'This New Government Will Last'
A candid conversation with Premier Hun Sen
It has taken him a long time, but Hun Sen has finally got what he wanted - acknowledgment as sole prime minister and undisputed leader of Cambodia. To get there, the 47-year-old strongman initially rode roughshod over his opponents, then compromised with them. In an exclusive interview on Dec. 1 with Special Correspondent Dominic Faulder, Hun Sen looked back - and ahead. In an Asiaweek Online exclusive, here is the expanded version of their talk:
Q. This is the first time I have met you as sole prime minister. Am I meeting a new Hun Sen?
It's the same Hun Sen, not a new Hun Sen.
Q. So you haven't changed in your own perception.
No.
Q. The new government is in many ways very similar to the one which preceded it. Why do you believe this one will succeed when the last one failed?
We did not foresee that the previous one would fail. This time we can foresee that it will last to the end of its term. Up to now I have led three different governments with different ways of working. In 1985 to 1993, I led a one-party government. In 1993 to 1998, I led a government of two prime ministers with four political parties. It is now 24 hours since I have been leading a government with one prime minister and two parties. The point of my confidence is that the commencement is different from that of 1993. In 1993, we started with integration without real mutual understanding and without a legal framework. Then, we did not even have a Constitution, so we just compromised with each other without any real framework. It was very difficult for us to counter that situation which later led to the split of the government. Compared to 1993, we are starting with the Constitution and many legal frameworks. The neutralization of the armed forces and civil administration has to a certain extent been successful, which serves the result of the election. At the same time, the two parties have also achieved with each other a common political program for the government and party co-operation in more detail. The Khmer Rouge no more constitute a power or something to [add weight] to any party. This time we will not have difficulties solving problems because we have only one prime minister and we will abide by the political program and legal framework. Another small point. It's like a husband and wife after being separated and coming to live together again. One has to be more cautious with the other. At least one has to be more respectful, starting from the use of words, with one another.
Q. If we look back on the period since July 1997 when the split occurred, it's probably been the most difficult period in your already difficult political career. Is there anything that you look back upon which you would never do again? What were the lessons?
No university in the world can give us such lessons. There were no experienced advisers for what to do in such a situation. Normally, when facing life and death, no one would choose death. Now it's best to [go for] prevention. We are being cautious. We will not allow any more arms build-ups, or anything else which is against the law. We have to promote peace, security. When people ask me why I did as I did last year, it's hard. There are no lessons [for this] in any university in the world.
Q. There is a perception of Cambodia: guns and violent crime. More importantly, there is a perception that there are people who are above the law, who are warlords. How will the problem of people who are in positions of power and enjoy impunity be addressed?
I think that [problem] will require [stern] measures within the coming five years. This time, it will be easier carrying out laws. It will not be motivated by politics or by any party. I can assure you that impunity can be enjoyed only by those people who commit crimes and one cannot find evidence [against them]. Once evidence is found, they can no more enjoy impunity. Actually, I do not agree with the use of the word impunity. Those who use such a word do not provide us with any evidence. [If] you provided us with evidence and we did not take any action, then you can use the word impunity.
Q. In September in Siem Reap, you were attacked with a rocket-propelled grenade. That was a very serious incident. Has that investigation progressed? Have you found out who did it?
We have some signs but it would still be early to say anything about that. If I was killed, it would have been a type of coup d'etat. I could not see the consequence of that [if] I was dead already. The person who envisaged such a plot did not foresee what [would] happen after Hun Sen got killed. We will continue investigations. Referring to this, I wonder why they used the word impunity without giving us evidence. So far we could not even investigate. Before the investigation is complete, we could not accuse or charge anyone. We can arrest enemies of Hun Sen, but without evidence it would be wrong to arrest any person. If it had been other parties facing [this kind of] difficult time, they would say it was from Hun Sen. Here there is no evidence.
