Differing Approaches to Development Assistance in Cambodia:
NGOs and the European Commission

Study carried out by INTRAC

Researchers:

Chris Dammers
James Firebrace
Sara Gibbs
Keo Keriya
Ly Saroeun
Men Sinoeun

[BACK]  [HOME PAGE]

August 1996

Study commissioned by:

Study carried out by: The International NGO Research and Training Centre (INTRAC)

The NGO Forum on Cambodia is made up of organisations grounded in their experience of humanitarian assistance to Cambodia and exists in order to advocate on issues of concern to the Cambodian people and to local and international NGOs working in Cambodia.

The NGO Forum co-ordinates and supports advocacy activities and capacity building of local partners to carry out advocacy while respecting their independence.

The NGO Forum has a particular responsibility to highlight the impact of the development process and economic, social and political change on ordinary Cambodian people.

The advocacy agenda of the Forum is set in Cambodia and driven by events in Cambodia. One role of the Forum is to mobilise international support for this agenda and another is to advocate in Cambodia, working as appropriate in partnership with local partners.

What does the Forum do?

There are five main areas of activity:

environment, focusing on forests, pesticides and Mekong River Basin Development

civil society, through supporting the development of local organisations and encouraging discussion of the meaning of civil society in Cambodia

development assistance, including monitoring bilateral and multilateral aid programs, participating in the annual consultative group meeting, undertaking research and advocacy on the impact of aid and relations between donors and NGOs

landmines, through the Cambodian and International Campaigns to Ban Landmines

genocide, through small group activities sharing and recording personal stories of the Pol Pot era, and working towards the establishment of a permanent international tribunal on genocide

Working groups meet regularly on these issues. In addition the Forum liaises with government, local and international NGOs and donors, undertakes research, organises seminars, discussions and campaigns on issues of concern.

The Forum is funded through membership fees and donations from international non-government agencies. Membership of the NGO Forum is open to non-governmental organisations.

For more information contact:

Preface

As part of its mandate to 'highlight the impact of the development process and economic, social and political change on ordinary Cambodian people,' the NGO Forum on Cambodia commissioned this study of European Commission and non-government organisation approaches to development assistance.

The project started in mid-1995, when the NGO Forum raised some concerns with the European Commission about its programme in Cambodia. In the course of these discussions, NGOs were invited to examine the issues more closely. This report is the result of that invitation.

During the study, and over the past year, there have been many opportunities for NGOs and the Commission to discuss some of the questions raised here. This has been a useful process which has gone some way to improving communication between NGOs and the Commission at the provincial, national and international levels. We hope that this will continue, and that the report will engender a wider discussion of how governments, donors, non-government organisations and communities can contribute to sustainable development for Cambodia.

The NGO Forum would like to thank the many people who have helped in this project: the Forum members both in Cambodia and elsewhere who contributed their time and experience; officials and staff of the European Commission; the many Government and NGO workers and communities who shared information and experiences; and, of course, the six-member research team who enthusiastically engaged in the issues and undertook the project with professionalism and insight.

We think this report is a useful contribution to the development work of governments, donors and non-government organisations. While some of the observations and recommendations are specific to Cambodia, others have a wider application. In both cases, the Forum believes that informed and open debate on matters such as project planning and design, decision-making, and cooperation and communication between development agencies is central to good development practice and, most importantly, accountability to the communities and governments with whom we work.

American Friends Service Committee, Asia Foundation, Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies, Bilance, Bread for the World, Cambodia Canada Development Programme, Cambodia Disabled People's Organisation, Cambodian Health Education Development, Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association, Cambodian Women's Development Association, Care, CarereUNDP, Caritas Australia, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, Catholic Relief Services, CCFD, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Christian Outreach, Church World Services, Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation, Community Aid Abroad, Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, Cooperation International pour le Developpement et Solidarite, Danchurchaid, Diakonia, Don Bosco Foundation of Cambodia, Forum Syd, Health Unlimited, HelpAge International, IFOD, Instituto per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Interchruch Aid for Development Cooperation (ICCO), International Rescue Committee, International Women's Development Agency, Japan International Volunteer Centre, Jesuit Refugee Service (Asia Pacific), Jesuit Service Cambodia, Khmer Development and Friendship Association, Ligue Cambodiennne pour la promotion et la defense des Droits L'homme, Lutheran World Service, Manitese, Maryknoll, Mennonite Central Committee, Misereor, New Humanity, Novib, Overseas Service Bureau, Oxfam Belgique, Oxfam Hong Kong, Oxfam UK&I, Partnership for Development in Kampuchea, People's Forum on Cambodia, Ponleu Khmer, Private Agencies Collaborating Together, Quaker Service Australia, Rural Association for Development of Economy, Save the Children Fund Australia, Save the Children Fund UK, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund, Servants to Asia's Poor, Socio-economic Development Organisation of Cambodia, Southeast Asian Outreach, Swiss Interchurch Aid, United Nations Association Great Britain and Ireland, Voluntary Service Overseas, World Food Programme, World Vision International

Index

APPENDICES

Glossary

Summary

Following discussion and debates in 1995 between NGOs and the European Commission (EC) it was mutually agreed that an independent study should be undertaken to look at comparative approaches to development in Cambodia. The study focuses on water projects and credit schemes supported by the EC and by NGOs.

The study highlights a number of policy issues in an effort to make a constructive contribution to debates over development issues in Cambodia. This summary considers some key issues facing first PRASAC and then NGOs, before outlining issues in credit programmes and domestic water schemes relevant to both the EC and NGOs.

PRASAC

PRASAC - Programme de Réhabilitation et Appui au Secteur Agricole du Cambodge (Rehabilitation and Support Programme for the Agricultural Sector of Cambodia) - is a rural development programme focusing on irrigation schemes, domestic water supplies, credit schemes and small enterprise promotion. It comprises the major part of current EC development assistance to Cambodia, with a budget of approximately $44 million. PRASAC works in the six provinces adjoining Phnom Penh and was scheduled to run from January 1995 to June 1997.

PRASAC displays serious weaknesses in design and planning, primarily because the developmental sectors in which it works are not amenable to a ‘rapid impact’ approach. The sustainability of its programme is jeopardised both by the uncertainties over PRASAC’s future after June 1997, and lack of clarity surrounding the institutions PRASAC is trying to promote. These problems are particularly acute in the credit sector.

The initial emphasis on demonstrating political support to the new Cambodian government as rapidly as possible led to shortcuts in professional planning procedures and a degree of incoherence in programme design. PRASAC’s design suffered from limited baseline information, unclear assumptions, limited consultation and an unduly quantitative as well as overambitious approach. More attention should have been given to the economic status of beneficiaries and to gender issues. PRASAC’s institution building objectives are not made explicit and have led to confusion about outcomes, particularly in the credit sector. The domestic water programme is much closer to achieving its quantitative objectives, but has had to cut corners in good developmental practice to do so.

PRASAC has been unduly inward-looking, with very limited transparency, despite some practical coordination with other actors at a provincial level. Opportunities for learning between the three PRASACs and from other agencies have not been developed. PRASAC management at a national and international level has been hampered by inflexibility, and by lack of clarity over decision making procedures between the provinces, Phnom Penh, Bangkok and Brussels. Delays over procurement have added to PRASAC’s problems, though these have been mitigated by pragmatic responses at provincial level.

