to seek shelter in a pagoda, he was confronted to their arrogance and contempt. It is also at this time that he discovered another dimension which was, up to then, unknown to him: the Vietnam war. The bombing of the border villages like Chantrea (Svay Rieng province), Anlong Kres (Kompong Cham province) or Dak Dam (Mondolkiri province) by the US Air Force, followed by the rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States were current events at the time when young Hun Sen was starting his life as a secondary school student.

When he was not at school, he was collecting food for the monks. His itinerary regularly brought him to visit a hairdresser who had a chess board set up for his customers. It was there that Hun Sen became a fearsome chess player.

One of his older cousins, Niv Kien, who lived in the same pagoda, was a militant of the Cambodian communist party, then called the Workers Party of Kampuchea. He regularly entrusted his younger cousin with messages hidden in bread that were to be brought to different locations within the city. During the repression that followed the peasant revolts of Samlaut (1967-1968), Niv Kien was arrested, as were many of the left-wing activists. Many became victims of summary executions. This incited Mr. Hun Sen, at the end of 1968, to return to the countryside to be near his parents.

Upon his return, Hun Sen saw that his parents had lost the main part of their two and a half hectares of land due to the erosion caused by the Mekong. They had left their village to settle to the East, in the region of Memot. It was there, in a village called Phum Chamkar Thmei, in the commune of Tonlung, Memot district, that they cultivated land that had become accessible.

Mr. Hun Sen then started working in the rubber plantations. He renewed his contacts with communist activists and dedicated most his time to propaganda and his activities as a messenger. Above all, he strove to make the young workers of the plantation realise the social disparities of which they were victims. He urged them to rise up against the seizures of lands. At one point, he even had to flee to Kratie province to escape from the police.

The War (1970-1975)

On the 18 March 1970, at the end of the day, Mr. Hun Sen attended a performance in Tonlung, given by a troupe of artists from Phnom Penh. During the interval, the news of the destitution of Prince Sihanouk spread amidst the spectators. A couple of days later, Mr. Hun Sen witnessed the extremely violent repression of which the demonstrators who supported the Prince were victims.

A few days before the Khmer new year, Mr. Hun Sen was captured by soldiers of the new republican army. He had participated in one of the demonstrations organised following the call to resistance from Beijing by Prince Sihanouk on the 24 March. On the 14 April, American helicopters launched an attack in the province of Kompong Cham. It is on that day that Mr. Hun Sen, who was able to escape, decided to take to the maquis with some 400 other young people who had just finished celebrating the Khmer new year. They were integrated in one of the many groups of “Khmer rumbdo” (Khmer liberation) which had then been created.

Little by little, these groups were to join those who were fighting under the banner of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) created by Prince Sihanouk. The large majority of those who had taken to the maquis were convinced that they were fighting for Norodom Sihanouk and believed that he was their real leader.

The NUFK called for the support of China, North Vietnam and the NFL (Vietcong). They immediately brought military assistance in the form of arms and ammunitions.

North Vietnam and the Vietcong, who then had sanctuaries inside the country which their soldiers could reach by crossing the Ho Chi Minh trail, also sent instructors and troops who were to be seen at the front during the first confrontations with the republican army and its allies. The NUFK also had the support of all of the countries of the Soviet bloc and a number of Third World countries.

In the forest, Mr. Hun Sen received elementary military training. Starting on 25 April, he participated in the take-over of the barracks of Snuol (Kratie province). His leadership qualities were appreciated and he was appointed member of the local military committee. It was there that his unit suffered the shock of the American invasion decided by Mr. Nixon on 30 April. Memot and Snuol were completely destroyed on the 1 May by the tanks of the 11th US regiment of the armoured cavalry, backed up by helicopters of the first squadron of the US cavalry. Mr. Hun Sen had just undergone his baptism of fire. He was wounded in his left leg. He belonged to a unit of approximately 300 men. Only some 30 of them survived. They retrieved on highway 7, going towards Kompong Cham.

They continued their battle against the American-South-Vietnamese forces during the whole of 1971 along this road. During one of the battles against the troops of Saigon, Mr. Hun Sen, who was then head of the unit, was wounded a second time, this time in the face.