Q. That's true, but if we look at incidents of violence, Cambodia has a very weak record on resolution. We're not discussing impunity so much as police solving cases. It is not for journalists to accuse people but for the police to resolve such crimes. The police in Cambodia consistently fail. Why is that?
It's like diving into a river to find a needle or a pin. If I am not mistaken, the assassination of the heads of state of some [other] countries have not been [solved]. In 1986 or 1987, the Swedish prime minister Palme was assassinated. They could not find the killer. We can say that it's weak police in Sweden, or what else? We have to handle it case by case. For the last few weeks, we have been arresting those involved in armed robbery and kidnappings for ransom, including foreigners and police. America will bring a plane to take back three criminals they had issued letters of arrest for in America but could not [catch]. We arrested them in Cambodia. We also arrested a Japanese terrorist who had carried out acts of terrorism since the 1960s. Those who commit such crimes can get away for some days but not for their whole lives.
Q. Those are successes I wouldn't dispute, but even so do you recognize that there is a need for dramatic improvement in policing in Cambodia?
We need professional training very much and materials, the means of working, so that their work will be more effective. In the last few years, our police were very weak in acting against narcotics because they did not even know what were drugs. Even if drug traffickers put the drugs in front of them, they did not know. With professional training and assistance from America and other countries, our police could be more effective. It's true that we need to further train and assist our police. According to our experience, bad people, drug traffickers, armed robbers, are more experienced and advanced than the police. Their knowledge of science is more advanced. The police need to carry out investigations and find means to curb them.
Q. Yesterday, you said your first priority in government was ASEAN entry. Why is it so important and what will you be doing in the next fortnight?
Cambodia's entry into ASEAN has been delayed for a year. From now until admittance is only a short time. Because of the time constraint, we have to push [for] our admittance. It will provide political profit and other [benefits] when we are admitted. I think now [is] the right time.
Q. The National Assembly has had problems in the last couple of years. Is legislation in place for ASEAN entry?
I think there is quite enough paper from the National Assembly for Cambodia to join ASEAN. The difficulties we have faced lately in the National Assembly is on two points. One difficulty is the shortage of a quorum. We require seven tenths of members to participate. Secondly, the political dispute also stalled meetings of the National Assembly. In coming times, the problem of quorums will be reduced. CPP will have only a few people who carry two positions as members of the government and also the National Assembly. Funcinpec also has the same plan. I believe there will not be any big obstacles or differences that will stall meetings. We feel that both the National Assembly and the government can carry on over the next five years.
Q. So if you were not completely ready with legislation for the Hanoi meeting, you could catch up very quickly afterwards.
Happily, we have all the paperwork completed since last year.
Q. When you enter ASEAN, there is a whole tariff structure that will come into play at some point. Cambodia is very dependent on customs revenue for the national budget. What provisions may have to be made with ASEAN entry to protect this?
This is very important and we have to consider carefully when we will carry out AFTA. According to the agreement, it provides us ten years to [implement] -- not just immediately once we enter ASEAN. We feel that if we are too hurried it would be dangerous. The free tax on importation would reduce our [revenues] and would also kill our local handicraft and manufacturing. The aim is to shorten the imbalance between imports and exports. In carrying out these agreements, what could be the replacements for the revenues we have from tax? This is the question we have to think further about. One of the considerations could be oil and gas -- whether by that time in another ten years [these] could provide revenue or not. I think that five years will not be time [enough] to carry out the agreement within AFTA. By 2003, I hope the new prime minister will come in and solve that problem. If we travel by train empty handed, we are just passengers on that train. I don't want to be too independent on the train so that they can drop us off anywhere they like. We would like to have our own means too.
Q. 2003. So you no longer plan to stay on as prime minister until 2015, the date you mentioned once before?
Too tired, I think. After the [early] results of the election, on the 28th July I offered my resignation. No one among the CPP's top leaders agreed to my request. I foresee that by the year 2003, [it] will be time for me to take rest. But who knows what will happen then? I am a bit strange from other people. If they do not ask me to leave, I would like to leave. But if they ask me to leave, I would like to stay. On the 28th of July this year, nobody asked me to leave, but I requested it. In August and September, there were demonstrations [for] me to step down. One has to be cautious.
By the year 2002, if I am not being expelled I would like to leave. But if they would like to push me, I would like to stay. That is also based on winning elections.
Q. From where you're sitting at the beginning of December 1998, there is no reason for Cambodia not to enter ASEAN mid-month -- providing, of course, there is ASEAN goodwill to receive you as new member.
I share the same view. Therefore I only appeal to ASEAN to keep the promise in which they said they would admit Cambodia after the new government is set up. Everything has been prepared for that, but last year because of the situation they said they could not admit Cambodia. But now the whole thing has been solved, a new government has been set up, so we are entitled to be admitted.
Q. Yesterday, you read out your government's manifesto for the next five years. We can't go through everything. There must be some items which give you particular personal concern -- cause you to wake up in the night. What are they?
Something I keep in mind, even to the point I wake up at night, is what happened before the death of my mother before the election. That relates the setting up of a new ministry, the ministry of water resources, methodology and areas for irrigation. I need to use a calculator to see how much we could do in five years. This was included in the CPP political program in its extraordinary plenum of March 1998. The other point relates to the 6 + 1 imbalances. In the coming years, we are trying our best to reduce the seven imbalances. Another point relates to my statement of 22 October. When I wake up at nighttime, I have to add some more points to that statement which has now become my political program. Important points are forestry policy and taxation and inventory policy.
Q. Another looming problem is the whole issue of donor support next year. The formation of a government obviously takes you a step closer to securing that aid. How much of a crisis is there in the situation at the moment?
I think the establishment of the new government will normalize our relations with donor countries as well as financial institutions. I am not sure about the US position, but I hope that it will release last year's frozen assistance. I have strong hopes for the EU and Japan because they continued normally their assistance programs. ADB has extended its credit for development, but what we would like is to have further assistance from the World Bank and IMF. I think from now until early February, the time donor countries will hold their consultation in Tokyo about further assistance to Cambodia -- it could be considered the last ICORC -- they will take into consideration the success achieved by the government. In order to secure assistance, it requires not just the establishment of the government, but the government to fulfill all the agreed points with donor countries. Tomorrow we will have the first meeting of the Council of Ministers [cabinet] of the new government, and some measures will be issued. On the 4th of December, we will adopt the national budget for 1999, and there will be some [new] measures in financial law.
Q. November was a really rather remarkable month in Cambodian history. It started in political deadlock and then in a three day period moved incredibly fast. Everybody has opinions on what may have happened, but would be interested to hear your account of what suddenly caused the change.
I would like to share you our strategy to bring the situation to this moment, wh at we considered our task. In late December, we set three important tasks which led to the final stage. First, by using the mechanism of the old government we had to normalize the situation in all respects. We had to curb the situation f rom deteriorating to the point we could not control it. Within that strategy, w e should not run otherwise we would fall. At the time, there was a boycott on r ecognizing the result of the election. Our best choice was to continue with the existing government. We strengthened everything -- security, the financial sit uation and macroeconomy. The second task was to safeguard the result of the election -- allow no one to destroy it. If we allowed the result to be destroyed, it would be a great loss to the Cambodian people and to the friends of Cambodia who helped it hold this election. Third, we had to be active communicating with parties who had seats in the National Assembly and with reconciliation hope to achieve [its] convening and the setting up of the new government. I always advised my colleagues within CPP that we had to be like elder brothers and try to work with the younger brothers, try to provide tolerance to them. When we curbed the situation from deteriorating, it was one of the [things] which brought our party together. Explaining it another way, [it was] taking the national interest first -- especially by the two major parties, Funcinpec and CPP. Therefore the two parties had to provide each other [with] concessions in order to lead to a solution. [Another] point is the result of the election has been nationally and internationally recognized, so there was no choice [of] turning it over. The third was encouragement by international friends who pushed all political parties with seats in the National Assembly to sit together, work together, to find a solution. The fourth point, which is the key point, is the role of King Norodom Sihanouk. It was the fourth point but the determining factor. In Cambodia nobody can play a role to replace King Sihanouk. It is fortunate Cambodia has King Sihanouk who was able to call all political parties to sit together, work together. People were without any optimism, but suddenly there was a breakthrough and everything could be achieved. I used to say that seeing calm water doesn't mean there are no fish in [it]. Seeing no people sitting at a table talking does not mean there is no talk under the table. My experience of more than a decade is talks under the table, so once you put [the dish] on the table it's already cooked.
Q. What was the biggest concession you made to your 'younger brother'?
Some criticized me for giving too many concessions to the party which had less seats than us in the National Assembly. [The cabinet] is almost 50:50. I stressed to my colleagues that it's not a question of 50:50 or 60:40 but of the country moving forward. I just explained in a simple way that you have to sacrifice something to get something. For example, in farming you need to plough, provide labor, seed, fertilizer -- you need to take care of everything before you can harvest. It is required [for a] win-win solution. It is all within the win-win formula. To call the Khmer Rouge out of the jungle, we [have to] recognize them and allow them to live in our society, keep ranks for them. The concession here is for the nation -- working together for the nation. The political program of the government is not exclusively CPP. It is jointly CPP and Funcinpec.
Q. You gave Funcinpec a fair share of cabinet seats, pardons to five controversial figures. Other issues were resolved -- for instance the helicopter in Singapore. Were there any other inducements given to Funcinpec to come into the fold with CPP?
With regard to the helicopter, it's an issue we did not pay enough attention to. People were handling it without our knowledge. I have been doing my best so Samdech Krom Preah [honorific for Ranariddh] would not face difficulties, including the provision of amnesties. Permission for armed forces which left to return is also to facilitate their leaders to be able to work with us. I think tomorrow or the day after I have to sign one of the proposals sent to the King for the appointment of one general to be a deputy chief of staff. This is aimed at providing confidence so that the lower ranks can return quickly.
Q. Yes, but beyond what was on the table for Funcinpec that we can all see, was there any material or financial inducement? A Khmer newspaper has alleged US$ 40 million was involved.
The government has no money for that, and they did not ask for that. Coming into the government, they have to share responsibility for expenditures. The government or the CPP would not have such an amount, and Funcinpec would not lower themselves to accept such money. They could not sell their idealism. Such a newspaper [article] is aimed at looking down on Funcinpec officials who did not demand such a thing, [only] to work with us in the government. I am obliged to defend the verity that there is no Funcinpec official who is in such a category. Even if they needed it, we do not have the money to do it.
Q. Why does Cambodia need a Senate?
It is necessary, a requirement for reconciliation. Before 1970, we had such an institution. We called it the Council of the Kingdom. After the coup d'etat, it was called the Senate -- in Lon Nol's time. In 1993, we did not establish the Senate. Maybe it's the place I will sit after 2003 -- as a humble member, not chairman.
Q. Foreigners who don't know Cambodian history may ask why it needs a Senate. Cambodians meanwhile will be asking who the senators will be.
Samdech Chea Sim will become chairman. We don't know yet the [two] deputy chairmen because the candidates are nominated from Funcinpec. CPP is also preparing its people to be members, but we are awaiting amendment of the constitution in order to be able to set up the senate. In the first term, they have to be nominated by the King.
There is no other choice but to use people from parties that have seats in the National Assembly. It is surprising that yesterday an alliance was set up amongst 25 political parties demanding to be members.
Q. So unelected parties will not have access?
If we allowed members of the 25 parties to become senators, it would no longer be a senate but a forum of political parties. In America, we have only Republicans and Democrats within the Senate. In the Cambodian context, if we allowed the 25 in there would be no room for CPP and Funcinpec.
Q. So people like Ung Huot, Son Sann, Ieng Mouly who are not elected would not be selected.
It's a point we are still considering. The King has also denied the appointment of many people to the Senate. Why did he do that? Because he received too many faxes requesting to be members of the Senate. And to me so far, there have been two or three hundred people who [would] like to be members of the Senate. How do we solve this problem? I think it's better to leave it to the result of the election for the lower house. Those who cannot be members of the Senate have to try even harder in order to be elected next time.
Q. Has the number of Senators been fixed yet?
What we can say is that the highest number will be only half of the lower house [ie 61]. Whether it's 40 per cent or higher or lower is up to discussion.
Q. We were talking about how important November turned out to be.
Another important development was the UN's three jurors who came to investigate the possibility of a tribunal for Khmer Rouge figures.
Q. What kind of tribunal do you yourself envisage?
Just a few hours after their arrival, I had discussions with these jurists. We [asked] the jurists to recommend what type of court should be set up. Through the discussions I learned that if we allow it to be set up through the United Nations it would be impossible. We feel that if the tribunal is set up by Cambodians in accordance with Cambodian law with international assistance, it would be easier. Using the Cambodian parliament is easier than using the United Nations Security Council.
Q. So, a tribunal in Phnom Penh under Cambodian auspices with international support. Is that what you're saying?
I think this way is much easier. To set up a tribunal outside Cambodia needs agreement from the United Nations and once you have to go through the United Nations you will face difficulties.
Q. What time frame is involved? We all know the most serious offenders in the Khmer Rouge are now getting old, and time is not on the side of justice.
We also provided [assistance] to the researchers so that they can complete their work and provide recommendations. When discussing with the jurists, I asked them the procedures in The Hague, and whether it allowed trials to be carried out in absentia or not. They responded to me that there is no such practice. Then I asked them if we cannot arrest Ta Mok and Nuon Chea, how can we hold a trial? It is better to provide this possibility through Cambodian law. We can hold a trial in absentia, issue a court verdict and ask for co-operation from other countries for the arrest of these people. If we use these procedures, then we can define the time [involved]. If it has to be done outside Cambodia, and cannot be done in the absence of the criminals, then we cannot [predict how long it will take]. Ta Mok, even though he lost one leg, runs very fast because he uses the car.
Q. Where does he use the car?
I think that can be understood.
Q. I think so, but would it not be possible to ask Thailand to co-operate before the case comes to court and have Ta Mok in the dock?
We can ask for Thai co-operation but there is no time in which Thailand admits that these people are on their soil. So, I would like to know where is Ta Mok right now? So it's best that we hold a trial, issue a verdict and then we pursue for arrest.
Q. We had a conversation two years ago and discussed the issue of catching `fish' [Khmer Rouge] and how to cook them. I asked you about this in the middle of the year, and you said you wouldn't answer the question. The central question in this tribunal business is who will be indicted. I think that's a straightforward question.
I did not comment on that even when I was asked the same question by the jurists during our discussion because it is only the prosecutor who is entitled to charge anyone. By doing it this way, we can also keep the independence of the court of law. It is not worthwhile allowing politicians to point to any persons. Lately, some people have even pointed at me to brought to trial.
Q. That's the next question.
We better leave it to the prosecutors to lay the charges.
Q. I can accept that as a legalistic argument, but as point of principle: people who have been amnestied for being Khmer Rouge but have not received amnesties for crimes against humanity, for genocide, could they be brought for trial?
The amnesties so far provided do not provide any assurance that the person would be free from being charged by the court. The amnesty does not close the door [to] the charges of the prosecutor. It is better to leave it to the prosecutors to do it rather than the politicians. In Cambodia there is a habit of painting one another. Cambodians have been painted Red, Blue, Pink and White.
Q. Didn't King Sihanouk do that in the 1960s?
I am not sure whether it was the King, but the practice has been like that. It's like me being painted with a Vietnamese hat. In the coming five years I will do my best to reduce the way people paint one another.
Q. Yes, but people like Ieng Sary, Ke Pauk [No. 13 in hierarchy, second bloodiest general after Ta Mok] who have cases they should answer cannot consider themselves to be immune from trial if there is a tribunal. Is that correct?
It is still subject to the prosecutor. Ieng Sary himself has said that he is also prepared himself to go to the court of law. That's the way he has talked with many journalists. I just refrain myself from commenting on this and that person being brought to trial. I prefer to leave it to the prosecutor. We have to respect the independence of the court.
Q. Okay, but there is no presumption of immunity.
No one would enjoy that.
Q. You've had your own problems recently with being painted by some congressmen in the US. What it is your response to House Resolution 533?
I was talking with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State [Ralph] Boyce and also the US ambassador. I told them that I did read that resolution. What is important for me is that we don't want this misunderstanding to be increased which would spoil the interests of the two nations. I have not only been painted by that resolution. I have undergone the rocket grenade attack and also the grenade attack on my house. You can ask me whether I am afraid to die. Yes, I am scared. God help me.
Q. The issue here is defamation. People make all these claims and don't back them up. This seems to be a problem for you. You have legitimacy through the election, and if the government goes successfully your credibility will grow on the international stage. But the perception of you overseas has to be addressed. What do feel when somebody calls you "Pol Pot's triggerman" and that sort of nonsense? Have you thought of ways of presenting your case?
I would not sue this case. I think that the American people, people of high civilization, would not allow themselves to be cheated. If there is such justice in the world, there is no more need to talk about the law, about human rights or about justice. I used to joke that the person who cheats is a bad person, but the person who allows himself to be cheated is very poor. I don't believe that people will continue to be cheated in this way. I have my reasons not to respond, not to react. Normally gold is tested by fire.
Q. So you'll let the truth come out in its own way.
Yes. If they carry out a thorough investigation [of] Pol Pot, then they would see that Hun Sen becomes the hero. Who toppled Pol Pot? They cannot separate the toppling of the Pol Pot regime, including the death of Pol Pot, from the activity of Hun Sen. Even now my son who is at West Point says he feels pity for being born in the Pol Pot regime. It would be ridiculous [if] one holds a trial for Pol Pot and then also holds a trial for the one who toppled Pol Pot. My policy of `let it be' has its meaning, therefore I do not respond. I have been appealing for 19 years, but no one cared about bringing Pol Pot to trial. I don't believe the prosecutor would be stupid to the point of charging Hun Sen and bringing Hun Sen to trial. I think they would [have to ask why] Pol Pot has come up. That would involve even Nixon and Kissinger.
Q. Should the US not be involved in the tribunal process because of its past in Cambodia?
I would not comment on that. It's like playing cards. Sometimes you get the ace. Ask, how come Pol Pot? Some say Pol Pot came up because of the Lon Nol coup d'etat. And who supported the Lon Nol regime? Then it would involve many people.
Q. Would you say the issue of US involvement in the tribunal should at least be discussed very seriously in view of the history?
I don't want to have such a link. In the last few months, the Japanese apologized to Korea. In the last few days, there is a problem between China and Japan which denies to provide an apology to China. For Cambodia, we never demanded the Japanese give us apologies even though they committed some crimes [here] during World War II. It is the same with France and America. We don't want it that way. On the contrary we would like America to end their problem of MIAs in Cambodia. Consider this as a humanitarian gesture. As for the trial of the Khmer Rouge, we would like to focus on the important leaders involved with these crimes. What the American congressman has been doing is like a contagious disease, spreading from one to another.
Q. Sam Rainsy now occupies a very interesting position. He is elected with a small party and is the first legally elected opposition in Cambodia to all intents and purposes. What do you see as the role of the opposition? Does Sam Rainsy have a job?
It is the first time in the history of Cambodia that we can create the culture of democracy. This is [what] we would like to have. Yesterday, he also shared his comments in the session of the National Assembly. He displeased some people, but even so I shook hands with him and welcomed his contribution. The role of the opposition in Cambodia is very important because we had a habit of abusing power. When we are in the same party, we are not really open to criticizing one another. For me as the leader of the government, I feel very pleased that government activities are monitored by the opposition parties. Once we commit a mistake, we will be criticized and that will stop the mistake. Yesterday, I encouraged him to continue this way of opposing within the National Assembly which can be broadcast through TV and radio. People can see it nationwide. It is much better than a voice along the street. A strike held in one place can only be seen by people [there]. But criticism in the National Assembly could be seen nationwide. That will caution more the officials responsible.
Q. I take what you say, but what you are discussing is a complete change in the political culture of Cambodia. In the past, politicians took power and did not listen to what others said. Is it really realistic to expect people in the National Assembly to start behaving in the way you are describing?
I think that in the term of this government we have to realize that we need proper law, we need it to be operated through the National Assembly. No one can do anything against this trend.
Q. It's very difficult to impose a culture of tolerance. People have to learn that it's more productive to work together, to agree to disagree -- all these democratic ideas.
That it is a point we need to try for and to achieve. We also have to avoid the model set by the Korean or Taiwanese national assemblies. My concern is disputes outside the National Assembly which leads to the use of arms. Using words [may] sound bitter or harsh, but it will not [cause] blood to be shed. This morning, during the transfer of power in the National Assembly, I advised people not to behave like the Cambodian saying in which when the water floods it is the fish that eat the ants, but when the water retreats it's the ants that eat the fish. This practice was carried out by Pol Pot. Coming from the jungle, they would kill those in the [water]. Winners always revenge [themselves] on the losers. Once the losers become winners, they also revenge themselves. What is important is that we make revenge in a way that the loser even profits from our winning. Our victory is not only for our group, but for the whole nation.
Q. But you've had enormous differences with Prince Ranariddh in the past.
That is democracy. There is a time when we are in dispute and there is also a time when we agree with each other. But we do not use revenge to get rid of one another. Victory of politicians does not mean killing or imprisoning the opposition. We needed to call them and work with us. In June last year, there was a time I received the deputy prime minister and ministers of the Khmer Rouge in my house. These people have spent twenty years cursing me, but I shared lunch with them and provided assistance for their living. We did not imprison them or kill them. On the contrary, we have to share their hardship, helping them to live in our society. We should not continue the revenge. I have been watching the TV about the electoral campaign in Taiwan. Some people got hit and there was bloodshed which was a pity. That such a thing happened in the parliament of Taiwan or Korea or India ...
Q. It's good for gambling. People can bet who will win the fight.
[Laughs] I would not play that game because I do not know how to box.
Q. You are presenting a very reasonable concept of how democratic pluralism should work, but if you look ahead there is going to be a real test by the end of next year with the communal elections. How will this new found tolerance stand up when power in the locality was the start of problems with Ranariddh in 1996?
The election of chiefs of communes could be the operation on cancer [in the] CPP and put an end to disputes between CPP and other parties. The leaders of CPP or Funcinpec will not decide who is to be elected. It is the people who will decide. That is the good point. In 1999, we will hold communal elections. There are two values to elections. One is the value of democracy in which people choose those they feel pleased with. The second is to increase the effectiveness of public service. Possibly there is another value in which we can cut the influence of bad communes from CPP. In some areas, CPP received less votes not because people hated the leaders of CPP but because people in those areas hated the chief of the commune.
Q. Have you found out yet whether Sam Rainsy plays chess?
[Laughs] We had two promises to each other. One to play chess, the other to play golf. But playing chess is a bit difficult because he knows the French way and I know my Cambodian way. How could we play together? But no problem with playing golf.