The solution to PRASAC’s problems of sustainability is not to cut losses and abandon the programme in 1997, but a sustained effort to redesign PRASAC and/or a long term follow-on programme on proper developmental lines. Recent management changes and the impact of the mid-term evaluation should make this more feasible, but only if this is accompanied by much greater clarity over objectives and expected outcomes, particularly at an institutional level.

NGOs

International NGO (INGO) activity in Cambodia in the sectors studied is probably quite representative of performance elsewhere in the world, though hampered by the limitations of civil society and of government capacity. Local NGO (LNGO) activities are almost equally varied: advantages in understanding society and culture are often offset by comparative inexperience. Most NGOs have quite limited capacity, though this too is very variable.

Most NGOs benefit from the comparative clarity of their objectives, often relating to poverty alleviation, gender focus and community participation, even if these objectives are often quite limited in scope. Most take some care in designing their interventions, investing time in dialogue at community level and/or in participatory rural appraisal, though only rarely in wider baseline studies. Performance indicators are sometimes unclear, and the quality of information obtained from beneficiaries often limited.

Most international NGOs attach importance to supporting local NGOs, though many do not follow this up in practice and few have well developed plans for capacity building and institutional support. Many are unclear about their future and have not developed strategies for handover and/or withdrawal, leaving the sustainability of their programmes in doubt.

Most NGOs recognise the value of coordination, cooperation, mutual learning and reasonable transparency, though some operate in comparative isolation from government and from other agencies. Some NGOs would benefit from working in a less isolated manner.

Comparative decentralisation leads to a degree of flexibility in the responses of many INGOs. Many however find difficulty in giving adequate support to fieldworkers, and experience related management problems such as lack of continuity of expatriate staff.

Assumptions about developments in Cambodian society are often not made explicit and cause uncertainties, in particular in relation to the desirability and/or appropriate methods of working with government, where approaches are particularly variable. Whilst the need for coordination and communication is very great and sometimes neglected, the desirability of working in direct support of government is less clear in current circumstances in Cambodia.

Credit schemes

Micro-credit schemes are an increasingly popular form of development intervention, and there is little doubt over the potential for such schemes in Cambodia. The national institutional framework for credit schemes in Cambodia is however in the early stages of evolution, with considerable uncertainty over the direction it will take. Any agency seriously involved in promoting credit should take careful note of this changing framework, as well as, where possible, contributing to the debates over its development. Currently there is a good deal of unrealised potential for learning between different programmes in the country.

A small number of larger or more specialised NGOs have acquired a good track record in promoting credit schemes in Cambodia and have taken a significant role in helping to develop models for the country. Many others have promoted credit schemes because they recognise their potential, because they are responsive to developmental trends, or as an entrée to other forms of development. These agencies have been much less successful, and most should reconsider their involvement in a sector requiring specialised expertise.

PRASAC targets for credit schemes were highly overambitious even in their revised form, and will take several years to take root even if their institutional framework is clarified. The assumption that such schemes will be run effectively by local government is unlikely to be viable: non-governmental alternatives on a national scale, or possibly some variety of parastatal option, will also take time to develop. In the interim PRASAC like other agencies should ensure its initiatives fit into the wider framework - though provided its own policies can be clarified PRASAC should also take (so far neglected) initiatives to influence that framework.

Financial sustainability (as related to pricing policies, portfolio quality, and fund capital), and the feasibility or desirability of accompanying savings schemes, need to be given careful consideration by any agencies involved with credit. Institutional sustainability - at the level of the village bank, the support organisation, and the apex support structure - is no less crucial. Interaction between different programmes, and status of beneficiaries, are important considerations. The study considers these issues as they apply both to NGOs and to PRASAC.

Domestic water projects are not as complex to promote as credit schemes but institutional and financial sustainability are no less central to their success, and uncertainties generally exist for both PRASAC and NGOs.

Most domestic water supply programmes lacked adequate baseline information and adequate monitoring, particularly of social aspects and of water quality. Sometimes PRASAC’s rush to meet targets has meant that social aspects have been neglected. The benefits of many interventions were liable to cooption by local social or political elites.

Different types of intervention (e.g. open wells, tube wells, village ponds) are not necessarily incompatible but could be prioritised on the basis of systematic assessment of their respective costs and benefits.

In Cambodia government-sponsored village committees such as the Village Development Committees may be considered more stable or even legitimate than alternatives but may also be subject to particular types of favouritism or political cooption. Non-governmental alternatives, whether dealing with water or credit, may not always be seen as having sufficient authority to enforce their regulations. This question needs sustained monitoring over an extended period. Dependence of local government structures is not as risky as in the credit sector, but is equally dependent on the long-term institutional viability of the structures promoted.

Recommendations

A. General recommendations for the European Commission

PRASAC’s design should be reviewed, with particular reference to its long term institutional objectives. If these can be clarified it should be extended for several years, or failing that replaced by a follow-on programme, which should take into account the considerations mentioned in the sectoral sectors below.

Future planning should pay adequate attention to baseline information, political and institutional assumptions, consultation with other development actors and qualitative aspects (including gender). General training should not be confused with institution building.

The EC should adopt an active communications policy both internally and externally, with a view to promoting mutual learning and cooperation. This also should include greater involvement in development policy debates at a national level, and more structured links with other agencies, including NGOs.

Decision making mechanisms at and between provincial, national and international levels should be changed and streamlined. A more inclusive management style should be promoted. Mutual learning between PRASACs should be improved by more structured interaction and visits.

B. General recommendations for NGOs

In planning development interventions, greater priority should be given to initial research, for example through baseline surveys, and to feedback from beneficiaries. Performance indicators often need to be clearer.

International NGOs should give more serious and practical consideration to supporting local NGOs, even in areas where they may need to take a long term view. Capacity building should not be confused with more generalised training. Strategies for handover and eventual withdrawal should be carefully considered.

All NGOs should give adequate priority to communication and coordination with other actors in development, including bilateral and multilateral agencies as well as the government.

Greater clarity should be sought in assumptions about political and institutional developments. In particular, the logic of working directly with government should be carefully considered. Whilst coordination and cooperation with government is important and should usually be upgraded, working in direct support of government departments may often not be the most productive type of intervention for NGOs in Cambodian circumstances.

C1. For all credit operators:

Efforts should be continued to reach a clear consensus on the key indicators determining sustainability in credit schemes, with particular reference to pricing policy, portfolio quality and institutional sustainability.

Operators should make such indicators public. This is not only in the spirit of mutual learning; it should provide ‘peer pressure’ incentive to set targets and move down the path to sustainability

Some diversity in credit methodology is healthy - there is no "right way" in credit. However the practical successes and failures of different methodologies should be compared so that guidelines for best practice in the Cambodian context emerge.

Information systems and feedback mechanisms from the villages need to be developed further. This will encourage early identification of potentially damaging unexpected effects, and build up a body of understanding about credit uptake, and the development of markets, over an extended period.

The EC should urgently review how to make the PRASAC operations sustainable. This is particularly important given the scale of their operations which will soon make PRASAC the largest provider of micro credit in Cambodia. This must involve more than a review of the time scale of the EC commitment to PRASAC or and/or a follow-on programme, crucial though this is. The institutional and financial arrangements for credit schemes must be seriously considered as below.

Local government departments should not in themselves be seen as an appropriate vehicle for running credit schemes in the long term. More appropriate institutions will depend on policy developments at a national level, to which the EC should contribute. Alternatives for building up appropriate institutions - whether NGOs or new, intermediate agencies - should be pursued.

