Asiaweek (Online), November 26, 1999 (cover date)

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'Respect Our Sovereignty'
The ONLINE EXCLUSIVE, full interview with Cambodia's Hun Sen

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, 47, reckons that he is mentioned on average four times a day in every Cambodian newspaper. With dozens of publications and 365 days in the year, it adds up to many thousands of stories -- many of them completely untrue, he maintains.

In recent months, the Cambodian media has been wallowing in lurid speculation about the murder of a famous ballet dancer, Piseth Pilika, who consorted with senior members of Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party. Hun Sen, who has been spending more time recently in the capital with his elderly father, has finally had enough and is planning legal action against those he considers guilty of defaming his family. Yet whatever his personal concerns, Hun Sen remains remarkably focussed on bigger
political issues. He recently met with Special Correspondent DOMINIC FAULDER for over two and half hours to discuss Asean, Indochina, the UN, donors, the Khmer Rouge, economic reforms -- and a possible scandal or two.

FAULDER: Is this your father's compound?

HUN SEN: Actually, it's a place where Pol Pot raised pigs. Pol Pot put Cambodians in the front house. At the back was a low storey house where they raised pigs. My father's room is next to my room in the house in front of this. This building was constructed in 1994-5 as a working place for my assistants and myself. After the coup d'etat of 1994, I felt that we needed to have people permanently in place to handle all eventualities, so people had to stay here on 24-hour duty. In 1994, it was fortunate for me that we changed the bodyguards. The new bodyguard was from the army. There were sixty and normally they travelled at night not in daytime, so they came quietly to be behind my house. My [normal] bodyguard was split into two groups here and there, and then finally I had no bodyguard. It was fortunate that we got the information beforehand with an attempt to arrest three generals. We declared an emergency, turning this place into a headquarters and used the house as a safety zone for ministers and politicians. We used the sixty-man bodyguard to control the situation waiting for Division 70 to send reinforcements with tanks to this area.

FAULDER: Is this now your office?

As you can see on television, this is the office I use sometimes to receive guests and sometimes my office in Takhmau. When there is too much work for me to do in the city, I stay in Phnom Penh at this place.
At the top, there are some people who stay permanently. The ground floor used to be an office but that was moved to  Takhmau.

FAULDER: How do you divide your time now between Takhmau and here? Four days a week in Phnom Penh?

HUN SEN: There is no proper division of time. It's up to how many days they require me to be in Phnom Penh, especially at the Council of Ministers. If it's necessary for me to be present in Phnom Penh for three days, I have to stay in this house three nights. The idea is to reduce use of fuel as well as the costs needed to provide protection along the road. If there is only one meeting of the Council of Ministers, then I will stay in Takhmau and receive guests there. When my mother was alive and [unwell], then I had to come and stay in this house. It's the same with my father when he has some health problem, I have to come from Takhmau and stay in this area, not bring him to Takhmau. He prefers to stay in this house in Phnom Penh than to join me in Takhmau. My father stays in the house in front, and my parents in law in the house behind.

FAULDER: It means that Phnom Penh is safer now.

It is not a question of safety. It is a question of being disturbed by the noise outside. There is a place in the pagoda for funerals, so every day there were two, three or even five ceremonies. They place some kind of music, so in daytime we were disturbed by this noise and at night by the noise from the traffic. The last few days I was disturbed. At night when there is rain the ceiling leaks so water drops down. I try my best not to renovate it because it will cost a lot or we might even have to pull it down and build a new one. The foundations are not so firm and we cannot put additional weight on top.

FAULDER: We last met in about May and talked about lots of things. It's been a mixed year for Cambodia. What stands out in your mind as a success?

HUN SEN: I think 1999 has been the best year for Cambodia on many points. We started one month before 1999 achieving national reconciliation, forming the coalition government and established a good start. The year 1999 also saw the total collapse of the political and military organization of the Khmer Rouge. This year we have complete control of the territory of Cambodia -- there is no more armed opposition. We have taken back our seat at the United Nations, assistance, and [seen] normalization of our relations with the global community and financial institutions. It is also the year we were integrated into ASEAN,  something we have longed for. We have achieved economic growth after a dramatic drop in 1997 and 1998. We have curbed
inflation from 12.5 per cent to just six per cent. We have had the best harvest in twenty years, even though there has been some damage by flooding which is still under way. But in general we have had a good harvest throughout the country. What is more important, this is a year of concrete reform and right now we are getting results. It is also a bright year for the Hun family. One of my sons graduated at Westpoint and one of my daughters got married. I expect to have a grandchild in January next year.

FAULDER: Congratulations. As you say, things have gone well. Forestry is more under control, tax collections are up, tourism is up -- there are quite a lot of things looking positive. What are you worried about at the moment that aren't responding so well?

