RESULT OF NGO DISCUSSIONS ON THE DRAFT SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN
MARCH 2001
NGOs wish to cooperate closely with the Royal Government of Cambodia in the process of developing plans to reduce poverty.
NGOs most appreciate the assistance of foreign donors in producing the SEDPII, but we worry about the lack of substantial input from both Cambodian civil society organisations and the need for further input from government. This relates to the need for greater capacity among both the civil society organisations and the government, and to the limited time that has been given for comment, especially considering that the draft was only in English. We wish to explore how capacity can be further built so that such documents are really an expression of the concerns of Cambodia’s government and people.
We are also most concerned about the multiple number of government planning documents now required, including the PRSP and the SEDPII. NGOs support the view of the RGC that there be only one poverty reduction strategy. However, the SEDPII in its present state is likely to be viewed by both the World Bank and others as inadequate in terms of both participation and content. Notably, the Interim PRSP, already passed by Cabinet, called for workshops at central and local levels, a stakeholder analysis, and consultations with local communities, local authorities, the National Assembly and Senate.
The SEDP II is Cambodia’s medium term
development plan. It is a
constitutional requirement and will go quite soon to the National Assembly for
approval. However, much work
remains to be done on further developing the SEDP II.
This is acknowledged by the lead consultant provided by the Asian
Development Bank to prepare the document, as well as representatives from donor
agencies. We understand that some sectoral strategies will not even be ready
until June or July, after the National Assembly has convened.
There also appears to be no input from the Provincial Development Plans
of the SEILA provinces in the SEDPII document.
Therefore, we respectfully request and urge the
Royal Cambodian Government to slow down the process of approval of the present
SEDP II document. If this is not
possible, we respectfully suggest that the National Assembly accept the SEDP II
as a broad framework that needs to be detailed through further analyses and
consultations. The introductory
chapter of the SEDPII should make this intention explicit.
We would be most willing to discuss with the
government methods of building participation (of both government and civil
society) in further developing the plan, and in soliciting donor support for
this work.
The Council for Social Development, under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Planning, may be one mechanism for fostering further inter-ministerial discussions on development plans. The Poverty Forum, proposed under the UNDP’s project of assistance to the monitoring and analysis function of the Council, would be one avenue for further consultations with NGOs and civil society groups.
We firmly believe that building national
ownership of the SEDPII in the above manner will lead to a more
Cambodia-specific approach to poverty reduction, and a more focused Public
Investment Plan which donors could confidently support.
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FURTHER NGO COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT SEDPII |
The
following comments result from NGO small group discussions in Phnom Penh and in
Battambang. Assistance was also
received from a regional NGO think tank, Focus on the Global South.
A number of NGOs are also interested in examining sectoral issues and
cross-cutting issues like gender more closely but have not had time to
contribute to this submission. These comments should be considered preliminary
only.
While we recognise many good elements in the SEDPII, we wish to draw attention to the following concerns.
Comments
on Process:
1.
The SEDP II has been developed without sufficient and adequate input and
participation from Cambodian civil society. It appears that while many donor agency representatives and
foreign consultants have contributed their ideas into the document, most
Cambodians, whose lives this plan will affect, have not had adequate
opportunities to contribute towards the SEDP II.
2.
The Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) provided a welcome avenue for
consultation with Cambodia’s poor. NGOs
were invited to some workshops connected to the PPA.
However, it is not clear the extent to which the PPA influenced the
strategy expressed in the SEDPII.
3.
There is a need to facilitate and host broad-based public consultations
and participation about the SEDP II. The
development strategies adopted by the Cambodian Government will have impacts on
all sectors of Cambodian society, from private entrepreneurs to garment workers
to subsistence farmers. Getting and
integrating their inputs into the SEDP II will make the SEDP II stronger and
create greater national ownership of the plan.
4.
There is a need to explore and identify ways in which impacts of past
reforms and of the SEDP II can be monitored, and how such monitoring can be used
to adapt and strengthen the SEDP II. This
is particularly important in areas that have direct but complex results on
poverty, for example, policies related to trade, macro-economics, agriculture,
natural resources and land. Civil
society organisations at every level can be valuable partners to the Government
in these processes and assist the Government in shaping the SEDP II to respond
to the needs and priorities of Cambodians.
5.
We have the impression that there is insufficient relation between the
SEDPII and the formulation of the Public Investment Plan (PIP) and the
government budget. These are areas
which need strengthening to make the SEDPII a more useful document.