Interest rates for credit schemes should be set at levels which are sustainable in terms of covering future costs. Care should also be taken to ensure that the sustainability of other credit schemes is not undermined.

Arrangements between the three PRASACs should be reviewed, to ensure a common methodology in key areas, and a coherent and co-ordinated participation in the national debates. Structured exchanges between PRASACs should be instituted to promote mutual learning.

Credit scheme methodology at village level should be reviewed to ensure the poor are not being/ will be not be excluded from benefiting (e.g. by making smaller loans available).

C3. For NGOs working in credit:

Smaller NGOs without access to expertise in credit need seriously to consider whether they can run programmes that will be sustainable. If not they should concentrate on other priority sectors, if possible passing on their work in credit to a better placed agency. An alternative would be to work very closely with an NGO specialising in credit, but this would need to be carefully set up.

Larger NGOs could consider whether they can extend their expertise and support to smaller NGOs (including smaller LNGOs), particularly if they share funders or operate in the same geographical region.

D. Recommendations on domestic water provision

These recommendations apply to both NGOs and PRASAC, though there are variations in the degree to which the activities proposed may already be taking place.

Agencies involved with domestic water provision should give greater priority to assessing the impact of their schemes. To do so will involve baseline studies of health status and domestic labour routines (including opportunities for socialising) in villages affected.

Further research should be carried out to assess different water projects, with particular reference to costs and benefits of different types of scheme. Key facts to be taken into account are cost, availability, accessibility and water quality. The stability and performance of local committees should be carefully monitored.

Access, ownership and control of domestic water points need to be better monitored and the implications assessed, particularly with regard to beneficiaries.

Consideration should be given to alternative low-cost methods of provision such as hand-augured wells, especially by NGOs.

Systematic efforts should be made to monitor water quality in all domestic water projects and disseminate the findings.

PRASAC should play a more active liaison role in relation to water supply provision at a provincial level, in particular supporting local government in the dissemination of hydrological and other relevant data.

1. Introduction

Background

The origins of this study lie in discussions and debates in 1995 between European Commission (EC) officials and representatives of NGO Forum on Cambodia. These debates occasionally had a high profile, generating coverage in the local press. At a meeting in September 1995 it was agreed by both the EC and the NGO Forum that an independent study looking at key issues raised would be the most constructive way forward.

The nature of the new EC development assistance programmes in Cambodia were central to these debates and gave rise to this study. (Other issues are briefly considered in section 3 below.) The NGO Forum contracted the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), a research and training agency based in Oxford, England, to carry out the study, research for which was mainly undertaken in May 1996.

Despite their original endorsement, in early 1996 uncertainty remained over the extent to which the EC welcomed the study and was willing to cooperate with it. In March 1996 INTRAC and the NGO Forum were persuaded that such cooperation would be forthcoming even though the crucial question of access to relevant EC documentation remained unresolved. Ultimately the study received good cooperation from almost all EC officials and contractors, as well as access to the most relevant reports and workplans - though one or two influential people remained opposed to extending any more cooperation than was considered strictly necessary, and we are grateful to Ambassador Caioullët for a couple of decisive interventions in favour of cooperation and transparency. We also received good cooperation from the 35 NGOs interviewed during the course of the study, as well as from government officials both in Phnom Penh and the provinces. We would like to thank all who offered such assistance.

Methodology

The focus of the study was comparative approaches to development assistance. Consequently field work was carried out in geographical regions and developmental sectors where both the EC and NGOs were active, i.e. domestic water supplies and credit schemes in rural areas. In the case of the EC this meant focusing on their rural development programme, PRASAC (Programme de Réhabilitation et Appui au Secteur Agricole du Cambodge).

The study team comprised three expatriate and three Cambodian researchers. Svay Reing and Kompong Chhnang provinces were selected, though some research was also carried out in Kompong Cham. Interviews were conducted in villages as well as with representatives of NGOs, the EC (principally PRASAC staff, though also members of the Technical Cooperation Office in Phnom Penh and officials based in the EC delegation in Bangkok and visiting from Brussels) and government officials (mainly from the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development) at local, provincial and national levels. Particular attention was devoted to policy issues. The interviews were supplemented by documentary research and by a questionnaire sent to all NGOs who are members of the Forum and/or of the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). Round table meetings were held in Svay Reing, Kompong Chhnang and Phnom Penh, the last of these to discuss interim findings. The terms of reference for the study are included as Appendix C, and consultants’ responsibilities as Appendix D.

Scope and limitations of the study

Consideration of ‘comparative approaches to development’ quickly leads into a very broad field. Keeping the scope of the research (and the report) under control has not been easy. We have tried to strike a balance between a mandate encouraging us to look at a very wide range of issues and the need to keep within sight of the original debates leading to the study. This balance has conditioned the format of the report.

In looking at differences in approaches to development we have also been struck by similarities in the difficulties agencies face and in their attempts to resolve them. All agencies face problems, made more difficult by Cambodia’s unusual circumstances, in promoting programmes which are truly sustainable, in the sense that they can continue to produce benefits after the agency has left. Many of the issues we raise apply to both EC and NGOs, and indeed others working in the field, including government departments.

The limitations of this study should also be acknowledged. In an effective research period of three weeks 35 NGOs were interviewed and in many cases their projects were visited. Most too provided further documentation. 31 NGOs answered the questionnaire, with varying degrees of detail. The interest raised by the study was gratifying. However it may have served in some cases to raise expectations of feedback on individual programmes which are quite impractical. The most we can attempt is a synthesis and summary, quite enough of a challenge given the quantity of information and documentation received.

Though NGOs inevitably took up more of our time than PRASAC we have tried to give NGOs and PRASAC equal weight. However our findings on PRASAC may, in themselves, be more significant. This is not only because it easier to present an analysis of some of the work of a single organisation than of large numbers of varying NGOs, but also because PRASAC is reaching a critical point in decisions over its future. If our findings can contribute constructively to those decisions they will not have been wasted.

In early July 1996 a draft of this report was circulated to members of the NGO Forum committee and study reference group in Cambodia, and was also discussed at a meeting of Forum members in London. Many useful comments were received and most have been incorporated in this final version. The draft was also sent to the European Commission in Bangkok and Phnom Penh. The Bangkok office called for more specific recommendations. This was a reasonable comment and a welcome one, indicating a readiness to respond to the findings of the report. It can be contrasted with earlier emphasis sometimes placed on the limitations of a ‘comparative study’, including a view expressed that such a study should not extend as far as recommendations.

With such encouragement we have made our recommendations somewhat more specific, though there are limits what can follow from such a study. We were not in a position to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of PRASAC, since we focused on only some of the provinces where they are working, and gave priority to specific sectors. However we acquired enough of an overview to contribute to critical and urgent questions concerning the impact of PRASAC’s work and the future of the programme. We have now seen a summary of PRASAC’s own mid-term review, whose findings largely though not entirely coincide with ours. An external perspective such as ours may have some advantages. At any rate we hope that the EC will consider our recommendations alongside those of the internal review.

We also very much hope that the findings and recommendations to NGOs, though necessarily more general in nature, will be useful and can be incorporated into the never ending and never easy debates about development priorities in Cambodia. We hope too that the issues raised in this report will be considered by relevant authorities in the Cambodian government.

2. Contrasting actors in development

The subjects of this study are NGOs in Cambodia, considered on the selective basis outlined above, and the European Commission, considered through its largest development assistance programme in Cambodia, PRASAC. The Cambodian government is integral to PRASAC, as well as a significant actor in much development work promoted by NGOs. By way of introduction, the roles of these three actors are outlined, followed by brief comments on some similarities and differences in their approach, and on some key issues in development.

NGOs in Cambodia

The role of international NGOs in Cambodia has been exceptional. From 1979 a major international initiative was undertaken to provide Cambodia with relief from the appalling ravages of the Khmer Rouge regime. International NGOs along with bilateral and multilateral agencies played their part in this initiative.

However the role of international NGOs acquired greater comparative significance between 1982 and 1989 when Western bilateral and UN agencies withdrew as part of a strategy to isolate the Vietnamese-backed government. Although the number of NGOs working in the country during this period was quite limited, they included several prominent agencies who were able to provide, by NGO standards, comparatively significant amounts of aid. These NGOs developed close working relationships with central government, which nevertheless controlled and circumscribed their activities very considerably. Many of these NGOs also supported an international campaign against the isolation of the country which, at the very least, helped contribute to international awareness of the political deadlock then facing Cambodians. This campaign was largely orchestrated by the NGO Forum which has since continued its programme of advocacy on issues of importance to Cambodia both nationally and internationally.

A feature of this period was that circumstances required international NGOs to abandon their normal methods of working and to function more like bilateral or multilateral agencies. That is to say that the NGOs worked very closely with government, generally in support of infrastructural rather than community-based projects and programmes. The legacy of this situation, which continued into the 1990s, is of some significance.

From 1989 to date the numbers and variety of international NGOs and of the development assistance they have contributed has increased dramatically. Most though not all such NGOs anticipate continuing to work in the country for many years to come.

Cambodian NGOs began to operate only from 1992, since when their development has been rapid if uneven. Many, especially at first, were oriented towards human rights rather than development. A minority of local NGOs, both large and small, have proved successful; many others have struggled to raise funds and overcome handicaps. Though not the primary initiators of the debate underlying this study, some local NGOs have expressed strongly held views on the issues raised.

The number and variety of NGOs working in Cambodia makes generalisations very difficult. This needs constantly to be borne in mind when discussing NGO views and policies. We have been primarily concerned with NGOs whose focus is developmental, and particularly those with considerable local and international experience.

The European Commission in Cambodia

The growth of European Commission as a multilateral development agency reflects the complex process of European integration, making it a major player in international development assistance, with substantial resources and policy-making powers.

The developmental policies of the EC, not least as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, have been praised for being more poverty-focused and progressive than the corresponding policies of many European Union member states. Indeed many have looked to the EC as a means of freeing development policies, and very substantial development assistance funding, from narrower national interests. At the same time critics have claimed that the gap between policy and practice in EC development assistance programmes is even wider than in most bilateral programmes. The situation in Cambodia reflects both these perspectives.

EC aid to Cambodians from 1986 to 1993 was almost entirely to refugees and subsequently to returnees. Under the EC/Cambodia Rehabilitation Programme (ERP) approximately $37 million was allocated between 1991 and 1994. These funds were channelled through 44 multilateral agencies and international NGOs.

The new approach from 1994 came quite abruptly, as the EC, along with many bilateral donors (though later than most multilateral ones), moved to programmes of direct assistance to the new government. Some assistance to international NGOs under co-financing schemes also continued. The new initiative was substantial. Under the European Rehabilitation Programme in Cambodia (PERC) around $80 million was allocated to several programmes. The largest of these ($44 million) was PRASAC, a rural development programme focusing on irrigation schemes, domestic water supplies, credit schemes and small enterprise promotion. PRASAC works in the six provinces adjoining Phnom Penh and was scheduled to run from January 1995 to June 1997.

The detailed rationale behind this policy shift is subject to differing interpretations within the Commission. There is no doubt that a primary motive was to express support for the newly elected government of Cambodia. Indeed the PERC programme was explicitly intended to demonstrate that the government could deliver effective services, especially in rural areas, and as rapidly as possible. Most decisions over development assistance programmes are based on a combination of overlapping political, humanitarian and developmental considerations. In the case of PERC, political factors can be described as dominant.

The Royal Government of Cambodia

The Government of Cambodia has made it clear that it welcomes development assistance from all categories of donor agency. As far as international NGO aid is concerned the government’s attitude can be described as ‘open door’, though this is as much from force of circumstance as from active policy, and is unlikely to continue indefinitely. The government is more actively involved in decisions relating to bilateral and multilateral aid, much of which aims to support it directly. Even here however most of the design and a good deal of the prioritisation of aid remains largely in the hands of the donors and/or of the agencies and consultants they designate.

The government has not actively concerned itself with debates such as those between the EC and NGOs, despite the publicity they have occasionally generated. Insofar as these debates concern institutional priorities of different agencies, this is perhaps hardly surprising. Insofar as they concern broader issues of development policy however, this is unfortunate: it is hoped that this study can contribute towards broadening that debate.

Important questions surround the sustainability of much of the current government infrastructure in Cambodia, even if a reasonable degree of political stability is maintained. Most government salaries do not amount to a living wage, and are wholly insufficient, in themselves, to maintain a viable still less an effective state apparatus, not least at local level. Most observers recommend radical reform, whilst also recognising the enormous political difficulties involved. The more limited reforms which may be on the agenda will not fundamentally alter the situation.

This situation has important implications for whoever wishes to work in support of Cambodian government structures. The importance of government in development policy and planning is not in question - indeed there is a widespread need for development agencies to improve their cooperation with government at a liaison and communications level. However this is a different matter to prioritising support to structures that currently show little real chance of being sustainable, or even of retaining trained staff over a long term period. Such tough questions pose particular dilemmas for PRASAC, but need to be addressed by development agencies of all kinds.

Different and similar approaches to development

Different types of development agency (NGOs, bilaterals, multilaterals, as well as governments) are often tackling similar issues. This is particularly true when, as in the case of PRASAC and NGOs, they are working in the same field, i.e. working to promote rural development in sectors which include water and credit. Their relationships with each other, though important, are secondary to the wider problems they both face in trying to promote sustainable development. Differences of scale certainly generate different challenges, requiring differing levels of managerial and technical expertise, but the similarities of the dilemmas faced at a local level are very marked.

Differences between the approaches to development of different NGOs may be at least as significant as differences between NGOs and multilateral programmes such as PRASAC. This does not rule out generalisations about NGOs, though it does make it easier to consider ‘PRASAC approaches to development’ than ‘NGO approaches to development’. A focus on problems faced by both PRASAC and NGOs can lead to a constructive debate - provided the will is there for such a debate to take place.

Both PRASAC and NGOs must work with the realities of government and civil society in Cambodia. Both PRASAC and NGOs must face up to their own limitations, which is not always easy. Both PRASAC and most NGOs must cope with unrealistic, externally generated expectations. Many aspects of PRASAC planning (by external consultants) have proved unrealistic, whilst may NGOs, particularly international ones, struggle with expectations generated elsewhere in a different context elsewhere in the world.

Villager perceptions of different agencies are a good reflection of the greater significance of agency outputs than agency categories. Expatriate-run agencies are often referred to as NGOs whether or not they are: to villagers the distinction can be almost meaningless in comparison with the differences (or similarities) between the services on offer, about which villagers may know a good deal. Despite this the involvement or otherwise of government officials with an agency is important, and may be decisive in the authority the agency is perceived to have. Such perceptions in turn may have major implications for villager reactions, e.g. to repaying loans. External characterisations of different types of agency may not in themselves be so decisive.

Impact and sustainability

Truly systematic assessment of development assistance programmes is still uncommon, though development agencies, including NGOs, are increasingly giving greater priority to monitoring and evaluation. Key factors are the impact and sustainability of such programmes. Impact can be defined in terms of measurable changes in the status of beneficiaries, and depends on the existence of baseline information on the situation prior to the intervention. Unfortunately such information is very often lacking. Sustainability can be defined as the capacity of a programme to promote long-term processes of development after the external intervention has ended. This invariably involves institutional sustainability, i.e. the capacity of stable local organisations to manage this continuous process of development. A related goal is financial sustainability - either the ability of the development process to generate funds for continuity and expansion (the paradigm for economic development), or at least the capacity to ensure that a permanent source of funding is available (for example by securing long term government funding for health or education programmes). Assessment of sustainability is often crucially dependent on assumptions made about the environment in which the project is operating - for example concerning political stability, physical security, institutional freedoms etc.

3. Issues arising from 1995

The issues forming the main subjects of debate between the EC and NGOs in 1995 do not necessarily have the same priority a year later. Nor are issues concerning EC/NGO relations, and mutual perceptions, as significant as those concerning broader development policy. Nevertheless they comprise the background to this study and are considered briefly here.

Plans and activities of PERC and PRASAC

NGO interest in the plans and activities of PERC and PRASAC has been longstanding. The issues raised comprise a major focus of this report, but it is worth noting that the perceived lack of information available and the nature of consultation were important contributing factors to NGO anxieties (justified or otherwise), as well as to the decision to carry out this study. The main NGO concerns are considered below.

Changing relationships between NGOs and the European Commission

Following the changes in EC patterns of development assistance to Cambodia, EC funding of many NGO programmes came to an end in 1995. Although less of a public issue than those mentioned above, this also may have contributed, at least for some, to the climate of relations in 1995. This question is briefly considered in Sections 4 & 5.

The Hunting affair

In 1995 Hunting Technical Services (HTS), a development consultancy agency, was contracted by the EC to manage an EC funded Food for Work programme in Cambodia. A British NGO discovered that HTS was linked through its parent company Hunting plc to Hunting Engineering, which inter alia manufactured armaments, including landmines. The NGO Forum, which has long campaigned on the landmines issue, mounted a campaign to prevent Hunting Technical Services from working in Cambodia. The EC maintained that the lack of any operational links between Hunting Technical Services and Hunting Engineering meant that the former should not be blacklisted. However pressure generated by publicity from the campaign forced Hunting Technical Services to withdraw from the contract. The details of this affair are beyond the scope of this enquiry, but the landmines question, very understandably, generates strong feelings, contributing to the climate of relations between NGOs and the EC.

NGO perceptions of PERC and PRASAC

Criticisms of PRASAC were raised by several NGOs as soon as plans began to emerge from EC consultancy missions in 1994. Some have proved well-founded and others less so. Key concerns are summarised here, along with the findings of the study.

Quality of aid

From an early stage NGOs pointed out that PRASAC’s design was inappropriate, particularly in trying to do too much too quickly. Although based at the time on limited evidence, with only outline plans and budgets eventually reaching the public domain, this concern has proved to be fully justified and remains the most significant of the NGO criticisms, explored in later sections of this report.

Geographical focus of PRASAC

Some NGOs considered that PRASAC should not have focused only on provinces adjacent to Phnom Penh, believing that this was avoiding the more difficult options in working in less accessible regions. There is some point to such arguments; however both logistical and security concerns were perfectly legitimate, particularly in Cambodian circumstances. The rural areas where PRASAC works contain much of the rural population of the country who are not greatly advantaged by their proximity to the capital. It is difficult to establish the extent to which security was an issue, but the EC can be credited with some foresight. A related NGO concern was the switch of EC support from the north and west to the south and east of the country, with some disruption, including to NGO funding, and which would have benefited from being phased over a longer period.

Consultation

NGOs complained that consultation with them was limited, and that PRASAC planning did not draw on NGO experience. Although some consultation did take place, its nature was sometimes unsatisfactory and some good advice was ignored, notably some explicit concerns re credit scheme design. More generally, ongoing consultation seems never to have been articulated as a policy for PRASAC, though a good deal has been put into practice by PRASAC management at a provincial level. At the national level of the Technical Cooperation Office (TCO) consultation has been extremely limited.

PRASAC’s relations with NGOs

PRASAC’s intended relations with NGOs were felt by many NGOs to be unclear - a legitimate concern which has continued to cause confusion. This question is considered further in the sections below on NGOs and on PRASAC.

Duplication

NGOs were concerned that PRASAC would overwhelm NGO projects or cause duplication or overlap. With a few exceptions these concerns have proved unfounded. In the provinces studied PRASAC managers have been sensitive to the issue and most incidents of duplication have been resolved on the ground. Since only a minority of communes and villages are reached by any agency this has only rarely proved difficult. However there is some danger that with the PRASAC programme continuing to expand this issue could reappear, particularly if the security situation deteriorates further and restricts areas where it is practical to work. NGO overlap, especially in relation to international NGO support to some local NGOs, may currently be as significant a problem (as may overlap between bilateral and multilateral agencies).

Competition for Cambodian staff

Some NGOs were concerned that they would lose staff to PRASAC - including in some cases government staff to whom NGOs were paying supplements. In fact this has not been a major problem, partly because PRASAC based their local salary structures on research carried out amongst NGOs, though there have been a few exceptions. In some cases - notably for example Oxfam UKI - staff movement from NGO to PRASAC coincided with changes in NGO policy away from infrastructural to more community-based projects. (In provinces not covered by the study this problem may be somewhat more significant.)

Payment of supplementary salaries

Although this criticism generally appeared later, PRASAC policy in paying salary supplements to large numbers of government employees and effectively ‘taking over’ a large part of provincial departments has been criticised by many NGOs. This is a complex issue, facing NGOs as well as the EC, and relates to assumptions about the long-term role of government and its relations to external donors that few agencies make explicit. Moreover many NGOs adopt a similar policy, if on a more limited scale, and there are few alternatives if the basic premise of working actively with government is accepted. This question is considered further in the sections below on NGOs and on PRASAC.

Political versus developmental objectives of PERC and PRASAC

The European Commission has been quite explicit about the political objectives of PERC, of which PRASAC is the major component. PERC was designed to demonstrate support for the new Cambodian government. In acknowledging this the EC naturally fed into longstanding debates over the legitimacy of tying development assistance to political objectives. To characterise such debates very crudely, NGOs and others have often argued against such linkage, principally on humanitarian grounds, whilst governments have continued to give priority to political aspects. Of course at some level separation is impossible, but the debate is substantive. Multilateral agencies have often been more sympathetic than bilaterals to efforts to allow humanitarian rather than purely political considerations to be given greater weight in decisions over development assistance.

There are two aspects to this debate. One relates to the general morality of aid allocations, and the weight which should be given to specifically humanitarian concerns. The other relates to the impact of political factors on the quality of the aid. The second aspect is particularly relevant in Cambodia. Most people would accept that supporting the new Cambodian government was in itself a reasonable political objective. However even if linking aid to such objectives is accepted, the question remains of the most appropriate and effective means for the EC to demonstrate such support, and of the impact of such political factors on the programme’s parallel developmental objectives. If the development objectives fail, the political objectives are also forfeited.

European Commission perceptions of NGOs

The European Commission has a long and profound experience of working with NGOs around the world. Its policy relating to NGOs is continuing to develop, not least with regard to facilitating support to local NGOs. Along with most multilateral donors the EC has increasingly come to consider NGOs to be key players in successful development strategies.

Such policies are however inadequately reflected in developments in Cambodia since 1994. Practical relations inevitably reflect the attitudes and perceptions of those involved. It should also be stressed that these vary considerably - indeed it may be more difficult to generalise about EC views on NGOs than about NGO views on the EC. Here we list (in italics) some of the more critical views we encountered from EC officials and employees, along with comments based on our findings. As with NGO comments on the EC, such critical comments may be of more interest, but should not obscure the positive aspects, such as a good deal of practical cooperation, particularly at provincial level, which has run parallel with such debates.

NGOs are unsympathetic to the requirements of programmes of the scale and impact of PERC/PRASAC.

Certainly some NGOs do not give adequate recognition to the desirability of maximising impact through working on a large scale, nor sometimes show much understanding of the expertise needed for a programme such as PRASAC. However most criticisms have related to specifics of the programme rather than to its general nature. NGO/bilateral relations to be successful need greater understanding from both sides. The way forward would seem to be improved dialogue based on active communications policies.

Many NGOs are not sufficiently committed to a policy of cooperation and coordination with government, nor (consequently) with multi/bilateral agencies

The situation is very variable, but most NGOs surveyed recognise the importance of government in development, and are open-minded about cooperation with multilateral and bilateral agencies. Some NGOs do operate in comparative isolation, and should be encouraged to recognise this is seldom viable in development terms.

NGO criticisms of the EC were mainly motivated by loss of funding to NGOs following the ending of the ERP and new policies developed from 1994.

Whilst this factor may have played a part with some NGOs, it was clearly not the main motivating factor behind NGO criticisms of the EC. Some EC officials tend to see NGOs as acting almost entirely out of organisational self-interest, ignoring the much wider range of concerns motivating almost all of them.

NGO performance under the ERP was in any case variable.

No doubt this was true, though it does not seem to have been a significant factor in EC planning. No doubt donor criticisms of those they fund is a sensitive area, but could be better addressed better if a more systematic and open dialogue could be established.

All these issues are explored further in Sections 4 and 5.

The following table outlines in very general terms some of differences between the approaches to development of NGOs and PRASAC. Such generalisations can be no more than indicative - they are explored more fully in the sections which follow.

NGO approaches

Small scale

Limited impact

Variable attitudes and practice towards cooperation with government

Developmental approach

Long term approach

Usually, long term commitment

Community development approach

Limited managerial and technical skills

Variable overheads, often low

Less sophisticated technology, generally replicable.

Substantial reliance on local purchase

Generally flexible

Transparency generally reasonable

Limited communications strategies

Limited accountability

Sustainability often uncertain

EC approaches (PRASAC)

Large scale

Substantial short-term impact

Working through government

‘Pre-development’ approach

‘Rapid impact’ approach

Uncertain long-term commitment

Variable approach

Substantial managerial and technical skills, occasionally inappropriate

High overheads

More sophisticated technology, some of uncertain replicability.

Substantial reliance on imported equipment; procurement delays.

Inflexible at some levels

Limited transparency

No clear communications strategy

Limited accountability

Sustainability very uncertain

4. NGOs in Cambodia

NGOs are diverse. They vary considerably in size, capacity, resources, policies and ideology. Nevertheless it is possible to make some generalisations. The study has focused on those NGOs who fall into the overlapping categories of those we were able to interview and those who answered the questionnaire. There is a bias towards those working in credit and water in the selected provinces, as well as towards those taking an active interest in the study. There is also, inevitably, a bias towards larger, development-oriented NGOs, as well as to some extent towards international NGOs - only one Cambodian NGO responded to the questionnaire, though several were interviewed. However there is reason to assume that our sample comprises a reasonable reflection of developmental NGOs working in the country, though is less representative of smaller NGOs and of those with non-developmental agendas, for example more exclusively religious ones.

NGOs and development

The contribution of NGOs to development is often difficult to assess. Evaluations of NGO projects and programmes, where they exist, are often limited in scope and may not be in the public domain. NGOs have often been accused of making uncritical assumptions about the value of their programmes, based on perceptions of how they conform to agreed criteria (poverty alleviation, participation, gender focus etc) rather than more rigorous analysis of their impact. Nevertheless in recent years some of the most wide-ranging evaluations of NGO programmes around the world indicate considerable success in achieving objectives, though these objectives are often narrowly defined. The ability of many NGOs to work at or close to community level remains one of their great assets.

Many aspects of NGO work in Cambodia reflect universal problems, whilst others are specific to the country’s unique circumstances. Amongst the strengths of NGO approaches are their commitment to poverty alleviation, to promoting participation, addressing gender issues and (less widely) environmental concerns. Generally this is combined with an ability to work at a local level. Nevertheless there is often a gap between theory and practice - the very poorest are seldom reached, the social dynamics of participation and gender relations may not be properly understood, etc. Despite improvements in recent years, and great variations between agencies, planning, appraisal, evaluation and monitoring are often weak. Few international NGOs in Cambodia, for example, have real plans concerning the length of their involvement or strategies for withdrawal, and although this in part reflects uncertainties over future developments in the country, it also indicates limitations in strategy and planning.

Sustainability

Circumstances in Cambodia can make it difficult to replicate experience gained elsewhere. Most international NGOs (INGOs) recognise the need to promote sustainable Cambodian institutions if their interventions are to have long-term impact, though others are content to pursue a purely ‘operational’ role. Many talk of the need to do themselves out of a job, but few have a focused strategy for this. In any case the most significant issue is not so much the withdrawal of the international NGO as the capacity and sustainability of the Cambodian institutions they have promoted, and from which the INGO can move on. The primary orientation of some is to build up local NGOs - in a few cases with the specific intention of promoting an organisation which will take over the work of the international NGO. Most recognise the capacity limitations of the new Cambodian NGO sector, though this may be reflected more in their intentions than in their rhetoric - only 4 out of 31 NGOs answering the questionnaire indicated that they planned to leave the country before the end of the century.

Cooperation and coordination

Most agencies interviewed, and answering the questionnaire, recognise the value of coordination and cooperation with other development actors - though here there may be a particular bias in our sample, with only the more communications-oriented agencies for example considering that the questionnaire to merited a response.

Most NGOs were found to have reasonably open and transparent attitudes towards their work, and certainly towards this study. Some, not surprisingly, can be said to present an optimistic interpretation of their activities in their reports - though others can be notably self-questioning. Annual reports and similar documents tend to be in the public domain, evaluations less so, though the study itself found a widespread preparedness amongst NGOs to release documentation of all kinds.

Structures for NGO coordination in Cambodia are quite well developed, both through the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC), which aims to represent as many NGOs as possible, and through the NGO Forum itself, which has a more specific advocacy-oriented mandate. Whilst the existence of two such structures, acting to some degree in parallel, has caused some comment and self-questioning, the different mandates of the organisations mean that they are able to work in a complementary manner. Both agencies are better placed to promote dialogue amongst NGOs, and to some degree between NGOs and bilateral and multilateral agencies, than between NGOs and government. Indeed given the overall significance of NGOs in Cambodia it is unfortunate that the government is unable to give such liaison greater priority.

Relationships between NGOs

International NGOs almost invariably indicate that they believe in supporting Cambodian NGOs, though only about half our sample would appear to give this much priority in practice. Many expressed concerns about the significant number of local NGOs whom they consider not to be sufficiently competent or functional. There are indications from the questionnaire answers that the expressed intentions of international NGOs towards supporting local NGOs are often not realised in practice, with many INGOs doing fairly little.

Local NGOs have a variety of relationships with international NGOs. Most though not all active Cambodian NGOs receive funds from international NGOs, and as with relations between international NGOs and bi/multilateral agencies this can exert a powerful influence on the relationship. Many Cambodian NGOs are also involved in training and capacity building relationships with international NGOs. Most appear to adopt a pragmatic attitude to both funding and training opportunities.

NGO relationships with bilateral and multilateral agencies

Most NGOs adopt a pragmatic attitude to working with bilateral and multilateral agencies, with many, probably most, international NGOs accepting funding from such sources. From our questionnaire sample only two NGOs professed a policy of complete independence, and only four refused to accept bilateral or multilateral funds as a matter of principle, though there are certainly some others who show little interest in practical collaboration. The nature of such collaboration is discussed in more detail below, but is worth noting that very few agencies have a policy of non-cooperation, even when they adopt a critical attitude to the agencies concerned. Most Cambodian NGOs also adopt a pragmatic attitude to cooperating with, and accepting funding from, bilateral and multilateral agencies, but for all but the larger local NGOs the opportunities for doing so are limited.

Relations between bi/multilateral agencies and NGOs (as well as between NGOs and governments) can be classified in various ways, though it is important to recognise that these are only parts of a spectrum of possible relationships:

no relationship

relationship of liaison and information exchange only

relationship of active coordination and cooperation

funding relationship. Multilateral agency funds NGO but does not determine policy.

subcontractual relationship. Multilateral agency funds NGO to carry out an aspect of its programme; multilateral agency (and/or its government counterparts) determines policy.

NGOs value their independence and most are reluctant to operate in a completely subordinate relationship. A good deal depends on initiatives at a local level. In general these have worked reasonably well, with PRASAC managers adopting a pragmatic approach, if with some variations. However relations have been hampered, sometimes severely, by confusion over EC intentions, and by a rigid approach to subcontractual relationships in particular.

As with most funding relationships (which also involve a contract) the nature of a contract where an NGO is more directly involved in implementing a multilateral agency programme should be tailored to local realities. These should include the capacity of the NGO and related needs for training, support or in some cases more direct supervision. Certainly there is a need for agreed goals and outputs - though these need not be exclusively determined by the bi/multilateral agency - and for coherence (rather than identity) in objectives. In many cases arrangements granting the NGO comparative autonomy - as for example under many existing EC funding and co-financing agreements - might be perfectly appropriate.

NGO relationships with government

The great majority of NGOs surveyed believe in the importance of collaborating with the government, and in many cases of supporting government directly, though some work independently as a matter of policy, and many in practice have limited active collaboration beyond a degree of information exchange. (A wider sample than ours of NGOs in Cambodia would almost certainly increase the proportion of those who have little practical liaison with government).

From a government perspective NGOs are secondary players in the development arena. Not surprisingly, government focuses its attention and often limited resources on the major bilateral and multilateral donors. Consequently the collective NGO perspective is not widely heard.

The question of paying salary supplements to government staff led to some particularly revealing questionnaire answers and discussions. About half of our international NGO sample, and the majority of those who actively believed in working with government, pay such ‘supplements’, which almost invariably amounts to many times the salary of the employee, which is often less than $20 per month. Yet this policy was often admitted almost reluctantly - exemplified by more than one answer stating that agency policy was not to pay such supplements but that practice was to do so. Those who refuse to adopt such a policy do so on the grounds that it is unsustainable, and those who do pay supplements are often afraid that it may be.

This issue provides a good illustration of the difficulties of grafting widely accepted development practices onto unusual circumstances. Coherent assumptions about the future role of government are often lacking. This may be understandable but is nonetheless important. Political and economic constraints mean that, even under the more optimistic projections of reform (involving increasing salaries and cutting employment in the entire state sector) a government apparatus which is both functional and financially sustainable will be difficult to achieve in Cambodia. This is not to deny the importance of the state sector in promoting coherent development programmes. It does however seriously call into question the priority given to supporting this sector, particularly for NGOs. Much of the training currently being undertaken may involve skills transfer but may have limited or even negative impact on institution building, since those trained are either going to need almost indefinite external support or are going to leave government in search of alternative employment. This may not be a disaster, but does leave a major question mark over many initiatives aimed at ‘supporting government’. This of course does not only apply to NGOs, but since NGOs do not usually work in support of government, and are doing so in Cambodia mainly for historical reasons and because of the current limitations of the Cambodian NGO sector, there are certainly arguments in favour of maintaining the trend away from such direct support. This would not remove the need for other types of coordination with government, which is likely to increase.

Such developments will not necessarily make NGO relations with government easier. Villagers may well grant government and agencies associated with government greater legitimacy than NGOs, including LNGOs - though their perceptions may not correlate with practice. (This question is briefly considered below in connection with PRASAC’s relations with government.)

Management issues

Management issues are summarised in Section 8 and only a few points are emphasised here. NGO management capacities are very variable, relating primarily to the size and experience of the agency. For international NGOs it is important to emphasise that their constituencies, structures of accountability and senior management are outside the country, sometimes providing constraints on the ability of local representatives to respond flexibly to local circumstances. For many lack of clarity over policy issues can lead either to greater flexibility, or alternatively to lengthy debates over the merits of local initiatives proposed. However for most international NGOs national offices are given a reasonable amount of autonomy, though may not be in a position to provide adequate support at a regional level.

5. PRASAC

Origins

An account of the precise decision-making processes leading to the establishment of PERC and PRASAC would require access to information and documentation not available to the study. Moreover differing interpretations are available from within the EC. Nevertheless the outlines are reasonably clear from interviews and from the reports of identification missions.

In 1993 the European Commission along with almost all bilateral and multilateral agencies was looking for ways to support the incoming Cambodian government. Initially the plan was to build on the existing EC experience of working through NGOs and multilateral agencies, which had been primarily with returnees in the north and west of the country. The first identification missions focused on replacing these programmes with others working directly with government, though still largely in the same (northern and western) regions.

Early in 1994 the plans were changed, apparently as a result of sudden, and to some people unexpected, high-level interventions in Brussels. The focus of the aid, it was now decided, should be not only to support but to demonstrate the credibility of the new government, and to shift away from the refugee and returnee communities who had long been receiving Western aid. This needs to be understood in the context not only of the high hopes entertained as Cambodia emerged from its period of isolation, but of the power-sharing arrangements between the two principal political parties - the CPP and FUNCINPEC - which were fundamental to the new dispensation. These arrangements included the establishment of new ministries to help FUNCINPEC gain some control over a government apparatus that, under a single-party system, had effectively been run by the CPP for fifteen years. Support for this dispensation in the core regions of Cambodia was seen as particularly appropriate.

As far as can be established, the thinking behind PRASAC was to devise a programme which would reach as many people as possible within a comparatively short period of time, not only as an end in itself but to demonstrate that the new government could deliver benefits to rural communities better than its predecessor. The desire to reach as many communities as possible, combined with other influences pushing developmental agencies towards a ‘grassroots’, ‘village-level’ or ‘community-based’ approach, seems to have been decisive in the overall design of PRASAC. This approach was described as ‘rapid impact’, and later justified as being a ‘pre-development’ programme (and so not subject to normal developmental criteria).

This approach represents a contrast to that of most aid projects designed to achieve political objectives. Characteristically such projects are likely to be highly visible and prestigious, for example involving major public works. As a result they can be subject to criticism that they were designed to impress the government rather than benefit the people, least of all the rural poor. The EC can be credited with some originality in trying to combine a ‘community-based’ and a ‘rapid impact’ approach. Unfortunately however this is impossible to achieve in the time frames envisaged, and this should have been clear from the start.

Objectives and methodology

The financing agreement for PRASAC signed in September 1994 specified a 30-month programme in six provinces in the south and east of Cambodia: Kompong Cham and Kompong Chhnang (PRASAC I); Takeo and Kompong Speu (PRASAC II); and Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (PRASAC III). The project undertook to provide over 3000 wells, claiming a beneficiary rate of 40 families per well, as well as 450 village reservoirs (ponds). It also planned to establish about 1000 ‘village banks’ benefiting an estimated 60 families per bank. (Only much later was this figure revised to 300.) Irrigation schemes would cover 30,000 - 36,000 hectares, with an estimated beneficiary rate of one family per hectare. Microenterprise promotion would benefit 3,000 to 4,000 small entrepreneurs. Over 1,000 people, primarily government employees seconded to the project, would benefit from training, with institutional support listed as a specific objective. Overall beneficiaries were estimated at 150,000 families.

The agreement does not specify which parts of the Cambodian government are to take responsibility for implementing the project, nor how they are to liaise with the external consultancy firms charged with sharing this responsibility - though it does specify the number of expatriate staff (6 FOR each PRASAC, i.e. 18 in all) to be provided. In practice provincial government authorities, principally from the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, have been the most directly involved. In practice too - as must have been foreseen - practically all de facto management of PRASAC has devolved onto the expatriate consultants. At provincial level liaison between the consultants and government has been primarily via ‘mixed committees’ of the two government departments and PRASAC management, which generally appear to have worked quite well. Large numbers of government staff, generally the majority of relevant provincial departments, have received substantial salary supplements from PRASAC, and to a great extent have also come under PRASAC expatriate management. Formal counterpart systems have only been established to a very limited degree.

At a national level the EC established a small Technical Cooperation Office in Phnom Penh charged with overseeing EC development assistance, run by three (initially four) expatriate executive staff, only one of whom, in addition to the head of mission, had direct responsibility for the PRASAC programme. Liaison at national level was with a three-member committee drawn from the Agriculture and Rural Development Ministries - a system which may have had some advantages in terms of decentralisation, but amounted to a very limited structure for performing the significant tasks which had to be facilitated nationally.

Design and planning

Virtually everybody working with PRASAC, or monitoring its progress, now recognises that its planning was unrealistic. Fundamentally this results from an attempt to put a programme which, to succeed, must satisfy long term developmental criteria, into a ‘rapid implementation’ framework. Equally seriously the design had little detailed analysis of the capacities, constraints, and prospects of provincial and local government and society in Cambodia. Other significant actors whose work had the potential to complement PRASAC - chiefly local and international NGOs - received little consideration. Gender aspects did not receive the attention they deserve. The approach of the identification mission documents is strongly technocratic, despite proposing what amounts to a social and economic development programme. Discussion of assumptions, for example about possible political changes, or developments in local government, are largely absent.

In practice those charged with implementing the programme, particularly PRASAC’s provincial managers, have been involved in a process of modifying and adapting the plans to something more feasible given their constraints of personnel, equipment, and time. One perception was that it takes a year’s effort to prove that the plans and targets are fundamentally impossible, in an attempt to negotiate permission to pursue alternatives.

Most of the quantitative targets are proving to have been highly over-optimistic, especially those relating to credit and microenterprise (which have been greatly reduced). This is hardly surprising, since credit schemes require a suitable institutional framework, which needs to be set up with care, not to mention considerable consultation, coordination and training. Credit schemes are almost the opposite of something that can be set up quickly as part of a ‘rapid impact programme’. Water projects might appear to be more suitable for a ‘rapid impact’ approach, and certainly they present fewer obstacles than credit schemes. However successful village water schemes require adequate management and maintenance at local level, a fact recognised more fully by those charged with implementing the schemes than in the identification mission reports. Consequently the only way to attempt to reach targets has been to cut corners on social and local management aspects. The water programmes have been further hampered by very considerable delays in procurement of equipment, little of which had reached the provinces 17 months into the programme. The projects have managed to improvise quite successfully with locally hired equipment, and somewhat fortuitously, with equipment available from NGOs pulling out of infrastructural schemes.

Management issues

The overall management of the programme has run into very considerable problems, undoubtedly exacerbated by the overambitious nature of PRASAC. Detailed analysis of such problems, involving as they do decision-making processes in Bangkok and Brussels as well as Phnom Penh, is beyond the scope of this study. However it is worth pointing out that a programme of this size and scope clearly merits more extensive support than can be provided by a very small number of officials with a wide range of other responsibilities. In particular communication and feedback, notably between the provinces and Phnom Penh, and between Phnom Penh, Bangkok and Brussels, need to be more flexible, responsive and clear. The TCO also needs to give greater capacity and priority to communicating with others involved in development in their fields (government, bilaterals, multilaterals, NGOs). In the opinion of many there is a pressing need for upgrading the levels of support for development programmes from within DGI, which in this regard, even by the hardworking standards of the Commission, is greatly overstretched. One consequence is that important decisions are made by individuals without the degree of consultation desirable.

PRASAC’s credit and water schemes are considered in more detail in sections which follow below. The rest of this section deals in summary form with other significant aspects of the PRASAC programme

Sustainability

There are several problems relating to the sustainability of initiatives undertaken by PRASAC. The most immediate and serious is the absence of any commitment to continuing the programme or designing a follow-on to PRASAC after the end of the 30-month project period in June 1997. It would appear that the option of extending the programme for a further year finally came under review only following the internal evaluation of March/April 1996. Whilst this would be very welcome it would not be enough. The assumption that government structures will be able to sustain these programmes, particularly in credit and microenterprise, without continuing external financial and technical support, seems quite unjustified. Without a long-term commitment the chances of negating results that have been achieved is high. To this extent PRASAC is in a far weaker position than most NGOs, and on a far larger scale. It is very important that PRASAC is extended, and that the very problems it has faced will not become a reason for allowing it to collapse and its achievements to be lost.

Other aspects of sustainability are considered in the sections on credit and water below. Much greater clarity is required over the institutional framework PRASAC is attempting to promote and to which it is expecting to hand over, particularly though not only for credit schemes. Assumptions that the government will simply take over cannot be applied in the Cambodian context. Such a situation is not unique to Cambodia, nor should it have been difficult to predict.

Working through government

PRASAC works through government: this is quite central to its concep