HUN SEN: As I said, it is the year we have taken concrete steps in reforms and we are starting to receive results. The reforms include forest management, taxation. But we do not hide failures. Where we have not been successful, we are trying to be successful. Our success also covers anti-corruption activities. There is still corruption in Cambodia, but one can ask whether it is increasing in scale or diminishing. It remains, but has not increased. It has decreased. Corruption happened mostly in the forestry sector, but once we moved against illegal logging we could also reduce substantially corruption. We have also strengthened the mechanisms for customs and taxation to increase substantially our national revenues. Before, revenues from
taxation were just around 30 to 40 billion riel. Now that measures have been taken, we can increase it up to 60 billion riel. We can see the amount of money lost through corruption. We have also discovered 15,000 ghost soldiers of which there are 150,000 dependents. Even so, I do not feel satisfied. There are two points of concern which I share with the donor community, especially the deputy chief of ADB. It's still on the question of taxation. We have tried to prevent collusion in tax evasion and smuggling. The second is land. So far, we have taken back thousands of hectares of illegally possessed land. It's a bad practice in Cambodia that people occupy public land and after a while try to own it. We are taking measures to counter that by not issuing land titles to those people. They are not the land inheritors from relatives or parents. We have also started reforms in the public administration, armed forces, the judiciary, but the process is slow. We accept the objective reason for that -- shortage of assistance. But demobilization and reduction of public servants has been slow. There are subjective factors because of
ourselves, too. At the same time as we are encouraged with our success, we do no hide the failures behind us. We are trying our best.

FAULDER: This is the first year of the Asean Ten. Has Asean lived up to expectations?

HUN SEN: I think we might need time to consider the future of Asean. I am concerned if it will be Asean Ten, Asean Eleven or Asean more than that. Asean Ten was the vision of Asean before. The movement for separation in Indonesia at the moment is something for us to worry about. In such circumstances and with economic turmoil, what are Asean values vis a vis its partners? What are the values of Asean vis a vis foreign investment in the region? These are the problems Asean heads of state and governments are considering. So far I have made no conclusions. We need to further monitor the development of the situation. Sometimes people say that East Timor is a problem of Asean. I do not accept such an idea. The United Nations should not take only what is a success and give to others failures. If there is any participation of Asean, that should be within the operation of the United Nations. It should not be the exclusive operation of Asean. That would be the subject for discussion in future. There was an idea that East Timor should be included in Asean, but the desire of the leaders of East Timor is to join the groups of the Pacific. This point affects the values of Asean. I like to speak frankly rather than in a diplomatic way about the issue.

FAULDER: So you are concerned about a dilution of Asean if you had East Timor as the eleventh member -- you might have Aceh as the twelfth. Is dilution the problem?

HUN SEN: That is the problem. I feel that the world is now losing order and new trends are emerging. The 1990s are the decade of separation. It started with the split of the Soviet Union into many states, and within those states there were also movements for separation. Yugoslavia split into too many states, and now there is the problem of East Timor and another emerging in Aceh. This may have an impact on others in the region or not. Look at what happened in Sri Lanka with the Tigers. In this context in Cambodia, we seem to be a bit fortunate. We realised [Khieu Samphan's] plan was to set up a state along the border.

FAULDER: He wanted to take over the whole country.

Hun Sen: If not the whole country, he could set up his own state and then he would have his own government with his radio to broadcast from there.

FAULDER: Did you make your concerns known to the new Indonesian president when he visited on Monday?

HUN SEN: I did not have much time with him to discuss many topics. He had just left Laos and came to Cambodia. He needed to entertain many programmes. At least he initiated two points for me. First, he [discussed] development in the triangle [Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam], and he wished Indonesia to take part. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have been discussing this with each other. I told him that I have an initiative for another triangle between Cambodia, Thailand and Laos between the
borders of the three countries. The new president of Indonesia and myself agree with each other that such development would not have any impact on the unity of Asean. I want to stress this point because there was too much comment by the media that the intention of the development of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is to set up another polar group in Asean. I would like to stress that it is not true, and even if we so wished we could not achieve it. Our need is for unity in the region, not just unity of a group of countries. If we would like to have the unity of  this group of countries, Asean and Indochina, it would fall back into
the old story again. The second point he raised with me was to share the experience of Cambodia -- the way Cambodia achieved national unity. National unity is an important subject, and I commented on this point and also stressed that Asean unity is very important. It's true that he raised with me that he wished to see East Timor integrated into Asean, but I did not respond whether I support or don't support his idea. During the reception at night, officials in the delegation asked me what my ideas were about the president's initiative or wish to see East Timor integrated into Asean. My response is that it's subject to the desires of the leaders of East Timor. We cannot force Timor to join Asean because it is now independent. They have their own right to decisions.