Once he had recovered from his wounds, Mr. Hun Sen was sent to the district of Dambae. With 78 young men, he followed in-depth military training for 12 months. He became an expert in intelligence operations. It was then that he met the only leader of the Democratic Kampuchea that he ever met before the peace negotiations at the end of the 80s. Indeed, in 1972, Ieng Sary visited the training centre where Mr. Hun Sen was studying.

Once his training was completed, Mr. Hun Sen was appointed squadron leader, leading a commando in charge of missions of intelligence. In Kompong Russey village, on the bank of the Mekong river, he was once again wounded in the leg in 1973 whilst carrying out these activities.

At the end of that year, he became squadron leader of the 55th battalion of infantry. He was still fighting around the area of Kompong Cham. On the 1 January 1975, in the village of Chirau Mouy, he was wounded in the shoulder. On the 16 April, during an offensive near Kompong Cham city, at Banteay Pom (Tonle Bet village), near the tower still visible from Kompong Cham city, he suffered wounds in the head and in the back. He lost his left eye. He remained unconscious until the 28 April and was treated in a countryside hospital that had been set up underneath a house on stilts in the village of Boeng Pruol, a few kilometres in the North..

On the 17 April, the Khmer Republic collapsed. However, it was not the NUFK who would take over. It was the tendency lead by Pol Pot of the Cambodian communist party which had, little by little, succeeded in infiltrating the structure of the NUFK. The royalists of the NUFK had had little structure and discipline. They had been weak. The communists, on the other hand, had been organised and determined. At their core, the Pol Potists, devoid of any scruples, had been even more determined. Starting in 1973, the latter had succeeded in taking control of the NUFK. This tendency was characterised by fanatical nationalism and radical agrarian collectivism. It distinguished itself by the extreme brutality of its methods. Cambodia had become Democratic Kampuchea. Vietnam, which had been the main ally and supporter of the NUFK during the five previous years, quickly became the main enemy.

From 1970 to 1975, Mr. Hun Sen fought as a patriot on behalf of the NUFK against a regime that had taken over the legitimate Chief of State and which had placed itself under the control of the United States and the Republic of South Vietnam. He fought as a soldier in the context of a
civil war. No testimony, no indication from the intelligence services signal a participation of his in activities against civilians. An ex-officer in the republican army has accused him of having participated, in September 1973, under the command of Mr. Heng Samrin, in a military action against the hospital of Kompong Cham during which a number of civilians supposedly died. Apart from the fact that Mr. Hun Sen had never met Mr. Heng Samrin prior 1978, his responsibility in this operation cannot be established. This has been proved by Elisabeth Becker.

According to his comrades-in-arms of that period, Mr. Hun Sen fought so that, after the victory, the political and social objectives announced in the programme of the NUFK could be realised. This programme, supported by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had rallied hundreds of thousands of
sympathisers to the NUFK. It announced reforms that aimed towards a society which would be freer and more just in a country that would be independent and neutral.

In 1973, Mr. Hun Sen realised for the first time that all of the NUFK units were not under a common chain of command. For the first time, he was informed of the draining out of certain combatants, mainly patriots who had returned from abroad (students who had responded to the appeal of the NUFK or Cambodian communists who had been exiled in Hanoi following the 1954 Geneva agreements) and people loyal to Prince Sihanouk. He himself had started worrying for a while when, in 1974, he was surprised to find out about certain activities of one of the neighbouring units concerning another military region (304). One of his uncles, Mouth Ho, a two-star general in the republican army, then offered him to rally. Despite his increasing doubts concerning certain decisions made under the NUFK leadership, Mr. Hun Sen stayed loyal to the cause to which he had committed himself in 1970.

Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1977)

Mr. Hun Sen resumed his service at the end of September 1975, during Pchum ben, the festival of the dead that was no more celebrated, except in secret. He received orders to participate in the repression of a revolt of the Cham. He avoided it using as an excuse complications in his eye that needed new treatment. Too many memories bound him to these Muslim Cambodians whom he had had close contact with throughout his youth in the province which bears their name. Nothing, according to him, could justify the extermination of the Cham. It was only in November that he resumed once again his leadership. He was assigned to one of the regiments stationed in the 21st region, based in Memot. This regiment was in charge of protecting the border with Vietnam.