6.
We understand that the SEDPII was developed even while some sectoral
strategies are not yet complete. There
also appears to be no relation with the Provincial Development Plans of the
SEILA provinces. It is not clear
how this centrally developed plan will relate to the new decentralized
development planning processes.
Comments
on Relation to the PRSP
7.
We understand that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
require that the Cambodian Government produce a full Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP) by December 2001. We
do not understand why Cambodia needs to produce an additional strategy paper
when we already have the SEDP II. However,
we would agree that the SEDP II needs a lot of work to improve its quality and
to be a truly Cambodian owned document. With
more time, broad-based public participation and systematic monitoring, the SEDP
II can become a strong and focused document that will form the basis of the PRSP
needed by the World Bank and IMF.
8.
It is a waste of government and NGO time to insist that another document
(the PRSP) be prepared by December 2001. It
would be better to focus on beginning implementation of the SEDPII and the
Interim PRSP, and in the meantime build up capacity in the Council for Social
Development. If the full PRSP was
delayed by one year, it could be a simple revision of the SEDPII, reflecting any
lessons learned in the first year of implementation.
The Council for Social Development, given adequate capacity, could
develop this revised SEDPII into a truly government-owned document including
civil society participation. Therefore,
we respectfully suggest that the Government postpone the deadline for the PRSP
to December 2002.
9.
We would be happy to support Government in this position, and do our best
to generate support from the international donor community. We believe that the
World Bank and the IMF cannot easily ignore a government’s honorable
intentions of designing a PRSP based on a workable, responsive and nationally
owned medium term development plan.
Comments
on Content
10.
The SEDP II does not offer sufficient analysis of the impacts of the SEDP
I, or the overall reform process on Cambodian society and economy, particularly
on the poor and disadvantaged. As
such, it is not clear what information or assumptions the document is based on.
11.
While the importance of poverty reduction is implied in the document, no
clear links are made about how the SEDP II would specifically address the goal
of poverty reduction. Cambodians
realise well that poverty in Cambodia is complex and multi-dimensional.
Analysing such poverty cannot simply be a technical exercise that counts
the poor and identifies who and where they are.
In order to lead to meaningful, pro-poor policies, poverty analysis also
requires that the impacts of past policies, plans and programmes on the poor be
accurately assessed. There appears
to be little evidence to show that the SEDP II is based on such analysis.
12.
The SEDP II is too broad. It
does not provide sufficiently developed strategies for strengthening the
capacities of various sectors or the economy as a whole.
At the same time, it promotes a “fast-track” strategy towards a
market economy without discussing the impacts of such fast transition.
The document does not discuss
the kinds of domestic regulations, safeguard measures and strategies that are
needed to protect the domestic economy and populations from the negative impacts
of rapid liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation.
13.
We express concern over the lack of consideration of alternative
technologies appropriate for the agricultural sector given the sector’s low
productive capacity, cost implications for farmers, and the amount of time they
need before they can embark on more intensive production. We further draw
attention to the potential impacts of the improper use of input-intensive
farming systems on the long-term viability of the land, on the health of the
farming population, and on the environment.
14.
The SEDP II is weak in establishing the linkages between the various
sectoral reform processes. For instance, the section on financial sector reform
gives the impression that the process is independent of other ongoing or planned
reforms, and therefore detached from the development of other sectoral
strategies. We are interested, for instance, on the types of financial policies
other than those on micro-finance that are supportive of the fledgling
agricultural sector, and the potential import substitution industries.
15.
The SEDP II is weak in systemic analysis of how the various reforms might
affect different sectors. It is
also weak in its suggestions of how the SEDP II and overall reform process can
be effectively monitored and adapted to alleviate negative impacts.
16.
Trade is a two way process. While
greater trade openness may increase Cambodia’s share of exports, it will also
result in increased imports of many of the same goods that poor Cambodians are
now producing, such as food and primary products.
In addition, imports of cheap, value-added products from neighboring
countries can put many small Cambodian producers out of business in both rural
and urban areas. The SEDP II does
not discuss the domestic measures needed to protect Cambodian producers from
imports, policies and measures to strengthen local production and marketing
capacities, or overall policies by which trade can contribute towards an
effective development strategy for Cambodia.
17.
We appreciate the acknowledgment of possible import substitution in both
agriculture and industry. However, this has not been developed as a policy
statement in the SEDP II, and therefore no clear strategies on how import
substitutes will be promoted are laid down in the document.