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1
Executive Summary
This short study focuses on the relationship between NGOs and the World Bank in Cambodia. It intends to provide the basis for dialogue between NGOs and the World Bank at the national, regional and global level through NGO Working Group networks. The focus on the World Bank is derived from the fact that the study was sponsored by the Regional NGO Working Group on the World Bank. The findings of this report should also be considered by other International Finance Institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank. 1.2.1 Information and Transparency Information about World Bank projects in Cambodia is available on the Internet, which enables English-speaking people with access to computers to gain a broad overview of the Cambodia portfolio. A Project Appraisal Document for the $30 million Structural Adjustment Credit is not available on the Internet. The World Bank office in Cambodia is very busy, and staff sometimes find it difficult to access documents in a timely manner. Most NGOs consulted during this work expressed the desire for more information about the World Bank and its projects in Cambodia. Whilst World Bank requires 'participation' or 'full consultation' in some of the processes that it supports, it does not always demonstrate the commitment to enforce a satisfactory consultation process. The lack of clear and agreed definitions for these terms creates the conditions for differences of opinion and makes objective assessment difficult. In the case of the Forestry Law, the passing of which was a condition of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Credit, it was NGOs who had to lobby for meaningful consultation. Consultative processes only really seem to be accessible and useful to NGOs with expertise in advocacy and clearly worked out policy positions, highlighting the importance of the relationship between NGOs working directly with poor people and NGOs with research and policy expertise. Most NGOs consulted have not been formally involved in World Bank financed projects. There is very low confidence amongst NGOs in the World Bank portfolio in Cambodia. The use of NGO technical assistance in World Bank projects has been attempted and, in some cases, has been judged very successful by all parties. A project steering committee with NGO representation is a promising feature of the EQIP project. One NGO bidding for a government contract on a World Bank financed project complained that due process had not been followed. This and rumours of other similar cases are a disincentive to NGOs contemplating preparing a bid for such work. A liberal constitution and a relatively free environment for NGOs to operate and speak out are favourable conditions for NGOs to engage in policy dialogue. This is especially the case for the international NGOs who showed solidarity with the Government during the international isolation of the 1980s. However, there is not a history of developing policy through public debate and consultation in Cambodia. Furthermore, the history of state violence over the past fifty years leads to a fear of confrontation, especially concerning matters which relate to party politics or personal profit. Uncoordinated donor initiatives and under-resourcing of the civil service is a major constraint to the capacity of government and therefore to the effectiveness of engaging in policy dialogue government institutions. 1.3
Conclusions and Recommendations The degree of influence that NGOs have over policy dialogue tends to depend on the orientation and capacity of the NGO. Those NGOs that have a clear advocacy agenda and have the time and resources to invest in understanding the workings of government and of International Finance Instititutions (IFIs) are able to exert some influence. The involvement of the World Bank in a policy process can be a key determinant in the degree to which NGOs are likely to be able to engage effectively with that process. However, World Bank 'requirements' for participation and consultation tend to be fulfilled only when demand is expressed by NGOs. At project level, NGOs have on occasions proved to be a valuable source of advice in project formulation and of contracted technical assistance in the preparation and implementation of projects. World Bank financed projects should be a venue for NGOs (as members of civil society rather than as sub-contractors) to engage with the state. The presence of NGOs on the steering committee of the EQIP project is a promising example of this. For
NGOs § NGOs should take individual initiative to be better-informed about IFI financed projects in their sectors and geographical areas. § Through national level coordination bodies, NGOs should ensure that there are sufficient NGO resources invested in policy research and advocacy – and that these activities are well networked with local NGOs and other civil society organisations at local level. For
World Bank (ADB and IMF should also note) § In discussion with civil society organisations and other stakeholders, develop some clear and concise definitions on what is meant by “participation” and “consultation” and how these could be measured, especially when they are imposed as conditions on policy processes. Develop procedures for further defining these measures in particular project contexts. § Be more active in sharing information about the portfolio and about Bank activities. § Facilitate NGO participation in steering committees (or equivalent) to oversee loan projects. For government § Foster tri-partite cooperation by inviting NGO representatives to attend all meetings with IFI representatives and consultants. §
Be more assertive in demanding
coordination from donors. This short mapping study focuses on the relationship between NGOs and the World Bank in Cambodia. The mapping study is part of the global mapping initiative of the NGO
Working Group on the World Bank,
which aims "to provide a mechanism for national NGOs to
systematically engage with World Bank officials on the question of
bringing civil society participation to policy development."
This project has five goals: 1. Learn about actual Bank-NGO/Civil Society interaction 2. Learn about actual Bank-Government-NGO/Civil Society interaction 3. Identify examples of good practice for each of the above categories 4. Determine whether the policy environment of particular countries (laws, regulations, freedom of speech and association, etc.) positively or negatively influences interactions between and among the Bank, government and NGO/civil society 5. Provide a systematic basis for dialogue between NGOs and the World Bank at three levels – national, regional, global – through the NGO Working Group networks, to discuss ways to improve Bank-NGO/civil society interaction and Bank-Government-NGO/civil society interaction. Broadly, the mapping study might be termed a rapid assessment, carried out in ten working days over a three-month period.[1] The method combined four case studies (two projects and two policy processes) with more general enquiries about the nature of World Bank-NGO (and World Bank-Government –NGO) relations in Cambodia. More specifically: § All World Bank Task Managers working on projects in Cambodia were contacted by e-mail and invited to comment on relations between World Bank and NGOs in Cambodia § All members of the NGO Working Group on Development Banks and the personnel of the World Bank Resident Office were sent copies of the project questionnaire. § Interviews were conducted with selected NGOs, World Bank and, where available, Government personnel connected with the development of the Country Assistance Strategy; the North-East Village Development Project; the Education Quality Improvement Project and the development of the Forestry Law (a condition of the Bank's Structural Adjustment Credit). See appendix for a list of people consulted. § Members and 'friends' of the NGO Forum on Cambodia were sent a rapid survey on relations with the World Bank, which elicted 35 responses (see appendix).[2] The study attempted to look at different styles of consultation and project engagement by selecting a few cases (see above). Within these cases the focus was only on World Bank-NGO and World Bank-NGO-Government relations. There was no attempt to study the engagement with other elements of civil society. The mapping study was conducted with a rapid assessment of Cambodia´s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process. The latter study was a higher priority for the NGO Forum on Cambodia and more time and resources were devoted to its completion. A project questionnaire, designed in Washington, was provided for this research. Unfortunately, reactions to it were extremely negative – almost everybody who completed it complained about its design.[3] As a result other tools had to be improvised in the course of the mapping study. The lack of responses from many in the World Bank, the Government and NGO sector in Cambodia were both a finding (relating partly to heavy workloads and the difficulty of devoting time to new commitments at short notice) and also a limitation on the breadth and depth of the study. These limitations, which relate to both sampling and research approach, mean that there are many biases in this study. It cannot be held to represent the entirety of World Bank-NGO relations in Cambodia as clearly those relations vary tremendously from project to project. So while this study has mapped World Bank-NGO relations, and has recorded a number of interesting insights and perspectives, it is not intended to be a comprehensive detailed map. These same limitations mean that it is difficult to discern trends from this study[4]. The conclusions and recommendations of the first draft of this study appear to have been well-received. However, Bank staff concerned with the rural sector case studies (NVDP and Forestry Law) have questioned the appropriateness of the rapid assessment method, arguing(with some justification) that the approach made it difficult for World Bank staff and government officials to engage during production of the first draft of the study. A further four weeks has enabled further comment and analysis. However, government and Bank officials have busy schedules, therefore, even with the extended consultation period, the constraints mentioned above still apply. The companion rapid assessment of the PRSP process in Cambodia includes a brief outline of Cambodia's post-independence political history. The following quotations from a leading historian and a democracy activist offer additional perspectives on this: 1. "In April 1975, following 90 years of French 'protection' and 22 years of independence, an indigenous communist movement known as the 'Khmer Rouge' seized power in Cambodia. Inspired by Mao's China, it stamped its utopian brand of socialism onto a population devastated by five years of foreign invasions, aerial bombardment and civil war. Until January 1979 when the regime was swept from power by a Vietnamese invasion, Cambodia called itself Democratic Kampuchea … Between April 1975 and January 1979 perhaps as many as 1.5 million Cambodians died from malnutrition, overwork and disease. At least 200,000 others were executed without trial as 'class ememies'” (Chandler 1998: 12) "…Under close Vietnamese supervision, Cambodia struggled to its feet in the 1980s though it remained isolated from global capitalism. Opportunities for corruption (or economic development for that matter) were few… Cambodia suffered inordinately in the closing stages of the Cold War because of the backing it enjoyed from Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The United States and its allies isolated Cambodia by cutting all economic and political ties". (Chandler 1998:16). 2. “Since independence in 1953 Cambodia has been ruled by a diverse array of governments which have successively claimed to be monarchist, republican, revolutionary, socialist and most recently, democratic in nature. The political orientations of these governments have varied widely, as has the impact of their policies on the fortunes of Cambodians. Despite these seeming shifts, a more consistent aspect of Cambodia's political life has been the retention of power in the hand of elites. The provisions made, in the better of Cambodia's first five constitutions to safeguard citizens' rights have never given rise to effective legal checks on the use of power. “In theory, Cambodia's 1993 Constitution, based on liberal democratic principles, goes further than preceding ones in preventing the abuse of power. But the system of 'checks and balances' it provides for is sharply at odds with Cambodia's deeply conservative political culture and its authoritarian underpinnings” (Hay 1998: 36) In 2000 the Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC) sponsored a study of the NGO sector in Cambodia. The following quotations are taken from the summary of that document which was itself written by the head of a Cambodian training NGO. NGOs and IOs have increased in number from 1990 to the present. According to registration figures available with the Ministry of Interior, the rise went from under 20 NGOs in the early 1990s to over five hundred in 1999. Although those numbers do not necessarily represent the actual number of function non-government organisations, the rise of local organisations has still remained dramatic over the past decade. According to more accurate information available at the CCC, there are over one hundred local NGOs registered, covering a broad range of sectors and services. There has also been a rise in the number of IO. As of 1999, there are 119 foreign registered IOs with the CCC.[5] More IOs are coming to Cambodia every year and the national government is trying to organise and identify every IO. The Government and NGO relationship is currently influenced by strong cultural beliefs and practices that are leader-centered and instruction oriented. The official policy towards NGOs is one of partnership and non-interference. The relationship between government and NGOs is mostly complementary and mutually beneficial; there are periods of tension though. The difficulties arise from a difference in concept, practice and technical support. The government in the Cambodian concept is the highest authority that functions primarily on personal relationships and nepotism. Throw in the autocratic cultural practices and the concept of participation and democracy takes a giant leap back. The real difference between the government and NGOs is that the NGO have more foreign influences and support, which help bring much needed organizational changes that are more regionally accepted. NGOs are provided funding and must follow the requirements set by the funding agency. These new practices and requirements encourage national NGOs to more progressively adapt. On the other hand, government staff are, and for the near future, receiving a monthly salary equivalent to 20 US dollars a month with limited supervision and accountability, which has only strengthened a culture of impunity (Khus 2000:4-5) The Resident Representative is the only member of World Bank staff in country, supported by two local staff and an Australian volunteer[6]. The resident representative filled in the project questionnaire for himself but the questionnaires for the Civil Society Liaison Officer and for Other Staff were not filled in because there are no other staff. The Resident Representative was unable to attend an interview arranged in the first half of the consultancy, and therefore an interview was held with the locally hired consultant who assists in the World Bank Country Office. During the second half of the consultancy neither of them was available as they were both involved in a Mission to negotiate the terms of a loan project for demobilisation with the Royal Government. All World Bank task managers were contacted by e-mail and asked for any information about the interaction between the World Bank and NGOs. The only Task Manager who responded substantively was the Rural Sector Coordinator who also manages the North-East Village Development Project and who was both interviewed and provided a series of answers by e-mail. A former advisor to both the Country Assistance Strategy process and the North-east Village Development Project and a current advisor to the Education Quality Improvement Project were interviewed. Whilst a good range of government officials were approached during this research, the responses from technical level officials and from provincial officials were more substantive than those from policy-making levels. Interviews were held with provincial authorities in two provinces. The head of the project implementation unit for the Education Quality Improvement Project was also interviewed. A number of technical officers from the Ministry of Planning shared their insights, as did officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economy and Finance during the PRSP Workshop 24-5 April. Six respondents filled in the questionnaire out of a total of 30 who were approached. A further two gave written responses. Thirty-five NGOs responded to a rapid questionnaire, mostly national NGOs, but also some international NGOs and including agencies with various roles including research, advocacy, networking, and direct poverty alleviation. Of the interviews, those related to the Country Assistance Strategy were with both Cambodian NGOs and International NGOs. Those related to the other three cases were principally with members of International NGOs. 3
Overview and Context of NGO-WB Relations 3.1 World Bank Policies on NGOs At an introductory meeting with Cambodian NGO workers on 11 May 2001 the new World Bank Country Director (responsible for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Mongolia) emphasised that for the World Bank the relationship with NGOs is "tremendously important". This reinforces statements in the Country Assistance Strategy and on the World Bank web-site (www.worldbank.org "World Bank and Cambodia") which mention "stronger partnerships" and a situation where "…stronger partnerships with the Government and others in the development arena, including donors, NGOs, civil society and the private sector are forged in policy dialogue, analytical work, and development and implementation of sector strategies under the Government's leadership". Globally, the World Bank has been attempting to become more 'participatory' and to build stronger partnerships with civil society, including through the establishment of an NGO and Civil Society Unit within the bank which is tasked with facilitating civil society involvement in development by inviting engagement into the World Bank's operations. Bank statements emphasise that "civil society is a significant factor in development" and "civic engagement" defined as " the process by which civil society organisations engage in constructive independent relationships with governments and others to achieve their common objectives" (see web-site "NGO and Civil Society Unit"). Both within and outside the Bank there is debate about whether the commitment to participation and engagement with "civil society" is genuine, or is ultimately a way to adopt a 'human face' and to deflect criticism. 3.2
Policy Context for NGO-Government-World Bank Cooperation As one Task Manager pointed out during this research, the World Bank tends to emphasise participation during the formulation of projects. Once projects are approved and loan agreements signed with the government there are far more restrictions that are governed by World Bank disclosure policies. For example, task managers' project visits lead to the generation of a supervisory report, but this is not a public document. One issue that was raised during the Country Assistance Strategy consultations was the constitutional requirement that all loans be approved by the National Assembly. Both government and the World Bank have received criticism from opposition political parties for failing to observe this requirement and therefore shutting off an important opportunity for lobbying and for influencing public debate of loan projects. 3.3
Existing Mechanisms for NGO-WB Cooperation There are no mechanisms for NGO-WB cooperation as such in Cambodia. There is, for instance, little systematic information sharing with NGOs by the World Bank office in Cambodia apart from the inclusion of the NGO Forum on Cambodia and the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia on the World Bank office’s donor mailing list. With the exception of the Country Assistance Strategy, the projects and processes in which the World Bank is involved are primarily government processes. The World Bank does have an in-country office, but there is not currently a designated civil society liaison officer. 3.4
Existing Mechanisms for NGO-WB-Government Cooperation The annual Consultative Group (CG) meetings of donors and government include position papers prepared by NGOs. This work is carried out by three NGO membership organisations, the NGO Forum on Cambodia, MEDICAM and the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia. NGOs also send two delegates to this annual meeting, which the World Bank facilitates. Following the 1999 CG meeting joint donor working groups were formed around the thematic areas of administrative reform, fiscal reform, demobilization, judicial reform. Donor working groups were subsequently created on the social sectors and on governance. These donor working groups roughly parallel various inter-ministerial reform councils on the government side. There has been NGO representation on each of these donor groups, with the exception of the Governance Working Group, chaired by the World Bank, and the Fiscal Reform Working Group, chaired by the International Monetary Fund. In the case of the Governance Working Group, the World Bank Resident Representative wrote to the representatives of the NGO Forum on Cambodia and the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia informing them that “most donors do not feel that it would be appropriate”. There has been some discussion amongst donors and NGOs about whether separate government and donor working groups are appropriate mechanisms for "stronger partnership". 4.1
Case 1. Education
Quality Improvement Project (EQIP) EQIP (Project ID KH-PE-59971) is a Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) worth five million US dollars at the time of signing. The loan is a 40 year loan with a grace period[7] of ten years. The project document was signed in June 1999 and the project dates are October 1999 to March 2004. The project intends to "create an opportunity for the MoEYS [Ministry of Education Youth and Sport] to experiment with a new, more participatory approach to management and to improve the effectiveness of its operations". 4.1.2 NGOs in Project Formulation and Management World Bank sent a series of missions to Cambodia during the two years preceding the signing of the project appraisal in 1999. During this time they made presentations at EDUCAM (the NGO/IO education coordination forum) and also met with NGOs in the education sector. During the pilot phase, prior to the signing of the loan agreement, a number of studies were commissioned for the project. International NGOs World Education and CARE won contracts to do some of these studies. These were judged successful by the World Bank advisor largely because of the knowledge and expertise that the NGOs had of operating within Cambodia. Also during the pilot phase a donor coordination group was initiated within Takeo in order to coordinate the inputs of various organisations that were providing support to primary schools. The World Bank advisor at national level explained that having achieved a reasonable level of coordination this group is no longer active (and no longer needs to be). Since the time of the pilot phase of the project EQIP has had a National Steering Committee. During the pilot phase this was called the "Technical Advisory Committee" and two NGOs Taipei Overseas Peace Service (TOPS) and Norwegian Save the Children were members of that committee. During the implementation of the project the steering committee has been renamed the "Sub-committee on Effective Primary Schooling" and Norwegian Save the Children is a member of this. 4.1.3 NGOs in Project Implementation – the case of VSO The British NGO VSO was approached during the pilot year of the project with regard to the possibility of co-financing the project by providing technical assistance. The project works at primary school level, and the pilot began in Takeo province. Takeo has 352 primary schools, which are organised into 52 clusters. Under the project each cluster is allocated funds to improve the primary schools within the cluster. In order to access these funds a Local Cluster School Committee needs to make a plan in a participatory manner with involvement from various stakeholders. From the pilot phase through the first two years of the project most grants were used for upgrading the learning environment with a particular emphasis on improving the quality of teaching. Takeo province has ten districts. In order to facilitate the implementation of the project in all 52 clusters of schools throughout the province an[8] education official from each district office acts as the district animator (or facilitator). VSO has provided four volunteers to Takeo province. They provide technical assistance and support to the eleven animators. VSO is also building up teams of four volunteers each in the other two provinces where the project is progressively being implemented. The VSO volunteers are funded by the Department for International Development (DfID) of the British government and supervised through its regional office in Bangkok. VSO is very pleased with the engagement it has had with the project. The main direct relationships have not been with the World Bank, but with the Project Implementation Unit in the Ministry and the Provincial Project Implementation Units in the provinces. To the extent that there has been direct interaction with the Bank it has been very positive, based on an understanding that the VSO contribution is essential to the success of the project. VSO has had to simplify the language of some Bank documents, for instance the initial job descriptions of the volunteers, because it has found it to be somewhat jargon-ridden and inaccessible. Through its involvement in the project, the quality of VSO's relationship with the Ministry has greatly improved. It has very good and close relationships with the people in the Project Implementation Unit, which has enabled VSO to have better access and understanding of the Ministry as a whole. The project has also facilitated VSO to have excellent relations with officials at provincial, district and community level, all of which it values highly. VSO has also felt that the successful operation of the project has been very valuable in raising the profile of the organisation as a high quality service-provider not just with the education sector but other sectors in Cambodia. 4.1.4 Project Monitoring and Loan Repayment NGO workers from both VSO and Maryknoll were very positive that money allocated for school improvement really does reach the schools. Funds are handed over by the Provincial Project Implementation Unit (PPIU) which is part of the Provincial Department of Education Youth and Sports. This takes place in a public ceremony with the money literally being handed over in transparent envelopes, the amount being publicly counted and announced by the Cluster Director in the presence of the LCSC members. In its involvement with the World Bank project VSO has been conscious of the fact that there is a loan which must be repaid. In this respect it was felt important that 80% of the loan money went to schools while only 20% went for project management and institutional strengthening[9].
VSO believe that it is important that the proportion of loan money actually being invested in the schools should be high, however, VSO has not attempted to monitor expenditures during the project. Indeed, its staff would probably not have felt comfortable doing so unless this had been specified as a right or responsibility in the original project agreements. Nevertheless, VSO expects one of the outputs of the mid-term review to be information about expenditure on the project (and expects confirmation that it is in line with the project document). While project implementation has gone very well, VSO is still waiting to see how effective the project has been in terms of impact. Monitoring data have been collected from the beginning of the project, a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan has just been issued and a mid-term review follows in September. The World Bank advisor to EQIP at national level explained that there is a monitoring and evaluation system and that the possibility of involving NGOs in the monitoring has been discussed. The newly issued plan, however, anticipates project staff taking the lead role in monitoring and evaluation. He also explained that in proposing a LIL it is not necessary to prepare the standard Bank investment cost-benefit estimates. Such calculations will have to be made (on the basis of international experience regarding the relationship between educational attainment and GDP) in planning a more substantial follow-up loan. He also made the point that with a ten-year grace period, no interest charges (apart from a management fee) and therefore no allowance for inflation, that the loan could more accurately be considered a donation as the value of money tends to halve every ten years. The Director of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) (a Ministry of Education Youth and Sport official on unpaid leave from the ministry and salaried by the project) explained that it was difficult to answer when people in the provinces asked him how the government would repay the loan. He went on to explain that the improvements in education will lead workers to become more productive and therefore strengthen the national economy and therefore enable repayment. He furthermore recalled that there had been some resistance to accepting loan money in the Ministry when the project was first being formulated. He, on the other hand, had argued that given the amount of loan money going into other Ministries, it was appropriate that some should also be allocated to education. While a role for NGOs in monitoring the financial management within the project is not currently envisaged, the PIU Director did express his openness to anyone wishing to check the finances. "We are the most transparent project … we welcome everybody to go and check and go and supervise". The national project advisor explained that there have been some coordination issues regarding 'fat clusters' and 'fat provinces'. This refers to overlaps with UNICEF support to some clusters in EQIP provinces, and to the fact that primary schools in EQIP provinces also receive similar levels of assistance from the Priority Action Programme (PAP) funds. He explained that this had not caused operational difficulties, but that it meant that some schools received twice as much assistance as others. From a policy point of view he thought that valuable lessons would be able to be drawn by comparing the results of the intensive EQIP approach and the less intensive PAP approach. Amongst the NGO workers, government officials and Bank staff and consultants met during this research, there was a high level of satisfaction with the EQIP project. Inputs from NGOs appeared to have been encouraged and to have made a valuable impact on the project. High quality Bank staff – NGO workers commented on them being committed, intelligent and very willing to listen – and a slow, consultative, research-oriented programme development process had created opportunities for NGOs to have input into the project design and for support to be mobilised behind it. The most substantial NGO contribution to the project appears to have been the contracting of international technical assistance, especially from organisations that have had long experience of working in Cambodia. A project steering committee with an NGO presence may be a valuable model which could be adapted for other IFI loan projects. 4.2 Case 2: North-east Village Development Project (NVDP) The Northeast Village Development Project (NVDP) is another Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL). The total project cost is US $6.3 million, with US $5 million being financed by a World Bank loan on concessional terms. The Ministry of Rural Development is the implementing agency. The project was approved on 18 May 1999 and is due to complete on 30 April 2002. The main focus of the project is rural development activities conducted in selected villages in Stung Treng, Kratie, Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham provinces of Cambodia. By May 2001 work was underway in approximately 40 villages, though at that time it was still engaged in planning and had “yet to break ground on its first sub-project” (Scura 2001) Part of the context for the project has been changing personnel. During the formulation and implementation of the project the Task Manager, the locally hired project advisors, the project manager and the lead policy-maker within Ministry of Rural Development responsible for the project have all changed. In this context some disruptions of relationships have been inevitable. 4.2.2 NGO Involvement in Project Formulation During the early stages of project formulation the Under Secretary of State for Rural Development responsible for the project introduced the World Bank Task Manager to the work of an American NGO called Partners for Development (PfD) which had operations in two of the NVDP target provinces. Reflecting the high opinion which government held of the PfD programme, the Country Programme Manager was invited to take a lead role in the formulation of the project. After some months this work did not come to fruition and was taken on by a local consultant (who had previously worked with NGOs and the United Nations' in Phnom Penh), who was subsequently hired as an advisor to the project. The former project advisor described a process whereby all NGOs in the target provinces were visited during project formulation. Furthermore, a series of technical consultations were held in order to reflect on development practice in Cambodia, and ensure that these reflections informed project design[10]. 4.2.3 NGO Involvement in Project Implementation During the first months of the project an emphasis was placed on developing the capacity of the project staff (20 development facilitators seconded from the Ministry of Rural Development and from the four Provincial Departments of Rural Development). The former project advisor explained that one of the key issues that had arisen during project formulation was that of rural landlessness. As a result, and at the prompting of the advisor, two of the facilitators were seconded during their training period to the Oxfam GB Cambodia Land Study Project. The two seconded staff worked as full members of the Oxfam project team for six months, conducting research into landlessness and development in NVDP and non-NVDP provinces. They were trained in the use of a rapid assessment tool and also in data entry and analysis using a computerised database. The landlessness and development research conducted by the team in 17 provinces, including the 4 NVDP provinces, informed a National Conference on Landlessness and Development. The latter workshop was co-hosted by the Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Land Management, Cooperation Committee on Cambodia and Oxfam GB. The World Bank provided funding support for the Ministry of Land Management´s contribution to the conference. Policy recommendations from that conference have also informed the formulation stage of the World Bank supported Land Management and Administration Project. In other words, through its cooperation with Oxfam, NVDP made a contribution not only to learning and understanding about landlessness related poverty in the NVDP provinces, but also made a contribution to national policies and programmes on poverty and land. One of Oxfam GB´s objectives in conducting the landlessness and development research was to reorient development programmes in Cambodia towards activities which would prevent or mitigate landlessness. At this early stage in NVDP´s development, it is not yet clear how this research experience will shape the institutions and practices of the project. NGO workers in the provinces confirmed that they had received early visits from the members of the NVDP team. In the case of PfD, who have been asked to drill wells in some of the target villages, there has been regular contact since, with the provincially located staff being described as extremely cooperative and trying hard to coordinate. Another NGO worker recalled receiving the initial visits, but had not heard of anything since and did not know what the progress with the project was. Regarding village selection, the World Bank rural sector coordinator explained that a preliminary list of project target villages was identified by the project preparation team in August 1998. During the initial stages of implementation, the NVDP project staff carried out a revalidation exercise for the first round of target villages, using multiple screening criteria. A second round of target villages is being revalidation currently using the same criteria. These criteria include presence of other organisations, though if a village is sufficiently poor and under-served it may still become an NVDP target village even if other agencies already work there. As part of the village identification process, NGOs were asked to submit lists of villages where they worked in order to inform the selection of NVDP target villages. One NGO worker explained that apart from submitting that list, the NGO had not had a role in the process of selecting the NVDP villages, and that NVDP provincial staff had said that the decisions had been made 'by Phnom Penh'. He furthermore said that NVDP village selection could have been much better with respect to both avoiding overlaps with other programmes and also with respect to identifying poorer under-served villages. The current World Bank Task Manager for the project explained that the project had begun with an emphasis on village level development, with government officials working in the villages. She suggested that it might not be realistic for government officials to be able to 'reach' every community in this way. For the future, therefore, there may be more possibilities for NGOs. For example, if the government can only effectively reach to commune level, NGOs may be able to help with community organisation in order that people can effectively link with government processes at the commune level. NVDP actively participates in Provincial Rural Development Committee meetings in order to coordinate and share information with government line agencies, international organisations and NGOs. In order to enhance this cooperation, NVDP is working on a project newsletter which will be distributed to communities as well as all development agencies, including NGOs working in the provinces. While noting that NVDP staff had been very willing to try to coordinate, the PfD staff member also described a number of problems relating to coordination. Some of these were aggravated by contextual matters, for example a provincial governor who did not take a lead in development coordination and had abandoned the practice of coordinating monthly meetings of the Provincial Rural Development Committee. In Stung Treng province, PfD works closely with the Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD), including working directly with PDRD counterparts. Also in that province there are two donor-supported PDRD projects: NVDP supported by the World Bank and Seth Koma ('child rights') supported by UNICEF. One deputy PDRD chief is responsible for the NVDP project in the province and the other is responsible for the Seth Koma project. At present, all three of these programmes are implementing, or about to implement, latrine construction projects. Each one has different conditions at village level with villagers receiving the latrines required to contribute more or less to the costs, and required to buy different parts of the latrine structure themselves. There had not been consultation between the programmes about these different approaches, and PfD described the NVDP staff as extremely cooperative, but having to comply with decisions from above. Similarly, each of the programmes works with elected Village Development Committees and conducts Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) activities in the villages prior to commencement of work. Recently, despite the fact that all three programmes are staffed with officials from the Provincial Department of Rural Development VDC elections have been taking place before they are due, and PRA processes have been budgeted for and have taken place in villages where PRA has already been conducted. Again, the NVDP staff are described as trying to make the best of this situation by ensuring that they review the existing PRA and try to add value to it, but generally the lack of coordination between the programmes is causing difficulties for all those involved. At every stage of the process there has been clear evidence of goodwill between government officials, NGO staff and World Bank Task Managers and local consultants. Despite good will and constructive efforts, it still appears that the main issue for concern is that of coordination. It appears at this early stage that, along with many others, the project may be part of a multi-donor process which is 'balkanising' the Provincial Departments of Rural Development and making policy development and coordination more difficult. It would be more accurate to see this as a manifestation of a general problem that exists in development in Cambodia rather than a specific problem related to only NVDP and Ministry of Rural Development. The Learning and Innovation Loan is designed to provide a platform whereby the Ministry of Rural Development is able to trial policies towards developing a framework for decentralised rural development. As solving the problem of parallel structures and poor coordination becomes an increasingly high priority for donors and government in Cambodia, NVDP is well-placed to work with others to become part of the solution to this problem. 4.3 Case 3: Country Assistance Strategy Formulation Process The most recent Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Cambodia was signed by the President of the World Bank on 7 February 2000. In-country consultants for the CAS were conducted during October 1999. Consultations were held with the Cabinet, Representatives of the National Assembly, Representatives of the Senate, Members of the Sam Rainsy (opposition) party, international donor community, NGO representatives in Battambang, NGO representatives in Phnom Penh and private businesses and business organizations in Phnom Penh. Summary points from each of these consultations are included in Annex G to the CAS (pp106-112). Within the CAS these consultations are interpreted as an endorsement: "The objectives and strategic approach outlined below were endorsed during extensive and unprecedented in-country CAS consultations" (CAS:iv[11]). The main recommendations of the CAS consultations are summarised in the main text of the final document and the impact of the consultations on the final document is described as follows: The strategic thrust of the CAS and the proposed delivery mechanisms have been reworked to reflect these recommendations. In particular, the country team undertook to disseminate information about activities more widely through the World Bank Office in Phnom Penh and also noted that the final CAS would be translated into Khmer and publicly disseminated (CAS:22). 4.3.2 Involvement of NGOs in CAS Formulation Annex G to the CAS describes the process whereby NGO consultation was structured into the CAS: With regard to civil society consultations, the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC), NGO Forum on Cambodia and MEDICAM, three major networks active in development work, agreed to facilitate the process. The NGOs also independently organised a series of pre-consultation planning meetings in Phnom Penh and Battambang. At these meetings, NGO representatives reviewed the history of the Bank Group's work in Cambodia and in other parts of the region, and the lessons learned which would be important in informing the new CAS. The issues that emerged from these meetings were organized around inter-clusters (key issues) that were subsequently incorporated into the agenda of the workshops. Participatory methodologies were adopted. The pre-consultation meetings also resulted in the selection of NGO representatives to present overview papers on key topics during the structured part of the workshops (CAS: 106). NGO Workers consulted about the CAS process during this research had differing perceptions of the process. People in Battambang remembered attending the meetings (although for some there was confusion between other more recent ADB missions to discuss formulation of specific projects). They explained that they had gone, and that there had been discussions, but that they did not know what the output or impact of those discussions was and that they had never received any feedback nor had they received copies of the final strategy paper that had been written. This, they said, was not specific to the World Bank CAS formulation, but was typical of missions who come to their province for consultations. The final documents were sent to NGO membership organisations in Phnom Penh, but did not get distributed further. In Phnom Penh some NGO workers spoke highly of the consultation process, praising the way that the process was structured, the changes that were made as a result of the consultations and also the communication of those changes. Others, meanwhile, felt that the consultation was less than substantive. It had the usual weaknesses of such consultations, namely that rather than being involved in every step of the formulation process, people had been invited to participate during a specific step in the process that was designated for participation and had been excluded from the rest. The result of this was therefore that any changes that were made as a result of the consultations were peripheral rather than central to the strategy. One respondent particularly appreciated the fact that unlike many processes that the World Bank is involved in, the CAS is something for which they can clearly be held accountable because it is a World Bank document signed by the president. This was contrasted positively with many processes where the World Bank may have a dominant role in developing policies, but because they are signed by the government, lines of accountability are much more difficult to trace. A possible explanation for the disparities in people's view of the CAS consultation process was with regard to the differing agendas and levels of awareness of the different NGO representatives. The NGOs who were more positive had an advocacy orientation and a very clear idea of the specific components that they wished to see incorporated in the strategy. Other NGOs, more oriented to project implementation and less advocacy oriented, appeared much less likely to sufficiently understand the World Bank as an institution and the CAS as a process to be able to use the consultation as an opportunity to promote their own policy agendas. The process, therefore, benefited from NGO participation, but may have not benefited from the full range of ideas and experiences that NGOs have to offer. 4.4 Case 4. Drafting of Forestry Law Forestry is a central issue in both macro-economic management and in livelihood and coping strategies of the rural poor. Both World Bank and NGOs have long involvement in the sector in a broad variety of ways. This has included a number of collaborations (both consultations and contractual arrangements) between NGOs and the World Bank and therefore covers a variety of relationships and positions which are beyond the scope of this case. This case focuses on the specific initiative of the World Bank in linking the development of the Forestry Law in Cambodia to a Structural Adjustment Credit. The case is of particular interest because it involves the World Bank making participation and consultation conditions for the release of substantial tranches of a loan. The World Bank’s recent involvement in the forest sector includes the Bank-led Forest Policy Assessment of 1996, the Bank-financed Technical Assistance Project of 1997-98, and Bank collaboration with the ADB Sustainable Forest Management Project in 1999-2000. 4.4.2 The Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) and the Drafting of the Forestry Law The SAC is a three-year loan project implemented by the Ministry of Economics and Finance. The loan is worth $30 million US, being disbursed in three tranches of 10, 15 and 5 million dollars respectively. The SAC program aims to help push forward the Government reform program in the following three areas, in close collaboration with IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program. First, the SAC program aims to assist in improving public resource management which includes resource mobilization and forestry management. Second, it would assist in enhancing public sector management which comprises expenditure rationalization and preparatory steps for military demobilization and administrative reform. Third, it would assist in formulating a strategy of enhancing governance and fighting corruption in economic management and implementing it (Project Information Document http:\\www.worldbank.org ) One of the conditions set for
the release of the second tranche (due in June 2001) was that the
government should "Draft and submit a new forestry law to the
National Assembly after full consultation with stakeholders" by the
end of February 2001. The
monitoring benchmark for this was to be "Extent of
consultation". Chronology:
World Bank SAC and Forestry Law Drafting 2000-2001
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