Although he was considered as being handicapped, he was appointed deputy commander of the regiment and chief of this regiment staff. In order to understand the real level of responsibility Mr. Hun Sen had during the two years when he was an army officer of the Democratic Kampuchea, one must remember that Cambodia was divided into zones. There were 8 zones. Each of them was then divided into regions. Several regiments were stationed in each of the regions. In region 21, where Mr. Hun Sen was stationed, there were three regiments. He was deputy commander of one of these three regiments. The commander was Chum Hort.

As deputy commander, Mr. Hun Sen found himself at the lowest level of the military hierarchy of the Democratic Kampuchea army. He was in the 7th rank of the hierarchy of the 21st region which was one of the five regions of the Eastern zone which, in turn, was only one of the 8 zones of the country.

So Phim was the highest ranking official responsible for the Eastern zone.

Except when the Cham were involved, he applied the directives of the Angkar with moderation. Until May 1978, this zone was one which had been the least scarred by the brutalities of the Pol Pot regime. All of the testimonies of the survivors confirm this.

On the 5 January 1976, in a village of Tbong Khmum district, thirteen handicapped ex-combatants were set to be married. Amongst them was Mr. Hun Sen. He married Ms. Bun Sam Heng, better known today as Bun Rany. Ms. Bun Sam Heng was born in 1954 in the village of Roka Knor, Krouch Chhmar district, the fourth among five children in a family of farmers. In this village, in 1980, the Khmer Rouge will kill her father during a raid. In 1972, she was a nurse in the NUFK forces. She met Mr. Hun Sen in 1973 in the village of Kompong Russey, in a dispensary where he was recovering from his wounds at the leg. By organising their marriage, the Angkar was in fact fulfilling their wishes.

Little is known of the military biography of Mr. Hun Sen during that year of 1976. No testimony associates him with any particular activity, political or military. He was, in fact, extensively run down by the injuries he had sustained during the previous year and was only slowly recovering from the paralysis of the left side of his body. The construction of dykes and canals were the main activities for all, civilians and military personnel alike.

At the end of that year, Mrs. Bun Rany gave birth to a boy who died accidentally the same day. Later, Mr. Hun Sen would deny that the baby had been killed by the Khmer Rouge. T.D. Allman, a journalist, had written about this. Mr. Hun Sen had refused to use this tragedy to enrich his family biography with a “victim of the Khmer Rouge” section which was contrary, on this point, to the reality.

The Rebellion (1977)

Upon finishing his convalescence at the end of 1975, Mr. Hun Sen discovered the massive deportation of entire cities and the repression against the Cham. He learnt that people were disappearing without reasons. His own father, although a resistant fighter, had been deported after having been accused of having been, during the period of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (the name given by Sihanouk to his regime from 1955 to 1970), the local leader of the Sihanoukist militia. His mother and youngest sister were also deported. Four of his cousins and one uncle were killed by the Angkar (Khmer word meaning “organisation” which was used by the Khmer Rouge to designate the Cambodian communist party of which they had kept secret the leadership role until September 1977).

Little by little, Mr. Hun Sen discovered that the Angkar was implementing a policy which was far removed from the ideas of the NUFK or from any communist ideals which he had learnt from his cousin and his teacher when he had been in Phnom Penh.

He discovered that the leadership of the country was driven by ultra-nationalism and racism that had not been in any way announced by the NUFK. He discovered that all of those who, yesterday, had been allies and friends fighting for a common cause, were, today, treated like the worse enemies and savagely eliminated. He discovered a climate of intense suspicion and that the best elements of the old NUFK were the first ones to disappear.

Little by little, he uncovered the project aiming to destroy Khmer society: families were dispersed, children were encouraged to denounce their parents, monks were defrocked, pagodas were burnt, entire populations were deported, starved, exhausted, annihilated.

He decided to rebel against the regime that had betrayed the aims for which he had fought before 1975. It was not the lack of determination – according to him, he had had this determination since the end of 1975 – but, rather, poor health which prevented him from doing anything in 1976. In addition, an interior battle was extremely dangerous. Many uprisings and conspiracies had been foiled and suppressed through blood baths. Everyone was living in the terror of getting arrested or of being invited to one of those mysterious summons from which no one ever came back. An escape to Vietnam remained very dangerous. The Vietnamese were not tired yet with the border incidents provoked by Democratic Kampuchea and, in 1976, Cambodian deserters were still being turned back.