FAULDER: Going back to Asean, it has changed a lot in the last few years with the addition of four new countries. You could look at Asean and see divisions potentially along religious lines -- you have the Buddhist overlay on top with different cultures, and a more Muslim underlay. This doesn't seem very important but people see it. What is noticeable in Asean is that you have countries you could say are 'haves' and 'have nots'. The levels of development are very different. Singapore is an advanced economy anywhere in the world, not just Asia. Thailand is prosperous, Indonesia was doing quite well, Philippines doing better,
Brunei very rich. Then you have the other countries -- Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar -- which are very poor and underdeveloped. Is this causing a problem inside Asean -- the fact that these countries don't have necessarily the same requirements? They have different development needs?

HUN SEN: We have to accept the fact that there are differences within Asean, from the political systems, from the level of development, from culture, from religion. However, we have to overcome all these difficulties. Asean has overcome these obstacles for thirty years, so it would not constitute the main problem for Asean unity. Asean has a very good co-operation spirit, especially the spirit of consensus. Cambodia joined Asean with equality, with equal rights. To me, religion would not
be a problem. In Cambodia we have different religions. The problem we need to work out together and co-ordinate with each other is how the 'haves' and the 'have nots' can share investment and know-how. We have to find out how we can help each other to develop all together. So far as political systems are concerned, it is the right of each [member] -- it should not be the subject of discussion.

FAULDER: The more practical issue is levels of economic development. You can say yes to religious and cultural freedom, and you have to accept systemic differences of government, but economic differences and levels of development makes it more difficult to find common ground. Where are the areas you actually have a reason to talk to each other?

HUN SEN: It's true that we need reconciliation between the giver and recipient. This can be solved with formulas for investment and transfer of technology. Giving for free is not the solution. Investment from those who have the money to poor countries must have profit [for both]. There should be dispute in this. Even the rich cannot stay alone. The rich and the poor are complementary; they must share the profit. Donor countries and financial institutions can also share reconciliation for the transfer of technology. For example, we send out people to be trained in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore financed by Japan or one of the
international organizations.

FAULDER: You've brought up the subject of donors indirectly, so we might as well go to that. Are you happy with the way donors are conducting themselves and giving funds to you?

HUN SEN: It's normal that when we are in need and given [something], we are happy. Therefore I feel happy. As I said earlier, what we lost we got back; what we wish to have we can also get. During the meeting which is done quarterly between the government and donor community, each side always tries its best to find ways that assistance can be used more effectively. Therefore, lately we have mainly focussed with the ADB and World Bank on strategies for rural development. The strategy for
development aims mainly at the poverty alleviation and enhancing partnerships. Lately, we have also taken note that the donor community and financial institutions have their own projects separately which has caused difficulties to us. There is no proper package -- no common scenario. In some places in Cambodia, you see too much assistance and in other places not any. In some places, the same project is carried out by many organizations. For example, the movement against HIV/AIDS. This
issue was taken up by NGOs, by government institutions and donor community. Sometimes we see on television that meetings on HIV/AIDS are done in the same place with the same participants but by different sponsors. In some provinces the assistance has been too much. In the whole country, there remain six provinces which have received no assistance at all. Therefore we would like to have a mechanism for co-ordination between the donor community and the government and within
the donor community. Then we can allocate the job to each [group]. Lately we asked the ADB to play the leading role in roads and water. The idea is not to have overlapping projects and not to give assistance to just one place. I also appeal that they do their best to transfer technology to Cambodians and to employ more Cambodians on projects because this costs less than foreign experts.

FAULDER: You're talking about efficient co-ordination, and it's better to have a problem of too much assistance than too little.

HUN SEN: Yes, it's a question of efficiency.

FAULDER: When I was asking the question, I was really thinking about the Cambodian Mines Advisory Centre (CMAC) where there have been problems this year. Donors have become unhappy because they have found out certain things about the way CMAC was being run. They have reacted and stopped funding until they see changes made. In that particular instance, in which there is a very important issue for Cambodia -- demining, do you feel donors have been unreasonable?

HUN SEN: When the CMAC problem started, it seemed to be too serious. Before the audit, this issue became a political problem. It was the first time in a record of twenty years that I shed tears. The donor community advised us that without change of the [executive] director and deputy directors there would be no assistance.

FAULDER: You shed tears signing the dismissal of [executive director] Sam Sotha?

HUN SEN: Yes, that's it. I see him as a good man; he is very active and works very seriously. You may know that Som Sotha is not CPP. I am thinking of his efficient work. He is not a man who used to support me before, but I like his efficient work. Even after we fired this person, the donor community still said they will not give assistance to CMAC. Therefore I advised the leaders of CMAC to be prepared to take two tests. First, even if there is [renewed] assistance, we need to carry out reforms. We have to cut down top levels and not be top heavy. We have to reduce the real work of demining, increase management,
transparency and discipline too. This is if we receive assistance. We will not use this issue as a political problem. Second, we will downsize 90 per cent of CMAC. CMAC was set up during the UNTAC period. If they wish to stop assistance to CMAC, then we have to reduce 90 per cent of the [organization]. Ninety per cent reduction does not mean we stop demining. It means that when the donor community has no confidence in CMAC and provides no assistance to CMAC, but provides assistance to organizations which are also doing mine clearance, the [laid-off] staff from CMAC could work for other organizations. Once assistance is resumed to CMAC, then CMAC could be immediately activated. After the audit, it was [clear] there was no mismanagement of foreign funds.

FAULDER: Well, the auditors found out where the money had gone. But there were other problems. There was the problem of nepotism -- people employing family and friends. Land had been cleared for the wrong people such as the Khmer Rouge in Kampot, and it was unacceptable that they should get priority. The point is there were problems in CMAC that have been found out. Why is [it] not possible now to move ahead and get back on track? Is it the fault of donors being unreasonable? More people have been dismissed lower down in CMAC who may have been more to blame than some of the people who went earlier.

HUN SEN: Right now, foreigners have resumed assistance to CMAC until late this year. It was wrong to make judgement before the completion of auditing. It forced us to sign the letters to fire people before the completion of the audit. To have real justice done, we should have taken measures after the audit. For example, the land in Kampot province [said] to have been given to one of the Khmer Rouge generals was completely wrong. Chhouk Rin is just one of the families which has land
there. He is also a Cambodian citizen, and the land has been cleared and allocated to many people there. Chhouk Rin is one of the people there. Whatever, CMAC is moving ahead.

FAULDER: Will it recover -- will it be saved? It seems ridiculous to destroy something which is doing good work if as you say there has been a misunderstanding. If Chhouk Rin was just one member of a group, it should be possible to prove that. The idea that CMAC is destroyed by misunderstanding seems very unfortunate and a very high price to pay for Cambodia.

HUN SEN: We are trying to convince the donor community about the real case of Chhouk Rin. Much has been talked about that, but it seems that only the Cambodians in CMAC have been blamed. No foreigners who worked in CMAC have been blamed. They got very high salaries and were advisers. It seems that we are always the one to receive the blame.

FAULDER: We talked a lot about difficult foreigners today. We've got MIAs, CMAC, so we may as well carry on and talk about the United Nations. What is the role the UN should play in Cambodia? We're a long way beyond UNTAC. Cambodia is a different country. What do you want to see coming from the UN for this country?

HUN SEN: Cambodia is now like other countries. If the UN wishes to end its role in Cambodia, they can stop it. But if it wishes to go on we don't know what we can do. If we say it's time for them to go back, then we would be blamed again. It's up to them. If they wish to go on, they can stay. You may have seen my speech to the UN when I stressed the point that one has to be cautious in selecting UN officials to work in recipient countries like Cambodia, otherwise they will become immoral
violating member countries who pay the money for high salaries. Before being sent to any countries, UN officials have to be trained to remember that they are officials of the UN -- they are not the UN. During my last meeting with Hammarberg, I advised him on this point.

FAULDER: People would still say that the UN Human Rights Centre can still do useful work in Cambodia. You could discuss what that work is if there is a difference in perspective. Do you feel that there is still a useful role for the centre?

HUN SEN: If their activity is like before, the benefit is so limited. If their activity is in conformity with my aide memoire to the UN Secretary General, then it would be more beneficial to Cambodia. If they are more focussed on providing assistance drafting laws for Cambodia, judicial reform, this activity would be more beneficial to Cambodia rather than doing odds and ends. This would be more beneficial than providing reports on cases they happen to meet here and there, or reports on the
no good conditions of the prisons. And if they so wish to have good conditions in the prisons, just provide the money for that. I told him that in some places people do not even have a proper place to sleep, so if we have good conditions in prison more people will wish to stay in prison.

FAULDER: What did Mr Hammarberg say to that?

HUN SEN: [Laughs] He remained quiet. Sometimes he just says something because he has been assigned to work in Cambodia. He needs to say something for the sake of [his] report.

FAULDER: Mr Hammarberg has gone now. What about the Secretary General's Special Representative office in Cambodia?

HUN SEN: I have requested the UN Secretary General to close this office. We would like relations with the UN to be normal like other countries via our permanent ambassador to the UN. So far, there is no response from him and the continued presence of his representative in Cambodia is without the agreement of the government. But if he so wishes, he can stay by himself like that. You see Lakhan Mehrotra wrote to me here and asked for an extension and I did not reply. In the diplomatic world, some consider that no reply means yes. But to me it's different. I did not respond to his suggestion. More than that, I requested the UN Secretary General to close his office. That was in the form of aide memoire as well as in the form of letters. I will wait to see how they treat the sovereignty of Cambodia.

FAULDER: Basically, what you're saying is that it has become irrelevant.

HUN SEN: It's not a crisis. Mehrotra has been a friend to me for a long time. It's not a question of friend or not a friend. It's a question of I would like the relations between Cambodia and the UN to return to normal. If we have something to do with the UN, we will do it via our permanent representative at the UN in New York not via the UN Secretary General's office. So he can continue to stay in Cambodia but without a job to do.

FAULDER: Is there anything in the treaty of 1991 that requires the UN to have a special representative here, anything in the peace accords?

HUN SEN: If we talk about the representatives on human rights, the basis is the Paris peace agreement in which there was a requirement for such a mechanism to monitor how the Paris peace agreement is executed. But [for] the political representative, the requirement is [according to] circumstances. After 1993, we accepted the special representative of the secretary general as well as military observers. Later we put an end to the military observers because there was no more requirement. We also
feel that now there is no requirement to have the UN special representative like an ambassador to Cambodia. We would like the money to be spent for the UNDP or the World Food Programme rather than this because these are really required for development.

FAULDER: The other big issue with the UN is the tribunal for the Khmer Rouge. This discussion has been going on for a very long time and doesn't seem to be moving. What from your point of view are the blockages? What are the real areas of dispute? We hear a lot about the judges which may be not such a big problem and can be solved. What are the other issues?

HUN SEN: I think from now on there will be no obstructions to our process. The last reconciliation between America and Cambodia -- especially on the super majority decision -- is enough foundation for us to move forward. We receive already legal advisers from France, Russia and India who will be arriving today. We have made the timetable already. The draft law will be completed by December to discussion and adoption by the Council of Ministers. The participation or non-participation of the UN is not the problem. It is quite different from the Paris peace agreement in which [without] action by the UN we could not move forward. There is no agreement between Cambodia and the UN that unless the UN does something that we can't do other things. Some even commented that without the participation of the UN the verdict of the court of law will not be recognized. I would like to stress that I do not request anybody to recognize the verdict of [a Cambodian] court of law. It's quite different from the result of an election which we wish the world to recognize. The verdict of the court is quite different. It requires no one to recognize it or not recognize it. We have to carry it out. This is about the independence of the court of law. So there are no ties attached for not moving forward. The main problem for us is not the UN or foreigners, but the National Assembly and the Senate. Cambodia is a sovereign country so it is subject to the National Assembly and Senate which have the right to adopt the draft law or not. Another problem is the Council of the Constitution's right to review whether the draft law is constitutional or not. The problem is in Phnom Penh not in New York. We do not close the door to any assistance to provide recommendations for the draft law. What we expect is the inevitable right that they respect our independence and sovereignty. If they would like to participate and be masters of the issue, that is not respect for sovereignty. Otherwise they can appoint someone to be king of Cambodia, the chairman of the Senate or National Assembly, the Prime Minister, instead of King Norodom Sihanouk, Samdech Chea Sim, Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh or Hun Sen.

FAULDER: What you're describing sounds to me like there is no provision for UN involvement but there is provision for foreign judges to be involved. You can't pass a law which would specify UN involvement without knowing whether or not they would be prepared to be involved. Is that not correct?

HUN SEN: According to the provisions, there is no requirement for the participation of foreign judges or the UN. Therefore my concern is not with New York but with the National Assembly and the Council of the Constitution. We have been reviewing all the relevant laws, even at the UN headquarters, and there is no such provision. What is stipulated in the provisions is whether its a national court of law or an international court of law. There is no provision which provides for a national court of law with participation by foreign judges. For the sake of reconciliation demanded by some in the international community, we
have drafted the law as such to be drafted by the National Assembly and the Senate. It's up to them whether they adopt it or not. A pure lawyer not involved in politics says there is no such thing.

FAULDER: Yes, a mixed tribunal is legally new ground. What I am asking is if this draft law will provide foreign judges with the super majority system put forward by the Americans?

HUN SEN: Yes, there will be such a provision. We found reconciliation on that point that there can be a majority of Cambodians and minority of foreign judges but the decision is a super majority. Let's say if there are five judges the decision will only be valid if supported by four.

FAULDER: Okay, so there will be foreign judges but what you're saying is that they don't have to be UN nominated.

HUN SEN: It could be judges [nominated] by the UN Secretary General or by the governments of the member states of the UN to be approved by the Council of the Constitution of Cambodia. So "foreigners" does not only mean the UN. We set up in this in way for observation of the elections in 1998. There were observers appointed for the election of 1998 by the UN, by the EU, appointed independently by America or even set up by NGOs.

FAULDER: Would the prosecutors be Cambodian or a mixture?

HUN SEN: According to our discussions, it could be co-prosecutors, but we would like to maintain the structures of Cambodian judges. There would be judges for investigation and prosecutors to make the charge. In the Anglo-Saxon system, sometimes the investigation is made by one prosecutor. In our system, the investigation is carried out by a judge and after completion there are prosecutors to make the charges based on that investigation.

FAULDER: Would there be a two-court structure outside the Cambodian three-tier court system?

HUN SEN: Actually in our system we have three. According to what we plan, we have the common court of five judges, three Cambodians, two foreigners. And then for the appeal court, it would be seven judges, four from Cambodia and three foreign. In the supreme court, there will be nine judges, five from Cambodia and four foreign. You have to pay attention to the words we use: the existing courts of law of Cambodia. When we refer to the existing ones, it means courts of three levels. The
system will be judge of investigation and prosecutors to make the charges.

FAULDER: So the draft law will go to the National Assembly and go through the constitutional process in December, and the UN will have an option to look and say yes we can help with this or to say no we can't?

HUN SEN: I feel that unless the law is adopted the decision can't be made. It is now too early for UN Secretary General Kofi Annan or for governments of other countries to respond to whether they will send judges to participate or not.

FAULDER: What you're saying is that the law has to be promulgated before the decision can be made. You're not waiting for the UN to say, if you pass this law we will help you.

HUN SEN: At least there is involvement of the UN. They will provide recommendations for the draft law. They have been here and provided recommendations to the first draft law. They also requested that once we finish the second draft law, please send it to them for their recommendation. I would like to have UN legal recommendations as well as [advice] from lawyers from other countries before its adoption by the Council of Ministers. Once it is adopted by the Council of Ministers we cannot retreat but must move forward. A month will be enough for us to do it.

FAULDER: Do you want the UN to be involved or is it a matter of indifference?

HUN SEN: That is what I put in my aide memoire to Excellency UN Secretary General that there is no obligation for the UN to participate or not to participate, but for us Cambodians we have the obligation to do it. If they participate it's good, but if they do not we would lose nothing. They cannot obstruct our process. It is ridiculous that some people comment that the UN should participate to correct their mistakes of the past. Some even comment that the UN would not recognize the verdicts of the courts of Cambodia. I respond that we do not ask the UN to recognize the verdicts. If they do not, it means that the UN
recognizes eternally the Khmer Rouge. The UN accepted the Khmer Rouge to sit [in the General Assembly] from 1975 to 1979 during the practice of genocide. And from 1979 to 1982 they still occupied the seat on behalf of the millions of victims they killed. From 1982 to 1991, they still occupied the seat as one of the tripartite coalition government. From 1991 to 1993, they still sat at the UN as one party in the SNC. In all the records, the UN recognized the Khmer Rouge. So if they do not
recognize the verdict of a court of law, it means the UN forever recognizes the Khmer Rouge. At the time we fought the Khmer Rouge, the UN recognized the Khmer Rouge. At the time we held a trial of Khmer Rouge leaders, they did not recognize the verdict of a court of law. What does that mean? In this context, no one deserves to be the teacher of Hun Sen.

FAULDER: So you're saying the UN has no right to expect to be there?

HUN SEN: Why do they always like to advise others?

FAULDER: Well, they're the United Nations. But you're saying they have no right on their past record to demand to be included in this tribunal.

HUN SEN: They used to have representatives of the Khmer Rouge, so their involvement might lessen the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. Before we held a trial of Khmer Rouge leaders, but they recognized the Khmer Rouge.

FAULDER: The crucial point is that because of that because of all this they have no right to demand anything.

HUN SEN: Yes.

FAULDER: If we forget about the UN because of their track record, the argument made for foreign involvement is that it's meant to assist Cambodia find justice for the Khmer Rouge. If you don't use UN mechanisms, which have been criticized by many other people apart from Cambodia, where do you get the technical assistance, the legal assistance in a very difficult area of law? Where will you draw your support?

HUN SEN: We have legal advisers from France, Russia and India. And we also have unofficial help from Australia. We also plan to invite the former minister of justice of America to come to Cambodia and to help us.

FAULDER: Then it becomes a much more complicated programme. You're then mixing different legal systems.

HUN SEN: The main point is that we are responsible ourselves in drafting the law. Those who come to help us can comment and ask for corrections or improvement of the draft law. Like the draft law prepared by the UN legal team, we incorporated some of the aspects of that into our own draft law -- the way they describe the crimes of genocide and the crimes against humanity. We also incorporated the fact that this law is not retroactive. There is one convention related to this issue which it
would be useful to incorporate. That relates to the resolution of UN General Assembly that there is no time frame for such crimes. That was the decision during the 23rd meeting of the UN General Assembly on 26 November 1968. There is no time frame for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Before, our lawyers were very concerned about this. One of the issues we have to define is whether the crimes committed by Pol Pot is a crime of genocide or a crime against humanity. Our draft law also clearly stipulates all these points -- crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes -- in chapter 4 and chapter 5 of the draft law.

FAULDER: These are obviously very important details that you have to consider, but in the bigger picture what we are discussing is in a sense a more risky course of action. If you go it alone as a sovereign court, without direct UN involvement, then you will be judged alone. You can bring in foreigners in different capacities, but it will be you who will be judged. The danger possibly for you is that you will be the person who defeated the Khmer Rouge but may be criticized later for failing to bring them to justice. Don't you worry about that personal risk?

HUN SEN: Justice is not done for the Cambodian people unless we put an end to the political and military organization of the Khmer Rouge. The last ten or twenty years, [when] the Khmer Rouge political and military organization constituted a threat to Cambodian people, nobody talked about justice for Cambodian people. If you look at negotiation documents in 1987, you will see that nobody talked about justice for the Cambodian people, no one talked about trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders except the parties from Phnom Penh. You can ask whether it's us or other groups of people who changed their ideas about justice for Cambodian people. They start to talk about [it after] we put an end to the organization of the Khmer Rouge. Justice for the Cambodian people first of all is to put an end to the political and military organization of the Khmer Rouge, put an end to the killing of Cambodian people. If until now Pol Pot still controlled the area along the Cambodian-Thai border, then there would be no justice done for Cambodian people. On the contrary, I might be under pressure to again talk with the Khmer Rouge. Right now, when we hold a trial for the Khmer Rouge, they are concerned that justice couldn't be done for the Cambodian people. If you would like total justice done for the Cambodian people, then you need accountability for all cases, and will they agree to that -- from 1970 to 1999?

FAULDER: That keeps going but what I am saying is that the judgement of your credibility -- of you -- may hinge not on what you did in the 1980s, not in going over to Vietnam in 1977, not bringing Cambodia round and defeating the Khmer Rouge, but the trial of the Khmer Rouge. That is such an issue, so strongly focussed internationally. Do you see that danger, if you like -- does it concern you?

HUN SEN: I don't see anything dangerous in that. The danger is that when we liberated our country from the Khmer Rouge [in 1979], they helped the Khmer Rouge to attack us. That was the danger. Another danger was in 1977 when the Khmer Rouge came to Phnom Penh to attack us. Another danger that exists today is that they might scare the former Khmer Rouge to go back into the jungle and wage war again. Then we could not avoid people being killed again.

FAULDER: This biography of you has just come out. Have you read it?

HUN SEN: I just read here and there. Last night I read the point where I talk about my wife and my wife talks about me. [Laughs] I do not read in detail because I am not fluent in English.

FAULDER: Did you have much involvement in producing it, work much with the authors?

HUN SEN: Others spent much time studying this. I also provided them interviews and even some written responses to questions they would like to clarify.

FAULDER: So not a lot, a bit.

HUN SEN: I think the interviews were just over ten hours.

FAULDER: There has been a lot of publicity recently following an article that appeared in France which you are aware of. Have you read this article?

HUN SEN: In order to be clear on all these issues with me, you would have to collect all the newspapers in Phnom Penh and even include articles in the US congress. Even with the grenade attack in front of the National Assembly, they very smartly created a farce. The US FBI was cheated because of that. They created two live witnesses. It was fortunate these two invented live witnesses could return to Phnom Penh and talk with the FBI again -- cheating the FBI. If you collected all the things that are created against me like this, you would have thousands of them. If you would like to have that, you can collect it from all the opposition newspapers. According to me, it would not be less than a thousand. In order to know the real story, you have to first know what is the source of the story and what they want to have from me. I don't think this one is more solid than the [others] they created against me. One even received a resolution of the US Congress, about my crimes against humanity. I gave an interview to AP the other day, and joked with them. When I moved from Takhmau to stay in this area to facilitate my work with conferences and meetings, there were all sorts of stories. The first is that I ran away from my wife, and if my wife comes to this house she has to be checked by my bodyguard. The second is that there would be a coup d'etat against Hun Sen, therefore Hun Sen has to flee the house in Takhmau. That's a story connected against me. With the death of my mother, they created [a story] that I hit my mother until she broke her bones. Even with the World Cup and last competition between Brazil and France, they say that I shot the television because I lost a bet. Actually, I won a hundred dollars from Excellency Ung Huot.
Everyone bet on Brazil but I bet on France. The newspapers reported that I shot four televisions because of that. They even reported that Kun Kim was called into the room and I slapped him around the face because he took some money. That's what they reported. Yesterday, I appointed him deputy chief of the armed forces. They can invent any story against me, but I still [reserve the right] to take legal action.

FAULDER: That's what I was going to ask you. Every public figure has this problem. People will talk about you, say this, say that. Some of it's true, some of it's not. What's interesting about the Pisith Pilika story is that it is so elaborate, there's so much detail. It's not like rumours about shooting airconditioners or televisions or anything like
that. This one is a very big story. I don't know whether it's true or not, but once before we discussed this issue with regard to the US Congress when you were censured. I asked why you didn't respond, react. In this instance, will you react, will you take legal action?

HUN SEN: I think one of my advisers made an announcement to clarify public opinion already. What I feel regret [about] is not my problem. I feel sorry that a person died, whose reputation has been spoiled, violated. In Cambodia the person who has affairs with husbands of others is very hated by the people. There might be legal action for that. There will be a presentation of [attorneys] on the 20th of this month in Phnom Penh. We will [lodge a] complaint in the court in France. Normally, we have three months to complain after the [date of] publication, so there is time until January. I prefer them to publish everything they have. The distortion is always from the same group, so I have been thinking whether it would be useful to be in dispute with this group of people. You can record on your tape and write down in your notebook that from now on you will see many stories against me. If I don't die, from now on there will be more stories. In Cambodia we have another saying that by lying too much you lose yourself, receive no confidence. They try always to trap others but they will forget themselves and [fall] in their own
trap.

FAULDER: One way to solve this problem would be to have a convincing investigation that proved the story is not correct, that the facts don't hold.

HUN SEN: To solve this problem, we have to investigate. The most important thing is to find the killer. This is the main issue. It was the issue of killing. Even now, the police are facing difficulty working on this case. Even with the case of the grenade attack in front of the National Assembly, [the publicity] caused difficulties not only to Cambodian police but also to the FBI. Once the grenades exploded, already they blamed it on Hun Sen. Then they tried to draw a picture [of the alleged attacker] and this was identified as Brazil. Then the newspapers published stories saying Brazil was Hun Sen's bodyguard. A couple of days later, Brazil was staying in Taing Krasan with Nhiek Bun Chhay. Another one was Sam Rainsy's bodyguard himself who fell off a car
and died. Then they arranged for two men in Bangkok to be questioned by the FBI in Bangkok. All this lead to the disturbance of our investigation. I am not sure whether it is true or not, but it is reported by newspapers that the FBI have concluded that it seems likely that the case of throwing grenades in front of the National Assembly was carried out by Sam Rainsy himself. I am not sure, but Cambodian newspapers over there [in the US] reported this.

FAULDER: But we keep coming back to this old chestnut of the police. Every time you look at the grenade attack, the people who died in 1997, the police never deliver anything. This is the only thing that keeps the UN Human Rights Centre going. Do you not feel great frustration that there is never any closure on these issues, and now you yourself, or at least your wife, is a victim of these accusations which a police investigation might resolve.

HUN SEN: I do not count it as a failure of the competent authorities responsible for investigation, but diving and searching for a pin under the sea is not easy. Like the assassination of President Kennedy or the building which collapsed in Oklahoma, it takes years for investigation. Even the killing of the former Prime Minister of Sweden, Palme, in 1987, it was eleven years later that they arrested Abdullah Ocalan and he confessed to all that. We are not closing the files on all this, so I think some time we can have results. In Cambodia we have saying about not striking the bush to frighten the snake. You wrote the article [concerning the collapse of the Khmer Rouge, 1996] about what I said about not talking about how to cook the fish before it is caught. We
have to be indifferent whilst investigations are still going on. Sometimes in intelligence work we have to send people to live among the bandits.

FAULDER: There is a rumour going around Phnom Penh at the moment that General Hok Longdy will be the next ambassador to Hanoi. Is that true?

HUN SEN: While I remain Prime Minister, Excellency Hok Longdy will remain the general of police. The ambassador to Hanoi passed away a few days ago, and right now we are inspecting candidates. There are rumours that he would be sent as ambassador to Hanoi or Australia, but I can say to you that while I remain Prime Minister he will remain the general of police. I know very well the strategy of the opposition that to bring hard times to Hun Sen they have to cut the hands of Hun Sen. But it's not easy to play games with Hun Sen. They have to study it thoroughly. If they do not know Hun Sen well, it's better not to play. I am not Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan in which with some movement of the troops he was put under arrest. The strategy of the opposition is in order to bring hard times to me they have to kill those who are loyal to me. In this world, there is no politician who does not appoint those who are loyal. This is the natural right of the politician. I must have this right too. I appoint persons to be chief of police and deputy commander in chief of the armed forces, and Hok Longdy will remain in his position. No one will dare stage any coup d'etat against me again. I am a cat who has been scalded by hot water, so I feel scared seeing cold water. So when I am in power, leave me with the ability to choose the people I need. If other people want to appoint others, they must wait for their time to come.