At the beginning of 1977, the situation had become more favourable. The Vietnamese were not yet assisting the Cambodian communists who had fallen out with Pol Pot. Nevertheless, they were no longer systematically turning back deserters.

Mr. Hun Sen decided to rebel against Democratic Kampuchea at the time when the preparations for an offensive against the Vietnamese provinces of Song Be and Tai Ninh were being engaged. The methods to delay the offensive used by Mr. Hun Sen and Sok Sath, the political commissioner of the regiment, and by Chum Sey, his deputy, started creating suspicion amongst the headquarters of the 75th battalion from which the 21st regiment was dependent. Sok Sath and Chum Sey were arrested and executed.

Shortly after this, Mr. Hun Sen decided to leave to Vietnam, together with some of his friends (Buth Than, Nhek Huon, Por Ean, San Sanh, Ung Phan). They left Tonlung on the 20 June 1977 at about 9 pm and short after they penetrated the Vietnamese province of Song Be. Two days later, they were arrested and transferred to Loc Ninh, then to Song Be where they were imprisoned for three months.

Mr. Hun Sen = Pol Pot: Re-Writing History

Mr. Sam Rainsy, picking up once again the language and arguments used by the Khmer Rouge, has not missed a single occasion to present Mr. Hun Sen as another Pol Pot.

Other than its very insulting or fiercely polemic side, this assertion is either a simple slander which is backed up by nothing else than a complete lack of information – and in this case, who would commit himself to utter such accusation – or it is a real will to completely transform history in order to soil, tarnish and discredit.

The author of these words continues to be haunted by the examples of intellectuals who, in good or bad faith, made the mistake, between 1975 and 1979, about persons who, later, were to go down in history under the name of Khmer Rouge. The attitude of academics such as Steve Heder or François Rigaux has acted as a deterrent. There have been a few, like Jean Lacouture, who have had the courage to recognise – in his case as early as 1977 – that they had been wrong.

It is because I have lived with this fear that I undertook research with the greatest care and caution possible, in a context where written traces are rare, where testimonies are fragile and require multiple verifications, where there is a real habit of secrecy and where re-writing history is a trait of political culture.

This is what I can conclude about the biography of Mr. Hun Sen:

1. Starting in 1969, when he was 17 years old, he was close to, if not already a member of, the communist party.

2. His commitment to it was limited to a role of messenger in Phnom Penh, and later, in the East of the provinces of Kompong Cham and Kratie.

3. His commitment in 1970 up until 1975 was that of a member of the resistance of the NUFK, responding to a call from Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He showed great physical courage and evident military qualities. He was not involved in any of the operations against civilian populations as had been witnessed in certain “liberated zones”. His area of action remained the same zone of combat until 1975.

4. Starting on the 17 April 1975 and insofar as his health permitted him, he was an officer in a regular army taking part in the leadership of a local border unit which received direct orders from a provincial military structure. Until he broke off from the regime that he objected to, his unit was not associated with any activities of repression of the civilian population or any other offensive activities against a neighbouring country.

5. His military authority never extended beyond his zone of activity. From 1970 to 1977, he never left the province of Kompong Cham (or the Eastern zone as it was called in 1975). He never exercised any function in the government, political bureau or central committee of the communist party, or in the security apparatus of Democratic Kampuchea. Before going over to Vietnam, he had never yet met those who would wait one more year before escaping the Pol Pot
regime. Before 1977, Mr. Hun Sen had not met any officers of the Democratic Kampuchea army who became, in 1979, important leaders of the Popular Republic of Kampuchea, as is the case of Mr. Chea Sim, Mr. Heng Samrin and Mr. Sar Kheng. He only met them once they had escaped to Vietnam after May 1978.

The officers of the Wehrmacht who rebelled against Hitler in July 1944 are today considered as heroes despite the fact that they were associated to the crimes against peace and the war crimes of the Nazi regime and that they waited until the defeat was certain to attempt to overthrow their leader.

Mr. Hun Sen was an officer in the regular army in charge of a local command. He split from a heinous regime at the summit of its power, without ever being associated to any of its crimes.

None of the acts of the deputy commander Hun Sen can be used to charge him with crime against peace, war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide.